May a parent be directed to maintain life insurance in a Family Court support proceeding? Do an aunt and uncle awarded primary residential and, with the father, joint legal custody of his children, share responsibility for the children’s health and education expenses? Such were the questions addressed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its September 12, 2018 decision in Lozaldo v. Cristando.

Following the death of the children’s mother, the maternal aunt and uncle were awarded residential custody of the children and shared joint legal custody with the father. The aunt and uncle commenced this proceeding for child support from the father. After a hearing, Nassau County Family Court Support Magistrate Patricia Bannon entered a support order which, inter alia, required the father to pay 100% of the children’s unreimbursed medical and educational expenses, and to maintain a life insurance policy in the sum of $1,000,000, designating the children as irrevocable primary beneficiaries. The father objected to these provisions of the order of support. Family Court Judge Conrad D. Singer denied his objections. The father appealed.

The Second Department agreed with requiring the father to pay 100% of the children’s medical and educational expenses. There was no basis to find the maternal aunt and uncle liable for a portion of such expenses.


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Close up of hebrew and english Bible.

Absent agreement of both parents, neither parent sharing joint legal custody nay cause or allow the children to receive any religious sacrament or education. So held Supreme Court Nassau County Justice Jeffrey A. Goodstein in his January 13, 2017 decision in DK v. AK.

The parties had two children together (currently ages 6 and 5). The parties were divorced in 2016 by a judgment which incorporated, but did not merge, the terms of their 2015 Stipulation of Settlement. Pursuant to the Stipulation, the parties shared joint legal custody of the children, with the mother having residential custody. Here, the father had brought this post-judgment motion for an order prohibiting the mother from causing or allowing the children to be baptized, or to receive any religious sacrament, or a religious education in any faith other than Judaism, without his written consent.

The father argued that there had been no issue with regard to the parties’ joint custodial relationship until the mother’s decision to baptize the children. The father further argued that the children were raised in the Jewish faith, as was allegedly agreed upon by the parties prior to their engagement. The mother acknowledged that the parties’ son had a traditional Bris, performed by a Mohel (performer of ritual circumcisions). The mother also acknowledged that the parties had a naming ceremony for their daughter although she contended that it was the paternal grandfather who wanted the baby naming and scheduled it, so she took over planning it.

The father further alleged that prior to their separation, the parties “actively” raised the children in the Jewish faith by celebrating the Jewish holidays. He contended that the children now accompany him to synagogue when he attends. Further, he set forth that a few months ago, the children started attending Hebrew school, with the mother’s consent.

The parties recently attended a mediation session when the mother wanted to bring the children to Catholic events. As reported by the parties, the mediator took the position that the children could be raised as both Jewish and Catholic, to which the father strongly disagreed. Shortly after the mediation session, the mother notified the father of her intent to baptize the children and invited him to attend the ceremony. The father further argued that a baptism is tantamount to changing the children’s religion without his consent.


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Difficult choiceA recent Swedish study based on a survey of almost 150,000 6th and 9th-grade students revealed that children who live equally with both parents after parental separation suffered from fewer psychosomatic problems than those living mostly or only with one parent. As might be expected, children of separated parents generally reported more psychosomatic problems than those in intact “nuclear” families.

A group of Swedish university and government child experts published their results online April 28, 2015 in the Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health in the article, Fifty moves a year: is there an association between joint physical custody and psychosomatic problems in children?

Using responses along the range of “never,” “ seldom,” “sometimes,” “often” and “always,” the survey investigated correlations between parenting arrangements and “psychosomatic” problems including difficulties in (1) concentration and (2) sleeping; suffering from (3) headaches and (4) stomach aches; feeling (5) tense, (6) sad and (7) dizzy and (8) loss of appetite. The students were asked to respond to the survey questions with

The authors noted that during the past 20 years, it has become more common for children in the Western world to live alternatively and equally with both parents after a parental separation. In Sweden, this practice of joint physical custody is particularly frequent and has risen from about 1–2% in the mid-1980s to between 30% and 40% of the children with separated parents in 2010.

Over the same period, however, there has been an increase in self-reported pediatric psychosomatic symptoms. Already, stressful circumstances such as bullying, economic stress in the family, peer and teacher relationships, schoolwork pressure and lack of emotional support from the parents have been shown to be related to psychosomatic symptoms in Swedish adolescents.


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The Second Department has modified an order of Suffolk County Family Court Attorney-Referee Roseann Orlando to direct that when one parent is working, that parent, prior to making babysitting arrangements with a nonparent, shall first afford the other parent the opportunity to care for the subject child during such work period.

In its August 27,

Five appellate decisions this month have dealt with the propriety of joint custody awards.

On March 20, 2014, the First Department upheld New York County Supreme Court Justice Lori S. Sattler‘s decision to continue the parents’ joint custody arrangement. In Boyce v. Boyce, the appellate court agreed that the mother had failed to make an evidentiary showing sufficient to warrant a hearing on her request to change that arrangement.

