It is common for divorce settlements and custody agreements to contain “relocation clauses.” These provisions spell out the radius within which the residential custodian will be able to move without first seeking judicial approval. It is a proper subject of agreement between parents. It will almost always be honored, although such a provision can never be binding upon a court’s determination of what is in the best interests of a child.

Such a clause might read:

The parents have established their custody and visitation arrangement to reflect what they believe constitutes the best arrangements to meet their child’s needs to have a continuing and close relationship with both parties. The parties recognize that an arrangement that provided for less contact between the child and each of the parties would not be in the child’s best interests. Based upon the foregoing, the residential custodial parent agrees that prior to the emancipation of the child, he/she will not establish a domicile with the child at any point beyond ____________ miles of _______________.

That distance is often referred to as the “radius.” Relocation clauses must be careful to specify whether the radius is in road miles or “as the crow flies” (radial miles).

In actuality, the concept is one of time, not distance. A parenting schedule is constructed assuming that it will take a certain amount of time for the child to be transported from the residence of the physical custodian to that of the other parent. The parents’ agreement should contemplate the distance between homes as it may relate to dropping a child off at school on a Monday morning, allowing for mid-week visits, etc. Thus, a radius clause that allows for 50 road miles near the Thruway in upstate New York contemplates something very different than 50 road miles on Long Island. The latter trip might take twice as long.

Continue Reading Relocation Clauses Must Specify Radial or Road Mileage

In five cases decided May 1, 2013, the Second Department continued to voice its concern when parents just don’t get along. Again, the court considered joint custody, hampering the child’s relationship with the other parent, private interviews of children by the judge, contempt for violations of visitation orders, and whether a non-parent may be granted custody over a surviving parent.

In Wright v. Kaura, the Second Department reversed a joint legal custody award to grant sole legal custody to a mother.  The appellate court noted that joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion.

Here, joint legal custody was inappropriate as the parties demonstrated an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child. The record was replete with examples of hostility and antagonism between the parties, indicating that they were unable to put aside their differences for the good of the child. Thus, Acting Westchester Family Court Judge Thomas R. Daly erred when awarding the parties joint legal custody of their child.

In Lawlor v. Eder, the Second Department held that a father’s refusal to encourage and foster meaningful contact between the child and the mother was the basis to award residential  custody to the mother, although the parents shared joint legal custody.

A custodial parent’s interference with the relationship between a child and the noncustodial parent is deemed an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as custodial parent.

Continue Reading Custody Issues Considered in Five Second Department Cases Decided May 1st