Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine

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“Estoppel” is the principle that precludes a person from asserting something contrary to that inconsistent with a previous statement, position or ruling. Two decisions last month bringing the principal and to focus.

First, the June 4, 2014 decision  of Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine in Zito v. Zito primarily resolved the wife’s motion for temporary relief in a divorce action commenced by the husband on June 7, 2011. The parties had been married 10 years before that, and had a daughter (then 5) and a son (then 3).

The husband works in the family-owned Smiling Pizzeria. The wife, although a licensed pharmacist, alleged that she had been a full-time homemaker since the children were born. Those children attend private school and participate in a number of organized activities.

However, in addition to the wife’s motion for temporary relief, Smiling Pizzeria, itself, had moved to be allowed to intervene in the divorce action. The pizzeria wanted to establish that it was owned only by the husband’s father; that the husband had no ownership interest. Without an ownership interest of the husband, it was argued, it could not be subject to equitable distribution.Continue Reading Being Bound by Statements in Tax Returns and Court Papers

Two decisions this past month involved joint custody awards despite antagonism between the parents and contested custody proceedings.

In Prohaszka v. Prohaszka, Supreme Court Putnam County Justice Francis A. Nicolai had awarded the divorcing parties joint legal custody of the parties’ children, with the mother having primary physical custody and final decision-making authority. In its February 6, 2013 decision on appeal, the Second Department modified that order to add a provision directing the mother to consult with the father regarding any issues involving the children’s health, medical care, education, religion, and general welfare prior to exercising her final decision-making authority for the children, but otherwise affirmed Justice Nicolai’s order.

Although the antagonism between the parties was evident to the appellate court, it was also apparent that both parties generally behaved appropriately with their children, that they could make parenting decisions together, and that the children were attached to both parents. Under those circumstances, there was a sound and substantial basis in the record for Justice Nicolai to have found that the best interests of the children would be served by awarding the parties joint custody. Similarly, the trial record also supported the determination that primary physical custody should be with the mother and that she should have final decision-making authority.

The court, however, should have directed the plaintiff to consult with the defendant regarding any issues involving the children’s health, medical care, education, religion, and general welfare prior to exercising her final decision-making authority.

In his January 8, 2013 decision in Scott M. v. Ilona M., Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine awarded the parties joint custody of their son; each parent having access alternating on a weekly basis.

Justice Sunshine did note that a significant factor in determining custody was whether the heated custody dispute, itself, indicated that an award of joint custody would be ineffective. Justice Sunshine cited to the Court of Appeals decision in Braiman v. Braiman, (44 N.Y.2d 584), which rejected joint or shared custody where the parties are in bitter conflict and do not agree to such an arrangement. That decision concluded:

Joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion. As a court ordered arrangement imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos.

[Question: If the children live primarily with one parent and that parent has final decision-making authority, what does “joint custody” mean? Is it merely a psychological benefit for the parent and the child? Does it entitle the non-primary custodian to make decisions in emergency situations when the other parent is not available? Braiman, itself, noted that “joint”, or, as it is sometimes called “divided”, custody reposes in both parents a shared responsibility for and control of a child’s upbringing. In Bast v. Rossoff, 167 Misc.2d 749, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1995), affd, 239 A.D.2d 106 (1st Dept 1997), affd as mod and remanded, 91 N.Y.2d 723 (1998), it was stated “In New York the term ‘joint custody’ generally is used to refer only to joint legal custody, or joint decision making.”]Continue Reading Ordering Joint Custody in Contested Divorce Custody Proceedings

Islam symbol.jpgIt seems that every decision after trial rendered by Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine is a divorce law treatise. His July 4, 2012 decision in Mojdeh M. v. Jamshid A. is no exception.

In addition to issues of property division, spousal maintenance for the husband, child support, and insurance, Justice Sunshine also…

Within weeks after entering a temporary support stipulation, the husband in a Kings County divorce action, resigned from his employment as a police officer with the New York City Police Department (NYPD). He moved to Georgia and entered the police academy as an entry-level officer at $38,000.00 per year, a more than 50% reduction of…

show your work 3.jpgShow your work.

Mistakes happen, and probably a lot more often than any of us matrimonial lawyers would care to admit.

We all make mistakes. I am happy to say that most mistakes are alleviated by collegial adversaries working together to put things right.

However, sometimes the spouse benefiting from the mistake in marital settlement agreement will not acknowledge that a mistake was made.

When that happens, the burdened party must ask the court to reform the agreement to correct the mistake. That party has a heavy burden.

The burden, however, becomes a lot easier to meet if the parties have shown their work.

