Under the parties’ divorce settlement agreement, the parents were not obligated to share their daughter’s sorority costs whether those costs were viewed as a college expenses or as extracurricular expenses. So held Nassau County Family Court Support Magistrate Sondra M. Toscano in her July 7th decision in Matter of C.A.B. v. D.S.B.

There, the parties’ 2021 Stipulation of Settlement provided in relevant part:

The parties agree and acknowledge that they shall contribute to the costs and expenses associated with each child’s college or post high school vocational education, with the Husband paying sixty five percent (65%) of such cost and the Wife paying thirty-five (35%) of such cost. . . . [t]he educational expenses referred to as the “Cost of College Education” shall consist of tuition, room and board, required supplies by the school, required fees of the college or university, and reasonable transportation expenses for the child for (4) round trips per year.

Magistrate Toscano recognized that the parties’ agreement unambiguously listed the specific college expenses that were to be shared. Sorority costs were not one of them.

However, the Magistrate did not stop there. Instead she considered the effect of language that did not so limit the items included in “college expenses.”Continue Reading Including “Including” in Agreements

For 13 years, Mr. De Niro and Ms. Hightower failed to account annually for their commingled separate and marital property when making investments or acquiring assets as required by their 2004 Prenuptial Agreement (PNA). In effect, the decisions in their 2018 divorce action have now interpreted this annual accounting requirement as an agreement to forever arbitrate and not litigate the marital and separate property issues of the divorce.

In his March 15, 2023 decision in Anonymous v. Anonymous, Supreme Court New York County Justice Ariel D. Chesler directed the parties to immediately provide to the parties’ chosen accountant those 13 years of disclosures . The accountant, and not the Court, would make the separate/marital property determinations. In doing so Justice Chesler applied the 2021 Appellate Division affirmance of a 2021 Order of now-retired Justice Matthew F. Cooper.Continue Reading Lessons to be learned from the De Niro/Hightower divorce and prenuptial agreement

Two days before the parties were married in February, 2011, they executed a prenuptial agreement. In it the wife accepted an agreed-upon maintenance provision. The husband commenced a divorce action in 2019. The wife counterclaimed, seeking an award of maintenance and a judgment setting aside the agreement as invalid.

The husband moved for summary judgment requesting the court deem the agreement valid. The wife opposed the husband’s motion and cross-moved for an award of temporary maintenance and counsel fees. Acting Clinton County Supreme Court Justice Keith M. Bruno partially granted the husband’s motion and dismissed the wife’s second counterclaim disputing the validity of the agreement. Justice Bruno also denied her cross-motion seeking temporary maintenance.

In its June 9, 2022 decision in Spiegel v. Spiegel, the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed, finding various issues of fact raised by the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement that precluded an award of summary judgment. The Court reported the wife’s allegations concerning the husband’s controlling conduct leading to the execution of the prenuptial agreement. The Court concluded:

We find that the foregoing facts, if established, raise issues concerning whether the wife was meaningfully represented during the abbreviated negotiations, and also raise an inference that the husband did not intend on engaging in a good faith negotiation of the agreement from the outset, which, if true, would be sufficient to establish overreaching on his part.

The Court also found that the wife was improperly denied temporary maintenance, invalidating the maintenance provision of the agreement for failing to comply with the requirements of Domestic Relations Law former §236(B)(5-a)(f).Continue Reading Temporary maintenance provisions in prenuptial agreements entered 2010 to 2015 must contain CSSA-type formula recitation

Drafting divorce settlement agreement provisions to dispose of the marital home is not easy. Anticipating how things will play out can be very difficult.

In some cases, one spouse may be remaining in the home with the children for a stated period of time, or until a stated event (such as the children’s graduation). How are bills to be paid in the interim? Will either spouse be entitled to credits?

What will be the procedures when the time/event happens? At the end of that period of “exclusive occupancy” (or perhaps immediately), the parties will be selling the home. Alternatively, one party may want to buy out the other. If the home is to be sold to a stranger, how is the broker to be selected, if there is to be one? How is the initial listing price determined? Must a certain bid be accepted? What happens if there are no bids?

If one spouse wants to buy out the other, how is the other’s interest to be valued? Should the amount of a broker’s commission be factored in? May one spouse have a “right of first refusal,” the right to match a bid from a third party? How will that work?

Take the April 28, 2022 decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Martin v. Martin. There, the parties’ 2012 divorce settlement agreement granted the husband the right to buy out the wife’s interest. The agreement provided that if the husband elected that option, the parties would obtain three appraisals, The husband would pay the wife half the “mean” (average) of those three appraised values minus a commission.Continue Reading Agreements to Dispose of Marital Home Interests

In its December 16, 2021 decision in Anderson v. Anderson, New York’s highest court ruled that the parties to a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement must acknowledge their signatures within a reasonable time of their signing. In a second appeal in Koegel v. Koegel, the Court of Appeals in its same decision also held that if the agreement is acknowledged by the parties at or within a reasonable time after signing, a defect in the acknowledgment certificate form may be cured at a later time by extrinsic proof.

In Anderson, the wife had signed and acknowledged the nuptial agreement the month after the wedding. Regardless of when the husband signed the agreement, his signature was not acknowledged until nearly seven years later, shortly before he commenced a divorce action and in anticipation of his wife’s imminent divorce filing.

