Equitable Distribution

Subscribe to Equitable Distribution via RSS
Property division concept, 3D rendering isolated on white background

In an action for the partition of real property owned by an ex-wife, her ex-husband and his parents, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to confirm the report of the Referee that recommended that the ex-husband’s parents (“the in-laws”) receive the first $1,078,710.20 from the sale of the property. Such represented the parent’s direct monetary contributions to the acquisition and construction and improvement of a house on the subject property. The balance of any proceeds are to be paid to all four parties in equal 25% shares.

Such was held by Richmond County Supreme Court Justice Wayne M. Ozzi in the November 13, 2025, decision in Mersimovski v. Mersimovski, 2025 N.Y.L.J. LEXIS 3502.

Two years earlier, Justice Ozzi had awarded the ex-wife summary judgment declaring that she was is seized and entitled in fee to an undivided one-quarter 25% interest in the premises. Mersimovski v. Mersimovski, 2023 N.Y..Misc. LEXIS 23846 (November 28, 2023).Continue Reading In-laws Win Credits on Partition-Action Sale of Shared Home

In the April 15th decision in FR v. AR, Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Edmund M. Dane ordered the pendente lite sale of the marital residence titled in the husband’s name after foreclosure proceedings had been commenced. The Court elected to preserve the asset by ordering the immediate sale, as the equity in the house was simply more important than the actual structure.

Last week’s post discussed the April 10th decision of the Third Department in Angello v. Angello, which upheld the trial determination that a wife’s refusal to approve a mid-action sale of the husband’s insolvent business constituted a wasteful dissipation of the largest marital asset. I asked whether the lower court could have simply approved the sale.

Here, to provide authority for the sale, Justice Dane wrestled with the 1977 (pre-Equitable Distribution) decision of the Court of Appeals in Kahn v. Kahn. There, it was held that while D.R.L. §234 authorized a court to decide questions of title, it did not authorize the sale of a marital residence held as tenants by the entirety unless there had been a change in a couple’s marital status that changed the interests of the parties to tenants in common. In the absence of a change in marital status, there could be no question of title between the parties, as the law treated tenants by the entirety as a single person. Nonetheless, the fiction is not applied when recognizing that a tenant by the entirety has the power to mortgage their interest. The Court also noted that prior to the enactment of D.R.L. §234 and its predecessor Civil Practice Act §1164-a, “no authority existed to permit a court to adjudicate a real property right in a marital action.”

Justice Dane held that Kahn did not preclude a sale and on the facts before the Court, an immediate sale was necessary.

The parties married in 2007. The marital residence was acquired after the parties’ marriage and prior to the commencement of this action. Title was taken solely in the name of the husband. The husband commenced this matrimonial action in May 2023 and stopped making mortgage payments in July 2023. The mortgagee bank commenced a foreclosure action on March 28, 2024.

The wife made a pendente lite application to sell the marital residence.Continue Reading Court Orders Pendente Lite Sale of Marital Residence

In its April 10th decision in Angello v. Angello, the Third Department upheld the trial determination that a wife’s refusal to approve a mid-action sale of the husband’s insolvent business constituted a wasteful dissipation of the largest marital asset. Such warranted saddling the wife with half of the business’s debts. It also, in part, justified a downward deviation from the maintenance guidelines but did not warrant an award of counsel fees to the financially-superior husband.

The parties were married in 1989 and had one adult child. The husband commenced this divorce action in 2016, and the trial began in 2019. The marital property at issue included a local, organic grocery distribution business primarily operated by the husband, which had incurred significant debt and had ceased operations by the time of trial. Marital property also included a warehouse associated with the business, as well as the marital residence. At the conclusion of the trial, the parties each moved for an award of counsel fees.

Columbia County Supreme Court Justice Margaret Walsh found that the wife had wastefully dissipated marital assets by refusing to agree to the 2018 sale of the business to one of the marital business’ competitors in exchange for the buyer assuming responsibility for $900,000 in business debt. The trial court valued the business as of the date of trial and directed that the wife be responsible for half of its $995,000 in debt. Justice Walsh also directed that the warehouse be sold and that the sales proceeds net of liens be applied against the remaining business debt. Justice Walsh also directed that the marital residence be sold with the net proceeds equally divided between the parties.

The presumptive amount of maintenance to which the wife was entitled was $914 a month, but Justice Walsh determined that a downward deviation was warranted, directing the husband to pay $305 a month for five years.Continue Reading Wife’s Refusal to Consent to Mid-Action Sale of Husband’s Business is Wastefull Dissipation

In its October 22, 2024, decision in Szypula v. Szypula, the Court of Appeals held that if marital funds are used to purchase premarital pension service credits, those premarital credits are marital property. But …

Mr. Szypula joined the Navy nine years before the parties married. He left the Navy two years later. The Court noted that, in general, members of the armed services become entitled to retirement pay only after they complete 20 years of service. Therefore, when the husband left the Navy, he was not entitled to retirement benefits.

After working in the private sector for 14 years, the husband joined the Foreign Service (diplomatic service personnel under the Department of State). The husband enrolled in the Foreign Service Pension System.