Consider, the February 21, 2012 decision of Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine in Hackett v. Hackett. The parties had entered a marital settlement agreement in January, 2006. The parties’ marital estate was itemized in a schedule annexed to the agreement. The agreement expressly provided that the husband was to pay the wife $19,336.40, “in order to equalize the allocation of marital property so as to arrive in an equal division.”

Included among the parties’ property was their marital residence, a Brooklyn home valued at $465,000.00 against which there were two mortgages totaling $195,124.00. When listing the assets being received by the wife, the marital residence was included at a value equal to its net equity of $264,447.00. Including this amount for net equity, the wife was to receive $557,442.00 in assets. From this the wife was to be take on marital liabilities of $195,124.00. Thus, the wife was receiving assets net of liabilities of $382,318.00.

The problem was that these liabilities were the very same mortgages totaling $195,124.00 which were subtracted from the home’s appraised value to result in the equity value of $264,447.00 stated for the marital residence. The mortgages were double-counted. Moreover, there was another simple math error. Subtracting the $195,124.00 in mortgages from the $465,000.00 appraised value of the marital residence should have resulted in the wife being charged with receiving net equity of $269,876.00, not the $264,447.00 which was stated as the net equity value of the marital residence being received by the wife. Thus, the wife was under-charged $5,429.00, in addition to having benefited from the double-subtraction of the mortgages.

Instead, the wife should have been charged with receiving $562,871.00 in net assets (the originally stated $557,442.00, plus the $5,429.00 math error, without the second deduction for the mortgages already taken into account). The husband was properly charged under the agreement with receiving $400,990.00. Thus, the wife received $161,881.00 more than the husband. In order to equalize the division of assets, the wife would have to pay to the husband one half of this amount, or $80,940.50. Here, the agreement as originally drafted with its mistakes ended up with the husband paying the wife $19,336.00. To correct the error, the wife would have to repay this $19,336.00, and on top of that pay the husband $80,940.50, for a total of $100,276.50.

Justice Sunshine provided the husband relief, reforming the agreement to require the wife to make the requested payment of $100,276.50. To do so, the court rejected the recommendation of the Referee to home the matter was referred to “hear and report.”Continue Reading Correcting a Mistake in a Divorce Settlement Agreement

Sad child torn picture.jpgIn an effort to help parents in high-conflict decision-making disputes, New York courts are now appointing “Parenting Coordinators.”

Professor Andrew Schepard of the Hofstra University School of Law in his  article, “Parenting Coordinator for High Conflict Parent” N.Y.L.J., 5/8/03, p. 3 col. 1, explained the role of Parenting Coordinator as “a combination educator, mediator and sometimes-therapist who helps parents develop conflict-management skills and decides disputes if they cannot. . . . [B]y supervising parenting and resolving conflict, a Parenting Coordinator helps high-conflict parents develop a tolerable working relationship (usually parallel as opposed to cooperative parenting) for the benefit of their children.”

In her 2007 article “Working with Parenting Coordinators” in the Summer, 2007 issue of the Family Advocate, the publication of the American Bar Association’s Section of Family Law, Eve Orlow, Ph.D., noted that a Parenting Coordinator mixes counseling and parent education with mediation and arbitration.

New York’s 8th Judicial District (the extreme west) has formalized the appointment process. Its court rules note:

Parenting coordination is a child-focused alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process in which a mental health or legal professional with mediation training and experience assists high conflict parents to implement their parenting plan by facilitating the resolution of their disputes in a timely manner, educating parenting about children’s needs. With prior approval of the parties and the court, the PC may make decisions within the scope of the court order or appointment contract.

The overall objective of parenting coordination is to assist parents in high conflict to implement their parenting plan, to monitor compliance with the details of the plan, to resolve conflicts regarding their children and the parenting plan in a timely manner, and to protect and sustain safe, healthy and meaningful parent-child relationships. Parenting coordination is a quasi-legal, mental health, alternative dispute resolution process that combines assessment, education, case management, conflict management and, upon consent, sometimes decision making functions.

New York courts seem to favor therapeutic or forensic evaluation backgrounds, rather than mediation skills and experience. Moreover, as Parenting Coordinators in New York are without final decision-making power, they may simply add another layer to the judicial process; in some instances only fueling the bitterness of one or both parents.

New York’s judiciary securely guards its exclusive power to make custody and visitation decisions.  Thus, in its October, 2011 decision in Silbowitz v. Silbowitz, the Appellate Division, Second Department reminded us that:

Although a court may properly appoint a Parenting Coordinator to mediate between parties and oversee the implementation of their court-ordered parenting plan, a court may not delegate to a Parenting Coordinator the authority to resolve issues affecting the best interests of the children.

Continue Reading Are Parenting Coordinators Too Little, Too Late in Custody and Visitation Disputes?