In Koegel, the parties executed a nuptial agreement approximately one month before their marriage. The agreement provided that neither party would claim any part of the other’s estate, with both waiving their respective elective or statutory shares. Both parties signed the agreement, and their signatures were acknowledged, each by his or her own lawyer. The acknowledgment followed the statutory requirements in all but one respect: both lawyers failed to attest that the signer was known to them.Continue Reading Delayed Acknowledgment Invalidates Nuptial Agreement; Defective Form Does Not

Generally, a transfer of a judgment debtor’s real property interest is not effective against a creditor whose judgment was recorded prior to the debtor’s transfer (C.P.L.R. §5203). However, that rule will yield to the equitable interests of a former spouse. So held the Appellate Division, First Department, in its August 19, 2021 decision in Tiozzo v. Dangin.

There, the parties’ 2004 Judgment of Divorce incorporated their surviving Stipulation of Settlement. Under the Stipulation, the wife was “entitled to sole ownership and exclusive use and occupancy” of the marital residence. The husband was to “provide a quitclaim deed to [the wife] only if doing so would not jeopardize the existing mortgage.” In the meantime, the husband was solely responsible to continue to pay the mortgage. The Stipulation further provided:

In the event that the Husband is unable, for any reason, to execute and/or record such quitclaim deed, the Husband agrees and covenants that notwithstanding the joint ownership of the Jane Street property, he will not act in any way or manner or through any deed or omission, whether directly or indirectly, to interfere with the Wife’s exclusive use and occupancy of the said property, including the sale of the said property by the Wife should she so choose.

The wife did not demand a quitclaim deed from the husband until 2019, almost 15 years after the divorce. The wife had then decided to sell the residence when the husband went into default of his obligation to make the mortgage payments.

By then, in February 2019, Lenz Capital Group, LLC (Lenz) had entered a two million dollar judgment against the husband upon his confession of judgment.Continue Reading Ex-Husband’s Judgment Creditor Subordinated to Ex-Wife’s Unrecorded Equitable Realty Interest

Does a four-day delay in notarization by the mediator/notary of a separation agreement  executed by the parties in a Zoom session with the mediator render the agreement invalid? In his June 29, 2021 decision in Ryerson v. Ryerson, Warren County Acting Supreme Court Justice Richard B. Meyer held it did not.

The parties used William J. McCoskery as mediator to assist them in resolving various matters attendant to their divorce. They met once in person with the mediator, during which he advised both parties to consult with an attorney. Based upon his discussions with the parties, the mediator prepared a 15-page separation agreement and emailed it to both parties for their review. The husband claimed not to have read the complete document.

The Governor declared the Covid state of emergency on March 7, 2020. Notarization using audio-video technology was authorized by Executive Order No. 202.7. That Order provides:

Any notarial act that is required under New York State law is authorized to be performed utilizing audio-video technology provided that the following conditions are met:

    • The person seeking the Notary’s services, if not personally known to the Notary, must present valid photo ID to the Notary during the video conference, not merely transmit it prior to or after;
    • The video conference must allow for direct interaction between the person and the Notary (e.g. no pre-recorded videos of the person signing);
    • The person must affirmatively represent that he or she is physically situated in the State of New York;
    • The person must transmit by fax or electronic means a legible copy of the signed document directly to the Notary on the same date it was signed;
    • The Notary may notarize the transmitted copy of the document and transmit the same back to the person; and
    • The Notary may repeat the notarization of the original signed document as of the date of execution provided the Notary receives such original signed document together with the electronically notarized copy within thirty days after the date of execution.

Continue Reading Delayed Notarization by Mediator Does Not Invalidate Separation Agreement Signed Over Zoom

Is a divorce settlement agreement that mandates that the children attend school within a particular school district satisfied by the children being home schooled within that district? Maybe, held the Third Department in its June 17, 2021 decision in Matter of John U. v. Sara U.

The parties were the divorced parents of two children (born in 2010 and 2012). They entered a separation agreement in October 2017, which was modified in September 2019. The agreement provided for joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the children. As is here relevant, it contained a provision that:

[s]o long as the [father] maintains a residence in [a certain school district,] the children shall continue to attend school within [that school district] unless both parties expressly agree in writing to change the schools of the children.

Prior to the 2019-2020 school year, the children had attended a certain public elementary school in that school district. The children had a religious exemption from vaccination. After a June 2019 change in state law eliminated such religious exemptions for students (see Public Health Law § 2164), and after the district’s denial of the mother’s requests for medical exemptions, the unvaccinated children were removed from their school in September 2019 and the mother began home schooling instruction at her home.Continue Reading Is Home-Schooling “Attending” School?

The parties’ 2013 divorce stipulation of settlement provided that child support for their two children would be adjusted annually. Beginning May 1, 2014:

“the parties shall set by April 30, a payment schedule of the Parent’s total obligation for base child support ‘made pursuant to the formula set forth below and income caps for the fiscal year beginning May 1 and continuing through April 30th of the following year. This schedule shall be based on the actual income’ for the previous calendar year. The Father shall then pay this base child support’ amount to the Mother in monthly installments.” [emphasis added]

For the purpose of computing base child support, the stipulation defined “income” as “the gross earned income solely attributable to a party and as listed on the Form 1040 United States Individual Income Tax Return filed by the parties, less (1) FICA taxes actually paid; (2) Medicare taxes actually paid; less (3) New York City or Yonkers income or earnings taxes actually paid.”

In 2016, the mother received a salary of $86,801 for her work as a veterinarian. She also received $39,631 in “[o]rdinary dividends” and $245,629 in “[r]ental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, etc.”  In 2017, the father calculated his base child support obligation using the mother’s adjusted gross income of $369,092. The mother disputed the calculation, contending that the income derived from her ownership interest in the LLCs was not “earned” income and therefore did not fall under the stipulation’s definition of “income.”Continue Reading Drafting Income Calculations in Divorce Settlement Agreements