familyUnder what circumstances may a step-parent’s income and assets be considered by a court when deciding whether awarding the formula amount of support would be unjust or inappropriate? When may a court deviate from the formula because of a parent’s obligation to support the children of another relationship?

These were the issues discussed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its April 5, 2017 decision in Hall v. Pancho.

The parties, who were never married, had one child in common, age 11. After a hearing to determine the amount of the father’s modified child support obligation, Nassau County Family Court Support Magistrate Elizabeth A. Bloom found that were the formula set forth in the Child Support Standards Act (the CSSA) to be applied, the father’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation would have been biweekly payments in the sum of $839.76. The father argued that the full formula should not be awarded because of his need to support the children of his marriage. Magistrate Bloom apparently agreed, deviating downward from the CSSA formula and determining the father’s child support obligation would be $425.00 biweekly. The mother filed objections to the Support Magistrate’s order, which were subsequently denied by Family Court Judge Thomas A. Rademaker. The mother appealed.

Continue Reading Considering a Step-Parent’s Income and Assets on Child Support Awards

Two people fighting over money / business transaction / giving & taking money / shopping / divorce / power struggle / etc.

A decision last week of the Appellate Division, Second Department, points out that the rules concerning the recovery of overpayments of child support may not always be logical, and in the end may not best benefit the children the support was intended to benefit.

The parties in McGovern v. McGovern had executed a stipulation in 2007 that was incorporated but not merged into their judgment of divorce. The stipulation required the father to pay the mother child support each month for the parties’ two children. That obligation was to continue until, as is here relevant, one of the children began attending a residential college, at which point the child support obligation would be reduced. The stipulation also required the father to pay 60% of the children’s educational expenses, but allowed him to deduct any room and board payments which he made from his child support obligation.

In February 2014, the father filed a petition with the Westchester County Family Court seeking a downward modification of his child support obligation on the ground that the older child had started college in September 2011. The father also alleged that from September 2011 to February 2014, he overpaid child support because the Support Collection Unit failed to reduce his child support payments after the oldest child started college. As a result, the father requested an overpayment credit towards his child support obligation.

Continue Reading Recoupment of Child Support Overpayments From Add-on Expenses (College); Not Future Support

Family 2In his March 8, 2017 decision in Dawn M. v. Michael M., Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice H. Patrick Leis III granted a wife “tri-custody” of her husband’s ten-year-old biological son with the wife’s paramour.

Dawn and Michael M. were married in 1994. After unsuccessful attempts to have a child, the couple attempted artificially insemination. Those efforts also failed.

In 2001, the wife met Audria and they became close friends. Audria and her boyfriend moved into an apartment downstairs from Dawn and Michael. When Audria’s boyfriend moved out, Audria moved upstairs. In 2004, the wife, husband and Audria began to engage in intimate relations.

As time went on, Audria, Dawn and Michael began to consider themselves a “family” and decided to have a child together. After the fertility doctor refused to artificially inseminate Audria because she was not married to Michael, the trio decided to conceive a child naturally by Michael and Audria engaging in unprotected sexual relations, and then, to all raise the child together as parents.

A son, J.M., was born to Audria in January, 2007. For more than 18 months, the three “parents” continued to live together. The child was taught that he had two mothers. When the relationship between the husband and the wife became strained, Audria and the wife moved out of the marital residence with the child.

Continue Reading Wife Awarded “Tri-Custody” of Son of Her Husband and His and Her Paramour

Zipped LipsThe judgment of divorce awarded by Orange County Supreme Court Justice Paul I. Marx, in Gafycz v. Gafycz, granted the wife, among other relief, 100% of two parcels of marital real property, 25% of properties located in Port Jervis, and $1,000 per month in nondurational (permanent) spousal support. The husband appealed.

In its March 1, 2017 decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed. It held that Justice Marx providently exercised his discretion when awarding the wife 100% of the marital properties located in Chester and Pond Eddy. The appellate court noted, “The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of marital property . . . and unless it can be shown that the court improvidently exercised that discretion, its determination should not be disturbed.”

In this case, Justice Marx had considered that the husband secreted assets, willfully failed to comply with court orders, and was deliberately evasive in his testimony in fashioning its equitable distribution award of the marital property.

Continue Reading Division of Assets Adjusted Due To Evasiveness of Husband

stamp "Evidence"It is understandable that parents who “cannot afford” a lawyer will attempt to represent themselves in Family Court child support proceedings. Moreover, the Family Court is remarkably able to apply the law and make its determinations of issues presented by unrepresented parties. However, the fact that a party does not have a lawyer does not excuse following the rules nor presenting the proof needed by the Court to make those determinations.

Take the recent child support decision in Matter of Carol A.S. v. Mark H. There, the mother commenced a proceeding against a father in Kings County Family Court in order to establish his paternity of a college-attending daughter (under 21) and to provide support for the child. (A DNA test established was administered that established the father’s paternity.)

The decision of Judge Xavier E. Vargas went to pains to discuss the history of the case, noting the various adjournments that were granted in order to allow both parents the opportunity to gather the documentation the court needed for each party to establish his or her positions. The mother wanted the father to reimburse her for the college expenses paid for the daughter. The father claimed he regularly had been giving the daughter $600 per month by depositing that sum directly to the daughter’s account. He wanted credit for making those payments.

Continue Reading Representing Yourself In Child Support Proceedings Has Its Risks

A court gavel on 100 bills - legal concept

In its December 30, 2016 decision in Peddycoart v. MacKay, the Second Department reduced a father’s obligation to pay child support from $542 to $378 per week by holding that the Family Court should not have imposed the support obligation on the parents’ income in excess of the C.S.S.A. “statutory cap” (then $141,000).

