In its March 21, 2018 decision in Elkins v. Mizrahi, the Appellate Division, Second Department, struck a credit issued at the time a father’s new child support obligation was established. That determination tacitly affirmed the new obligation, after a lower court found that a prior waiver of future child support, to which both parties had stipulated, violated public policy. However, the same lower court had previously discharged prior arrears and terminated the father’s support obligation in the order entered that had incorporated that prior stipulation of the parties.

The parties, who have three children together, were divorced in March 2008. In 2014, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby they agreed, inter alia, that the father would pay the mother a lump sum of $50,000.00 in full satisfaction of his accrued child support arrears, which, at that time, exceeded $70,000.00, and that the father’s child support obligation would be terminated going forward. The mother received the $50,000.00 payment on November 21, 2014.

In an order dated January 29, 2015, Nassau County Family Court Judge Ellen R. Greenberg gave effect to the stipulation, terminated the father’s future child support obligation, and directed that the father’s remaining child support arrears of $21,385.46 be deemed satisfied.


Continue Reading Waiver of Future Child Support Voided, But Miscalculated Credit Struck

In its July 5, 2017 decision in Decillis v. Decillis, the Appellate Division, Second Department, recognized, but significantly reduced a credit against a formula child support obligation for the father’s extraordinary visitation travel expenses.

The parties were the parents of a child born in 2003. The mother filed a petition for child support. After imputing annual income of $43,000 to the mother, Suffolk County Family Court Support Magistrate Kathryn L. Coward determined that the father’s formula basic child support obligation would be $572 biweekly (grosses up to income of $94,729 per year). However, after gaving the father a $168 biweekly credit to compensate him for the “extraordinary” expenses associated with visitation, the Magistrate directed him to pay child support in the sum of $404 biweekly.

The Second Department first found that the Support Magistrate properly imputed $43,000 of income to the mother based upon her prior income, her choice to engage in only part-time employment, and her current living arrangement, in which she did not pay rent or related housing expenses.

However, the appellate court found that the Support Magistrate improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding the father a $168 credit against his child support obligation $168 for the “extraordinary” expenses associated with visitation, including $67 for travel expenses.


Continue Reading Travel Expenses Credit Against Child Support Reduced on Appeal

In a recent decision of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Holeck v. Beyel, 145 A.D.3d 1600, 43 N.Y.S.2d 816, the court upheld a direction to a disabled father (the non-custodial parent) to apply to the Social Security Administration to change representative payee of the children’s social security disability (SSD) benefits from the father to the custodial mother. The appellate court also upheld the denial of the father’s request for a reduction in his support obligation by virtue of his loss of the SSD benefits for the children.

Generally, when a disabled parent is qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the children may also qualify to receive benefits on the disabled parent’s work-record. Eligible children can be a biological, adopted or stepchildren. Normally, benefits stop when the child reaches age 18 unless they are disabled. However, if the child at age 18 is still a full-time student at a secondary (or elementary) school, benefits will continue until the child graduates or until two months after the child becomes age 19, whichever is first.


Continue Reading Child Support and Social Security Disability Payments Received for the Children’s Benefit

stamp "Evidence"It is understandable that parents who “cannot afford” a lawyer will attempt to represent themselves in Family Court child support proceedings. Moreover, the Family Court is remarkably able to apply the law and make its determinations of issues presented by unrepresented parties. However, the fact that a party does not have a lawyer does not excuse following the rules nor presenting the proof needed by the Court to make those determinations.

Take the recent child support decision in Matter of Carol A.S. v. Mark H. There, the mother commenced a proceeding against a father in Kings County Family Court in order to establish his paternity of a college-attending daughter (under 21) and to provide support for the child. (A DNA test established was administered that established the father’s paternity.)

The decision of Judge Xavier E. Vargas went to pains to discuss the history of the case, noting the various adjournments that were granted in order to allow both parents the opportunity to gather the documentation the court needed for each party to establish his or her positions. The mother wanted the father to reimburse her for the college expenses paid for the daughter. The father claimed he regularly had been giving the daughter $600 per month by depositing that sum directly to the daughter’s account. He wanted credit for making those payments.


Continue Reading Representing Yourself In Child Support Proceedings Has Its Risks

Focused man paying his bills in the living room

The filing of a divorce summons commences the action and terminates the marital economic partnership. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Mesholam v. Mesholam, 11 N.Y.3d 24, 27, 862 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2008), that partnership is to be considered dissolved when a divorce action is commenced.

Retroactive to the first request for support, often contained in the divorce summons, itself, the trial court has the power to order both spousal and child support. It can also determine the parties’ relative responsibilities for marital residence carrying charges and other expenses.

In light of the trial court’s power to determine the parties’ rights and obligations for the period the divorce action is pending, what should be done if a party’s uses marital assets to pay living expenses accruing after the divorce action is commenced.

In its June 30, 2016 decision in Carvalho v. Carvalho, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that marital assets may be used while a divorce action is pending to pay for legitimate household and living expenses without needing to later offset the division of those assets. Moreover, the burden is on the non-spending party to prove that the marital assets were not used for such “legitimate” purposes.


