After 36 years of family law practice, I pride myself on having a good idea of what I don’t know.
The good news is that I can reach out for the help needed to make sure the bases are covered when drafting a divorce settlement agreement. Matrimonial litigation has spawned a host of forensic specialities
The February 15, 2010 [sic] decision of Rockland County Supreme Court Justice Alfred J. Weiner in C.K. v. M.K., adds to what is shaping up to be a remarkable string of cases applying the 2010 temporary maintenance and counsel fee amendments to the Domestic Relations Law. The decision was published March 15
The way you phrase the credit is just as important as the amount.
Let’s assume that when the divorce action was filed, the parties’ marital residence was encumbered by a mortgage with a principal balance of $250,000.
Let’s further assume that while the divorce action is pending, the wife, only, makes all the mortgage payments.
The March 15, 2011 decision of Westchester County Supreme Court Justice Francesca E. Connolly in Margaret A. v. Shawn B., raises a number of questions and invites lessons to be learned. Here, the Court applied the recently-adopted temporary maintenance and counsel fee statutes to a recently-terminated substantial wage-earner.
The parties were married in June
Marital financial planning is vital for spouses dealing with advanced age and deteriorating health. Though not arising from an orchestrated plan, the February decision of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Matter of Donald L.L. (Miceli), supports that planning.
After almost 40 years of marriage, the wife in 2005 suffered a stroke that left
In a 3-2 decision, the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Culver v. Culver, affirmed that part of a Saratoga County Family Court decision of Judge Courtenay Hall which granted visitation to an incarcerated father with his 5-year old daughter.
The father, Christopher Culver, 35, a former Shenendehowa elementary school teacher, pleaded guilty in 2008
In its February decision in Fragin v. Fragin, the Second Department interpreted a 1995 separation agreement which survived the entry of the parties’ 1995 divorce judgment. Pursuant to that agreement, the ex-wife was obligated to contribute to the basic graduate school expenses of the parties’ unemancipated children. However, in fact and not surprisingly, at