The parties, who were never married, had one daughter together, born in 2009. The father signed an acknowledgment of paternity less than nine days after the child was born. The parties did not have an order of child support for approximately six years. In 2015, the mother filed a petition against the father seeking an award of child support. After a hearing, Support Magistrate Barbara Lynaugh determined that the mother had income of $36,112 and that the father had income of $166,096, for combined parental income of $202,208, exceeding the cap by $61,208.

Continue Reading Imposing Child Support on Income Over Cap Not Warranted

Close up of hebrew and english Bible.

Absent agreement of both parents, neither parent sharing joint legal custody nay cause or allow the children to receive any religious sacrament or education. So held Supreme Court Nassau County Justice Jeffrey A. Goodstein in his January 13, 2017 decision in DK v. AK.

The parties had two children together (currently ages 6 and 5). The parties were divorced in 2016 by a judgment which incorporated, but did not merge, the terms of their 2015 Stipulation of Settlement. Pursuant to the Stipulation, the parties shared joint legal custody of the children, with the mother having residential custody. Here, the father had brought this post-judgment motion for an order prohibiting the mother from causing or allowing the children to be baptized, or to receive any religious sacrament, or a religious education in any faith other than Judaism, without his written consent.

The father argued that there had been no issue with regard to the parties’ joint custodial relationship until the mother’s decision to baptize the children. The father further argued that the children were raised in the Jewish faith, as was allegedly agreed upon by the parties prior to their engagement. The mother acknowledged that the parties’ son had a traditional Bris, performed by a Mohel (performer of ritual circumcisions). The mother also acknowledged that the parties had a naming ceremony for their daughter although she contended that it was the paternal grandfather who wanted the baby naming and scheduled it, so she took over planning it.

The father further alleged that prior to their separation, the parties “actively” raised the children in the Jewish faith by celebrating the Jewish holidays. He contended that the children now accompany him to synagogue when he attends. Further, he set forth that a few months ago, the children started attending Hebrew school, with the mother’s consent.

The parties recently attended a mediation session when the mother wanted to bring the children to Catholic events. As reported by the parties, the mediator took the position that the children could be raised as both Jewish and Catholic, to which the father strongly disagreed. Shortly after the mediation session, the mother notified the father of her intent to baptize the children and invited him to attend the ceremony. The father further argued that a baptism is tantamount to changing the children’s religion without his consent.

Continue Reading No Religious Sacraments To Be Administered To Children, Absent Consent of Both Joint Custodial Parents

Ketuba- is a special type of Jewish prenuptial agreement. It is considered an integral part of a traditional Jewish marriage, and outlines the rights and responsibilities of the groom, in relation to the bride. Nevertheless, there is no agreement in modern times as to the monetary worth of the ketubah, and in practice it is never enforced

Imposing a higher maintenance obligation on an Orthodox Jewish husband who refused to give his wife a religious divorce (“Get”) would violate constitutional protections. So held Orange County Acting Supreme Court Justice Catherine M. Bartlett in the January 13, 2017 decision in Masri v. Masri.

The parties married in 2002, separated in 2007 and have lived separate and apart since that time. They have 14 and 11 year-old children, the older one being disabled. The wife commenced the present action for a no-fault divorce March 8, 2016.

Since the separation, the wife has attempted without success to secure from the husband a “Get”, which she requires under Jewish law in order for her to remarry. The husband refused to participate in proceedings in 2012 before a Rabbinical Court, asserting that the wife had waived her right to rabbinical arbitration by previously going to a secular court (the divorce judgment in which had been vacated). The Rabbinical Court advised the husband that he had no power to decide the issue of the wife’s alleged waiver on his own, and was required to arbitrate that issue before the Rabbinical Court. The husband refused to comply, whereupon the Rabbinical Court declared him to be a “Rabbinical Court evader.”

Continue Reading Unconstitutional to Consider Husband’s Refusal to Give Religious Divorce (Get) When Granting Support

We are not moving croppedFor the second time this month, the Second Department prevented a wife from relocating with the children “locally” when the move would have limited the husband’s substantial involvement in the children’s daily lives. In its January 18, 2017 decision in Lipari v. Lipari, the appellate court affirmed the prohibition of a mother’s proposed relocation from Valley Cottage, in Rockland County, to Rye, in Westchester County, a distance of 17 miles. Only a week earlier, in DeFilippis v. DeFilippis, the Second Department prevented a wife from relocating from Floral Park to East Hampton [last week’s blog post].

In Lipari, under the parties’ divorce settlement the parties shared joint legal custody of their two children, with the mother having primary residential custody. The father had overnight visitation on alternating weekends and certain overnight visitation with the children during each week and during certain school breaks and holidays. With the mother remaining in the Valley Cottage marital residence, the father rented a two-bedroom condominium approximately five minutes away.

Continue Reading Mother Cannot Relocate With Children 17 Miles From Valley Cottage to Rye

We are not moving croppedIn its January 11, 2017 decision in DeFilippis v. DeFilippis, the Appellate Division, Second Department, prevented a wife from relocating with the children from Floral Park to East Hampton, a move that would have curtailed the husband’s involvement in the children’s daily lives, school, and extracurricular activities.

The wife commenced this action for divorce. While the action was pending, the wife sought to relocate. The wife claimed that the move would enhance the children’s lives economically, emotionally, and educationally.

The husband opposed the relocation, contending that if the children moved to East Hampton he would be unable to remain involved in their daily lives, school, or extracurricular activities, as he would see them only on the weekends.

Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Hope Schwartz Zimmerman granted the wife’s relocation motion, and the husband appealed. The Second Department reversed (the appellate court had stayed the relocation order pending the appeal).

Continue Reading Mother Denied Relocation With Children From Floral Park to East Hampton