The Appellate Division, Second Department, has held in its June 15, 2016 decision in Schiero v. Perrotta, that a mother’s testimony was a sufficient foundation for the admission in evidence of her children’s medical bills and her proof of payment of those bills.

The mother had filed a violation petition alleging that the father had failed to pay his pro rata share of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses. At the ensuing hearing, the mother testified that she had incurred $980 in medical expenses for the children. She attempted to offer into evidence copies of medical bills and proof of payment.

Support Magistrate Rachelle C. Kaufman, however, refused to admit the medical invoices into evidence on the ground that the medical invoices were hearsay, and were not admissible through the mother’s testimony. Magistrate Kaufman then held that the mother failed to demonstrate the amounts of each individual medical expense, or when they were incurred. The Magistrate dismissed that branch of her petition. The mother filed objections, which were denied by Rockland County Family Court Judge Sherri L. Eisenpress.


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In its October 30, 2014 decision in Hoffer-Adou v. Adou, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the granting of summary judgment awarding a no-fault divorce solely upon the plaintiff’s (here the wife) sworn statement. That award had been made below by Supreme Court, New York County Justice Deborah A. Kaplan.

In so holding the First Department joined the Fourth Department in holding that whether there has been an irretrievable breakdown is purely subjective. In a decision issued November 9, 2012 in Palermo v. Palermo, the Fourth Department (December 13, 2012 blog post) had affirmed a decision of Monroe County Supreme Court Justice Richard A. Dollinger (January 30, 2012 blog post) for the reasons stated in Justice Dollinger’s opinion: a party’s sworn statement of irretrievable breakdown is incontestable. It is not subject to attack at trial.

The First Department, here, held:

Contrary to the husband’s contention, the wife was entitled to a judgment of divorce under the no-fault provision of DRL § 170(7), since her statement under oath that the marriage was irretrievably broken for a period of six months was sufficient to establish her cause of action for divorce as a matter of law.

However, as noted in prior blog posts, the subject has not been without debate. Two decisions of the Nassau County Supreme Court, Townes v. Coker (relied upon by the First Department and discussed in the blog post of February, 20, 2012), and A.C. v. D.R. (discussed in the April 4, 2011 post), both held that New York’s new no-fault ground was purely subjective.


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