March 2012

show your work 3.jpgShow your work.

Mistakes happen, and probably a lot more often than any of us matrimonial lawyers would care to admit.

We all make mistakes. I am happy to say that most mistakes are alleviated by collegial adversaries working together to put things right.

However, sometimes the spouse benefiting from the mistake in marital settlement agreement will not acknowledge that a mistake was made.

When that happens, the burdened party must ask the court to reform the agreement to correct the mistake. That party has a heavy burden.

The burden, however, becomes a lot easier to meet if the parties have shown their work.

Consider, the February 21, 2012 decision of Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine in Hackett v. Hackett. The parties had entered a marital settlement agreement in January, 2006. The parties’ marital estate was itemized in a schedule annexed to the agreement. The agreement expressly provided that the husband was to pay the wife $19,336.40, “in order to equalize the allocation of marital property so as to arrive in an equal division.”

Included among the parties’ property was their marital residence, a Brooklyn home valued at $465,000.00 against which there were two mortgages totaling $195,124.00. When listing the assets being received by the wife, the marital residence was included at a value equal to its net equity of $264,447.00. Including this amount for net equity, the wife was to receive $557,442.00 in assets. From this the wife was to be take on marital liabilities of $195,124.00. Thus, the wife was receiving assets net of liabilities of $382,318.00.

The problem was that these liabilities were the very same mortgages totaling $195,124.00 which were subtracted from the home’s appraised value to result in the equity value of $264,447.00 stated for the marital residence. The mortgages were double-counted. Moreover, there was another simple math error. Subtracting the $195,124.00 in mortgages from the $465,000.00 appraised value of the marital residence should have resulted in the wife being charged with receiving net equity of $269,876.00, not the $264,447.00 which was stated as the net equity value of the marital residence being received by the wife. Thus, the wife was under-charged $5,429.00, in addition to having benefited from the double-subtraction of the mortgages.

Instead, the wife should have been charged with receiving $562,871.00 in net assets (the originally stated $557,442.00, plus the $5,429.00 math error, without the second deduction for the mortgages already taken into account). The husband was properly charged under the agreement with receiving $400,990.00. Thus, the wife received $161,881.00 more than the husband. In order to equalize the division of assets, the wife would have to pay to the husband one half of this amount, or $80,940.50. Here, the agreement as originally drafted with its mistakes ended up with the husband paying the wife $19,336.00. To correct the error, the wife would have to repay this $19,336.00, and on top of that pay the husband $80,940.50, for a total of $100,276.50.

Justice Sunshine provided the husband relief, reforming the agreement to require the wife to make the requested payment of $100,276.50. To do so, the court rejected the recommendation of the Referee to home the matter was referred to “hear and report.”Continue Reading Correcting a Mistake in a Divorce Settlement Agreement

“square peg2.jpgThere is a gap in New York’s child support statutes. They do not contemplate a custodial parent paying support to a non-custodial parent.

The Family Court Act does declare that both parents are chargeable with the support of their children. Moreover, the Family Court Act does not make a distinction between the “custodial” and “non–custodial” parents when declaring that parents of a child under the age of 21 years ,“if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, shall be required to pay for child support a fair and reasonable sum as the court may determine.” F.C.A. §413(1)(a). (The Domestic Relations Law contains no such preamble to its section providing for an award of child support within matrimonial actions.)D.R.L. §240(1-b).

However, those same Family Court Act and the Domestic Relations Law provisions provide that awards of child support “shall″ be made “pursuant to the provisions” of those subdivisions. The subdivisions, then, set out the presumptive formula to determine awards of child support. The presumptive formula is to be varied only in the event the court finds, based upon factors specified, that the “non-custodial parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate.” In all events, the statutes only contemplate support being paid by the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent.

Although the statutes carefully define many of the terms used, “non-custodial parent” is never defined. Thus, in ever-increasing scenarios, the courts have had to decide who is the “non-custodial.”

In Bast v. Rossoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 675 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1998), the Court of Appeals recognized that in most instances, the court can determine the custodial parent by identifying which parent has physical custody of the child for a majority of the time. In cases where the child’s time was divided approximately equally between the parents, the more-monied parent has been deemed the non-custodial parent because such a rule maximizes the benefits realized by the child at both homes. Baraby v. Baraby, 250 A.D.2d 201, 681 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3rd Dept. 1998).

Nonetheless, the best interests of a child may require an award of child support from the custodial parent to the non-custodial parent.

Take, for example, New York County Supreme Court Justice Ellen Gesmer’s February 29, 2012 decision in M.R. v. A. D. In that case, the court denied a father’s motion for summary judgment dismissing a mother’s claim for child support. In a painstaking decisionmade earlier in the case, Justice Gesmer (32 Misc.3d 512, 928 N.Y.S.2d 429) awarded the parents “parallel custody” of their 6-year old son with significant learning disabilities. After a through review of the evidence, and as neither parent was sufficiently better than other parent to warrant an award of sole custody, Justice Gesmer gave the father primary custody during school year, and gave the more permissive and disorganized mother primary custody during summer and other school breaks.Continue Reading Awarding Child Support to the "Non-Custodial" Parent

College Fund 4.jpgA recent decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department, appears to unduly expand the basis upon which a parent may be obligated to contribute to the college education expenses of a child beyond age 21.

Generally, a parent’s obligation to support a child terminates when the child reaches age 21. That general rule, of course, may be varied by the parents themselves by agreement.

Indeed, it is quite common to extend by agreement a parent’s support obligation, beyond the date on which a child turns  21, in a written separation agreement or divorce action stipulation of settlement, whether written or entered in open court. Such agreements often have an “emancipation” clause which defines the circumstances under which a child will be deemed emancipated for the purposes of the parent’s support obligation to a time either before or after child reaches age 21. Again, it is common to delay emancipation until the child turns 22 or thereafter, if the child is enrolled on a full-time basis in an accredited college, university or other post-high school educational program. If properly entered, such agreements are routinely incorporated into divorce judgments or other support orders. They are enforceable in both Supreme and Family Courts.

In its January, 2012 decision in Shapiro v. Shapiro, the Third Department affirmed a divorce judgment which, in part, obligated a father to contribute his pro rata share of college expenses until each child reaches the age of 22.

The court acknowledged that absent an agreement extending the obligation, a parent is not legally obligated to pay college costs for a child that has reached the age of 21. However, the court found that such an agreement could be inferred from statements which did not expressly exclude post-21 expenses from a statement agreeing to contribute to college. The sole basis of the Third Department’s decision was as follows:

Plaintiff acknowledged in his testimony that he had, in fact, agreed to pay part of the children’s college education costs, there was no indication that he intended to limit his payments to the children’s first three years in college, and proof at trial established that funds had been previously set up to assist in such costs. Under these circumstances, it was not error for Supreme Court to direct plaintiff to pay a portion of the children’s college costs until they reach the age of 22.

Continue Reading Court Extends Parent's Obligation to Pay College Expenses Beyond Child's 21st Birthday