The Child Support Standards Act authorizes parents to agree to a child support obligation that deviates from the presumptive formula provided in that statute. However, if they are going to deviate from the formula, the parents must state what the obligation would have been if the formula were to be applied, and the reasons why the parties have agreed to deviate.

In its September 26, 2018 decision in Fasano v. Fasano, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that if one of those reasons no longer applies, such is a “substantial change in circumstances” warranting a new child support determination.

The parties were married in 1993 and have two children together. In October, 2012, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement of a prior divorce action after which that action was discontinued.

That stipulation provided that although the husband’s monthly child support obligation using the C.S.S.A. calculation would be $1,994.45 on the first $130,000.00 of combined parental income (then, the “cap”) and $2,575.61 on the total combined parental income, the parties had agreed that the husband’s monthly child support obligation would be $1,500.00. The stipulation also provided that there would be no “add-ons” or “additional health costs” added to these child support payments, even though the C.S.S.A. generally provides that each parent’s share of unreimbursed health care expenses is to be prorated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income.

The stipulation contained an explanation that the deviation from the C.S.S.A. calculation was necessary “to allow the [husband] to retain the marital residence as a place for the children to be with him when they are together” and had “been agreed by the parties to be in the best interests of the children to provide them continuity and stability in their living and educational environments.”Continue Reading A Child Support Redetermination Is Warranted If a Stated Reason Parties Deviated From CSSA No Longer Applies

In its October 22, 2014 decision, the Appellate Division Second Department in Ebel v. Ebel  upheld an open-court divorce settlement stipulation against the attack of the wife.

In his June, 2012 determination of the lower court, then Supreme Court Suffolk County Justice Hector D. LaSalle (now himself an Associate Justice on the Appellate Division Second Department) had rejected the argument of the wife that her emotional state prevented her from entering that May, 2011 settlement stipulation knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.

On appeal, the Second Department first noted that the wife’s contention that the terms of the parties’ stipulation of settlement were unconscionable was not properly raised on appeal, as it was not raised at the trial level.

The wife’s additional contention on appeal that the stipulation should have been vacated because it did not address, and she did not waive her claims regarding, certain financial issues was also found to be without without merit.

The Second Department noted that stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and are not lightly cast aside, particularly when the parties are represented by attorneys.

Where, as here, the record demonstrates that the parties validly entered into a comprehensive open-court stipulation by which the plaintiff knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to be bound, the agreement will not be set aside.

Here, the terms of the parties’ agreement, including issues of financial support and equitable distribution of the marital residence, were placed on the record in what the Justice LaSalle characterized as a “global stipulation of settlement.” Moreover, the wife’s counsel affirmatively waived all other equitable distribution matters and withdrew all outstanding requests for relief.Continue Reading Attacking Open-Court Divorce Stipulations: Is There a Double Standard?