Continue Reading Charging a Party for Spending Marital Assets During the Divorce Action

The ever-changing landscape of Equitable Distribution case law makes it difficult, if not impossible, to rely on the “law.” A parent cannot (or rather, should not) make a gift to a married child without bringing the lawyers into it.

Take the April, 2016 decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department in Mistretta v. Mistretta. There, the parties had been married in 1991. During their marriage they lived in a home, at first owned by the husband’s mother, and deeded to the husband in 1996.

At the trial of this 2010 divorce action, the husband claimed that the residence was a gift from his mother, and therefore constituted separate property. However, he acknowledged that for many years, he paid his mother $500 per month “rent” (the opinion does not state whether rent was paid after the property was deeded to the husband). The husband and his sister both acknowledged that rental income from the subject premises was paid to the husband’s mother pursuant to the written agreement between the husband and his mother that was introduced into evidence.

Supreme Court, Suffolk County Justice Joseph Santorelli held that the home was marital property subject to equitable distribution. He directed the sale of the premises, with the parties to share equally in any net proceeds or deficiency from such sale.


Continue Reading You Can't Make A Gift To Your Married Child Without Getting The Lawyers Involved

What do you do upon divorce when the home purchased during the marriage and titled in one spouse’s name was purchased using the proceeds from the sale of the home owned at the date of marriage solely in the name of that same spouse?

The Appellate Division, Second Department, in its March 2, 2016 decision in Ahearn v. Ahearn, applied well-established equitable distribution principles to affirm the determination of now-retired Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice William J. Kent, III, and hold that the home purchased during the marriage was marital property even though titled in only the one spouse’s name. Moreover, the titled spouse was entitled to a dollar-for-dollar separate property credit against the equity in the marital-property home for the use of the first home’s net sales proceeds.

The fact pattern was straightforward. In June 1996, the wife-to-be purchased a house on Salem Street in Patchogue. Approximately nine months later, the parties were married and lived together in the Salem Street house. In December 2004, the wife sold the Salem Street house and used the $143,000 in net proceeds from that sale toward the purchase, in March 2005, of a house in Holbrook. Only the wife’s name was on the Holbrook deed, but, at the time of trial, both parties were listed on the mortgage.


Continue Reading Tracing One Spouse’s Pre-Marital Home Sold During Marriage To Purchase Another

College Fund 3Should a court reinterpret a divorce settlement agreement in light of New York’s public policy? It is one thing to void a contract provision as violative of that policy. It’s another to pretend that the contract was intended to be consistent with that policy.

Take, Monroe County Supreme Court Justice Richard A. Dollinger’s recent decision in Luken v. Luken. There, the parties’ June, 2014 separation agreement provided that the couple would jointly finance the college education for their sons. At the time of the agreement the older son had completed his first year of college; the younger son was in high school. The husband was to pay 70 percent of the college cost, the wife the remaining 30 percent, up to a combined cap of $42,000. The agreement also gave the husband a college expense credit against his child support obligation:

The father shall be entitled to receive a credit against his child support for payments for college educational expenses as set forth herein.

The agreement had obligated the father to pay child support of $33,996 annually for his two sons. The amount was calculated using the $141,000 C.S.S.A. “cap,” even though the couple’s combined family income substantially exceeded that amount (the wife estimated the husband’s income at $600,000).


Continue Reading Crediting Child Support With Payments for College Expenses

OverstuffedIn contrast to its decision in Zaratzian, the subject of yesterday’s blog post, the Second Department, in Eagar v. Suchan, held the same day that a father was entitled to receive child support from a mother after their two children moved in with him.

In Eagar, the parties’ 1999 Settlement Agreement which was incorporated, but not merged into their judgment of divorce, contained separate provisions for child support and the payment of college expenses for the children. At the time, the then 7- and 5-year old sons of the parties lived with their mother.

After the parties’ two children began to reside with the father, he petitioned to terminate his child support obligation.

After a hearing, Suffolk County Support Magistrate (and former Judge) Barbara Lynaugh granted the father’s petition. She determined that the parties’ older child, then 21, was emancipated, and directed the mother to pay child support to the father for the parties’ younger child, then 19, in the sum of $344 per week. Family Court Judge Martha L. Luft denied the mother’s objections to the ruling.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed. It held that Magistrate Lynaugh properly exercised her discretion when applying the Child Support Standards Act formula percentage to the combined parental income in excess of the statutory cap. “Here, the Support Magistrate properly articulated her reasons for applying the statutory percentages to parental income over the statutory cap, and her determination was not an improvident exercise of discretion.” It appears that the mother’s C.S.S.A.-adjusted annual income was approximately $105,000.00, which (applying the 17% formula) resulted in a $344.00 per week award.

The appellate court did not discuss the language of the parties’ Stipulation of Settlement, or why that language allowed for an affirmative award to the father.


Continue Reading “I’m Moving In With Daddy”: The Child Support Perspective (Part II)