Custody and Visitation

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In five cases decided May 1, 2013, the Second Department continued to voice its concern when parents just don’t get along. Again, the court considered joint custody, hampering the child’s relationship with the other parent, private interviews of children by the judge, contempt for violations of visitation orders, and whether a non-parent may be granted custody over a surviving parent.

In Wright v. Kaura, the Second Department reversed a joint legal custody award to grant sole legal custody to a mother.  The appellate court noted that joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion.

Here, joint legal custody was inappropriate as the parties demonstrated an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child. The record was replete with examples of hostility and antagonism between the parties, indicating that they were unable to put aside their differences for the good of the child. Thus, Acting Westchester Family Court Judge Thomas R. Daly erred when awarding the parties joint legal custody of their child.

In Lawlor v. Eder, the Second Department held that a father’s refusal to encourage and foster meaningful contact between the child and the mother was the basis to award residential  custody to the mother, although the parents shared joint legal custody.

A custodial parent’s interference with the relationship between a child and the noncustodial parent is deemed an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as custodial parent.

Continue Reading Custody Issues Considered in Five Second Department Cases Decided May 1st

In two decisions this month, appellate courts reversed Family Court orders and dismissed petitions for grandparent visitation.

In Pinsky v. Botnick, the petitioner was the paternal grandmother. Her son had died at the age of 35, survived by his widow and 4 children, then ages 9, 7, 5, and 3. Her Family Court petition for visitation was filed approximately six weeks after her son’s death.

At the hearing, the grandmother testified that she had a close relationship with the children. The grandmother also acknowledged that the mother was a fit parent. However, according to the mother, the children were hysterical about the court proceeding, fearful that the grandmother would take them away from their mother. The attorney for the children informed the Family Court that the children did not wish to see their grandparents.

Nassau County Family Court J.H.O. (and former Judge) Elaine Jackson Stack denied the mother’s application to appoint a neutral forensic evaluator. The mother retained Peter J. Favaro, Ph.D., whose report was received in evidence. Dr. Favaro reported that the children were experiencing a “complicated bereavement”: the three older children had reported having bad dreams about seeing their grandmother and that she would take them away. Dr. Favaro concluded that forcing interaction between the children and grandparents would only strengthen those fears.Continue Reading Grandmothers Denied Visitation in Two Recent Appellate Reversals

Where the parties’ joint legal custody agreement only provided for each parent to have equal input on all major decisions, including education, but did not provide for conflict resolution, the mother, after a hearing, was awarded temporary decision-making authority. Such was the holding of the April 11, 2013 decision of the Appellate Division, First Department,…

In its February 14, 2013 decision in Melody M. v Robert M., the Third Department affirmed an order of now-retired St. Lawrence County Family Court Judge Barbara R. Potter which modified a prior joint custody order to award the father sole custody of the parties’ three children (ages 8, 9 and 12). The Third Department also affirmed Judge Potter’s imposition of an order of protection against the mother that prohibited her from, among other things, posting any communications to or about the children on any social network site.

The parties had entered into a separation agreement in 2006 providing for joint custody of their children with alternating physical placement. In February 2009, they stipulated to continue joint custody, but with the father having primary physical custody. In July 2010, the mother commenced the first of the four proceedings determined by Judge Potter’s order, seeking to alter her parenting time so that she would have the two youngest children from Wednesday to Sunday of each week and the oldest child from Sunday to Tuesday of each week. The father opposed the proposed schedule change, filed violation petitions and filed a modification petition seeking, among other things, sole legal custody of the children.

After a hearing, Judge Potter found a change in circumstances sufficient to conclude that the joint custody arrangement was no longer viable and that an award of sole legal custody to the father would be in the best interests of the children.Continue Reading Mom Ordered to Stop Posting about Her Children on Facebook

Two decisions this past month involved joint custody awards despite antagonism between the parents and contested custody proceedings.

In Prohaszka v. Prohaszka, Supreme Court Putnam County Justice Francis A. Nicolai had awarded the divorcing parties joint legal custody of the parties’ children, with the mother having primary physical custody and final decision-making authority. In its February 6, 2013 decision on appeal, the Second Department modified that order to add a provision directing the mother to consult with the father regarding any issues involving the children’s health, medical care, education, religion, and general welfare prior to exercising her final decision-making authority for the children, but otherwise affirmed Justice Nicolai’s order.

Although the antagonism between the parties was evident to the appellate court, it was also apparent that both parties generally behaved appropriately with their children, that they could make parenting decisions together, and that the children were attached to both parents. Under those circumstances, there was a sound and substantial basis in the record for Justice Nicolai to have found that the best interests of the children would be served by awarding the parties joint custody. Similarly, the trial record also supported the determination that primary physical custody should be with the mother and that she should have final decision-making authority.

The court, however, should have directed the plaintiff to consult with the defendant regarding any issues involving the children’s health, medical care, education, religion, and general welfare prior to exercising her final decision-making authority.

In his January 8, 2013 decision in Scott M. v. Ilona M., Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine awarded the parties joint custody of their son; each parent having access alternating on a weekly basis.

Justice Sunshine did note that a significant factor in determining custody was whether the heated custody dispute, itself, indicated that an award of joint custody would be ineffective. Justice Sunshine cited to the Court of Appeals decision in Braiman v. Braiman, (44 N.Y.2d 584), which rejected joint or shared custody where the parties are in bitter conflict and do not agree to such an arrangement. That decision concluded:

Joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion. As a court ordered arrangement imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos.