For the appellate court, the fact that the parties, who have joint decision-making authority, have different views on education or extracurricular activities did not mean that they could not co-parent. Indeed, the parties had anticipated that they may have these disagreements and provided for a procedure to deal with them in their stipulation of settlement. In the event the procedures failed, as occurred here, the parties reserved their right to resolve such matters in court.

Again supporting joint custody, in Johanys M. v. Eddy A., the First Department on March 11, 2014 reversed the order of Family Court Bronx County Referee Jennifer S. Burtt that had awarded sole custody of a child to the mother.

Referee Burtt had found that the parties had similar abilities to provide for the child financially; that there was no difference in the emotional bonds that they each had established with the child;and that the child had essentially spent an equal amount of time with each party. Nevertheless, the Referee awarded custody to the mother on the grounds that she no longer worked outside the home and thus was “fully available” to care for the child (and a newborn), while the father worked outside the home. The Referee was also concerned about the father’s testimony about the mother because it was “globally negative.”

The First Department, however, found that the it was in the best interests of the child for the parties to have joint legal custody. Although sharing physical custody was no longer feasible because the parties now resided in different boroughs, there was no evidence that the parties’ relationship was characterized by acrimony or mistrust.

Moreover, over the course of the child’s life, the parties had been able to resolve any visitation or custody disputes between themselves. They also appeared to have been in accord with respect to the child’s best interests, despite their failure to communicate directly with each other.

The [father] should not be deprived of a decision-making role in the child’s life because he is unable to care for the child full time. The record shows that he has a strong interest and plays an active role in the child’s life, including aggressively seeking out necessary services to foster the child’s development, and that he arranged for child care while he worked.

Here, although the father’s testimony may have painted an unfairly negative picture of the mother, there was no evidence that he disparaged her in the presence of the child. The record showed that his concern for the child’s welfare was paramount.


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Absent a court order specifying which parent is entitled to make educational decisions, the New York City Department of Education will follow the instructions of the primary physical custodian.

The policy was upheld in the October 22, 2013 decision of the First Department in Jennings v. Walcott. The appellate court reversed  the determination of  

Count the overnights. “Legal” custody or decision-making power does not matter. Child Support is only payable to the parent with the children the majority of the overnights. If overnights are equally shared, the parent with the higher income is deemed to be the noncustodial parent for C.S.S.A. purposes.
Such is the rule of law made clear in two recent Appellate Division cases. In its June 28, 2013 decision in Leonard v. Leonard, the Fourth Department held that despite  the father having sole legal custody, as parenting time was equally shared and the father had the higher income, the father would be deemed the noncustodial parent and obligated to pay child support.

In Rubin v. Della Salla, an April 18, 2013 decision of the First Department, where each parent had spheres of decision-making, it was held that the father with whom the child spent 56% of the overnights could not, as a matter of law, be ordered to pay child support under the C.S.S.A.

In Leonard, upheld the decision of Monroe County Supreme Court J.H.O. to award the husband sole legal custody. The wife sought joint legal custody, bu the Fourth Department agreed that the parents’ acrimonious relationship and inability to communicate effectively with respect to the needs and activities of the children made joint custody not feasible. Moreover, the J.H.O. did not abuse his discretion in failing to split decision-making “zones of influence.”

The Fourth Department, however, held that it was error for the J.H.O. to award child support to the husband. Child support should have been awarded to the wife. As the residency arrangement was shared, and neither parent had the children for a majority of the time, the party with the higher income was to be deemed to be the noncustodial parent for purposes of child support.

Here, the residency schedule affords the parties equal time with the children. Inasmuch as the husband’s income exceeded that of the wife (at the time of trial, the husband earning $134,924.48 annually, with the J.H.O. imputing income of $25,000 to the wife), the husband was the “noncustodial” parent. As such, he must pay child support to the wife.

The Fourth Department acknowledged that the authority presented by the wife involved awards of joint legal custody, whereas the husband, here, was awarded sole legal custody. That fact, however, should not affect the child support determination.

Although the award of sole legal custody to plaintiff allows him to make important decisions in the children’s lives, that decision-making authority does not increase his child-related costs. A parent’s child-related costs are dictated by the amount of time he or she spends with the children.


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In five cases decided May 1, 2013, the Second Department continued to voice its concern when parents just don’t get along. Again, the court considered joint custody, hampering the child’s relationship with the other parent, private interviews of children by the judge, contempt for violations of visitation orders, and whether a non-parent may be granted custody over a surviving parent.

In Wright v. Kaura, the Second Department reversed a joint legal custody award to grant sole legal custody to a mother.  The appellate court noted that joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion.

Here, joint legal custody was inappropriate as the parties demonstrated an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child. The record was replete with examples of hostility and antagonism between the parties, indicating that they were unable to put aside their differences for the good of the child. Thus, Acting Westchester Family Court Judge Thomas R. Daly erred when awarding the parties joint legal custody of their child.

In Lawlor v. Eder, the Second Department held that a father’s refusal to encourage and foster meaningful contact between the child and the mother was the basis to award residential  custody to the mother, although the parents shared joint legal custody.

A custodial parent’s interference with the relationship between a child and the noncustodial parent is deemed an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as custodial parent.


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