[Question: If the children live primarily with one parent and that parent has final decision-making authority, what does “joint custody” mean? Is it merely a psychological benefit for the parent and the child? Does it entitle the non-primary custodian to make decisions in emergency situations when the other parent is not available? Braiman, itself, noted that “joint”, or, as it is sometimes called “divided”, custody reposes in both parents a shared responsibility for and control of a child’s upbringing. In Bast v. Rossoff, 167 Misc.2d 749, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1995), affd, 239 A.D.2d 106 (1st Dept 1997), affd as mod and remanded, 91 N.Y.2d 723 (1998), it was stated “In New York the term ‘joint custody’ generally is used to refer only to joint legal custody, or joint decision making.”]Continue Reading Ordering Joint Custody in Contested Divorce Custody Proceedings

In an October, 2012 decision, Kings County Civil Court Judge Harriet Thompson, in Matter of Kobra (Hossain), denied on cultural grounds the applications of a mother, Tamannatul Kobra, to change the names of her children: four and nine-year-old females. The two petitions were supported by the consent the girls’ father, Mosharaf Hossain (Ms. Kobra’s husband).

The mother sought to remove the name “Hossain” (or Hossian) because because of its association with Muslims.

Ironically, in January, 2009, Kings County Civil Court Judge Dawn Jiminez-Salta had granted an application by Mr. Hossain, on consent of his wife, to add “Hossain” to the name of his older daughter (then six). Judge Jiminez was satisfied that the interest of the child was substantially promoted by the infant child assuming the surname of her biological father.

Here, the mother sought to again change her nine-year-old daughter’s name; this time to a completely different name: from Siratul Muntaha Hossain to Oporajita Neeladri. The child would not bear any surname that would identify her with either parent. The mother also sought to change the younger child’s name from Heemika Hossian to Himika Himadri. Under the parents’ plan, neither child would have any name that would identify her as a child of either parent-not the surname of either parent, nor any name that would identify them as relatives or even sisters for that matter.

The mother asserted that in Bangladesh and India, it is customary for everyone in “a typical household” to have completely different names. Nevertheless, Judge Thompson noted that both of these children were American-born citizens and have adapted, embraced and are a part of our American culture.

Applying the American cultural norm, Judge Thompson found that “sharing the surname by the child with the parent she or he lives with is a legitimate point of concern because it minimizes embarrassment, harassment and confusion in school and social contacts.”

This court will not deviate from that which is deeply rooted in the American Diaspora which definitively supports our social customs and long standing accepted practices in New York as well as many other states for family members to share in one of the custodian’s parents name.

This common practice is to alleviate confusion in the child’s day to day life and obviate the need to explain to school administrators and teachers, doctors, insurance companies and government agencies why the children have completely different names from their parents and from each other.Continue Reading Parents Denied, on Cultural Grounds, Name Changes for 4- and 9-Year-Old Daughters

Father and daughter.jpgParents sometimes enter child support agreements which track the presumptive formula set out in New York’s Child Support Standards Act (Family Court Act §413; Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b]). However, parents in their agreements often deviate from the presumptive formula to reflect various considerations. That deviation for a married couple may reflect the delicate balancing of property rights, spousal maintenance and child support.

For example, parents may reduce the presumptive child support amount where the child(ren) spend more time with the “non-custodial” parent than what might be considered the “normal” alternate weekends and a mid-week dinner.

May the non-custodial parent’s failure to fully exercise visitation rights under an agreement serve as a basis to increase child support?

In its July 11, 2012 opinion in McCormick v. McCormick, the Appellate Division Second Department said, “Yes.” It found that the substantial reduction in a father’s visitation with his child warranted an upward modification of the father’s child support obligation. That reduction in visitation provided the substantial change in circumstances needed to justify a support modification.

[T]he mother established that an increase in the father’s child support obligation was warranted by a change in circumstances … Specifically, the substantial reduction in the father’s visitation with the child, which significantly reduced the amount of money the father was required to spend on the child, “constituted an unanticipated change in circumstances that created the need for modification of the child support obligations.”

The Second Department was quoting from the 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in Gravlin v. Ruppert, 98 NY2d 1, 743 NYS2d 773. That case also addressed a father’s failure to live up to his scheduled substantial parenting time.Continue Reading Father's Failure To Visit Child Is Grounds To Increase Child Support

Diary girl 2.jpgA father’s efforts to push his daughter into keeping a journal disparaging her mother and to be videotaped complaining about her mother caused his visitation to be both supervised and limited. The father’s stated intention to enhance his case that the mother was abusive to her daughter, which both the appointed forensic evaluator and the Court found was not the case, was not justification for the father’s poor judgment.

In her June 14, 2012 decision in Matter of A.H. v C.B., Queens County Family Court Judge Edwina G. Richardson-Mendelson, not only rejected a father’s efforts to expand his visitation, but further limited them.

The father alleged the mother’s abusive behavior towards their daughter constituted the change in circumstances necessary to alter existing arrangements. The father also sought to resume the liberal visitation that he had been informally allowed by the mother following the parties’ divorce. The parties’ 2003 divorce decree granted custody to the mother, but did not deal with visitation issues. As a result, a 2002 Family Court order providing for supervised visitation had remained in effect, although often not followed.

The father claimed that the daughter told him that the mother would call her “a jackass” and “stupid” and that in conversations with the daughter, the mother would disparage the father and his family. The father testified that he began to be concerned that the mother was mistreating his daughter through “verbal abuse” and by putting extreme pressure on the daughter to do well in school. He alleged that the mother slapped the daughter and abused her mentally and emotionally.

In 2009, the father gave his daughter a journal and encouraged her to write in it about her negative experiences with her mother. He also videotaped his daughter talking about her mother in a negative way.Continue Reading Father Who Coerced Daughter into Making Anti-Mother Journal and Video Limited to Supervised Visitation