Veterans who enter the foreign service may add their years of military service to their Foreign Service pensions by making additional contributions for the years they served in the military. The husband purchased his 11 years of Navy service by having $9,158.00 withheld from his Foreign Service pay over seven years through 2018.

In 2019, the wife filed for divorce. The parties could not settle whether the husband’s purchased premarital pension credits were separate or marital property. After the nonjury trial, Tompkins County Supreme Court Justice Joseph A. McBride held the credits to be marital property.

The pension rights at issue in this case were the product of both his pre-marriage service and the contribution of marital assets.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed, finding that the premarital credits were separate property. However, the Third Department held the funds used to purchase those credits were marital property to be equitably distributed.Continue Reading Premarital Pension Credits Purchased with Marital Funds are Marital Property, But …

In his June 13th decision in E.J. v. M.J., Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Edmund M. Dane resolved the complex financial issues arising when a divorce action is commenced after a child begins attending a private university, but before the child turns 21 or graduates. The fact pattern presents a blend of Equitable Distribution and child support add-on issues.

Here, the parties were married in 1997 and had two children born in 2001: a son who by the time of the decision had turned 21 and had just graduated from Quinnipiac College and a daughter with developmental disabilities for whom the parties had agreed to adult dependent support.

The wife commenced this divorce action in May 2021. The parties entered a Settlement Agreement resolving most of their issues. However, issues of their son’s college education expenses and counsel fees remained to be decided upon written submissions.

The wife alleged that in the year prior to commencement of the action, the husband signed a series of Parent Plus loans for their son, totaling approximately $141,000. She argued that the Court should consider the husband’s financial ability to contribute to those expenses, as well as the academic backgrounds of the parties and the best interests of the child. The wife further contended that if she were to be obligated to contribute to the Parent Plus loans, her obligation should be capped at a SUNY rate. The wife maintained that there was no prior agreement between the parties regarding the payment of college expenses for their child.Continue Reading Apportioning a Child’s Pre- and Post-Divorce Action Commencement Private College Expenses

For 13 years, Mr. De Niro and Ms. Hightower failed to account annually for their commingled separate and marital property when making investments or acquiring assets as required by their 2004 Prenuptial Agreement (PNA). In effect, the decisions in their 2018 divorce action have now interpreted this annual accounting requirement as an agreement to forever arbitrate and not litigate the marital and separate property issues of the divorce.

In his March 15, 2023 decision in Anonymous v. Anonymous, Supreme Court New York County Justice Ariel D. Chesler directed the parties to immediately provide to the parties’ chosen accountant those 13 years of disclosures . The accountant, and not the Court, would make the separate/marital property determinations. In doing so Justice Chesler applied the 2021 Appellate Division affirmance of a 2021 Order of now-retired Justice Matthew F. Cooper.Continue Reading Lessons to be learned from the De Niro/Hightower divorce and prenuptial agreement

Generally, a transfer of a judgment debtor’s real property interest is not effective against a creditor whose judgment was recorded prior to the debtor’s transfer (C.P.L.R. §5203). However, that rule will yield to the equitable interests of a former spouse. So held the Appellate Division, First Department, in its August 19, 2021 decision in Tiozzo v. Dangin.

There, the parties’ 2004 Judgment of Divorce incorporated their surviving Stipulation of Settlement. Under the Stipulation, the wife was “entitled to sole ownership and exclusive use and occupancy” of the marital residence. The husband was to “provide a quitclaim deed to [the wife] only if doing so would not jeopardize the existing mortgage.” In the meantime, the husband was solely responsible to continue to pay the mortgage. The Stipulation further provided:

In the event that the Husband is unable, for any reason, to execute and/or record such quitclaim deed, the Husband agrees and covenants that notwithstanding the joint ownership of the Jane Street property, he will not act in any way or manner or through any deed or omission, whether directly or indirectly, to interfere with the Wife’s exclusive use and occupancy of the said property, including the sale of the said property by the Wife should she so choose.

The wife did not demand a quitclaim deed from the husband until 2019, almost 15 years after the divorce. The wife had then decided to sell the residence when the husband went into default of his obligation to make the mortgage payments.

By then, in February 2019, Lenz Capital Group, LLC (Lenz) had entered a two million dollar judgment against the husband upon his confession of judgment.Continue Reading Ex-Husband’s Judgment Creditor Subordinated to Ex-Wife’s Unrecorded Equitable Realty Interest

Please indulge me; it’s one of my pet issues. And I apologize in advance for what may be my most boring blog post to date.

Writing math narratively is very difficult. When drafting a divorce settlement agreement, I try to include examples whenever formulas are written out. When reading decisions, I often draw a flow chart to help me follow the calculations.

Calculations done by the court establish rules of law. When an appellate court does it, that’s the way it’s going to be done in all cases like that in the future. All the more reason that the reader be able to follow and understand the calculations made by the court. For each calculation, you need to know how much went from where to where and why.

Sometimes, I can’t follow those calculations made by the court. Take the February 26, 2020 decision of the Second Department in Alliger-Bograd v. Bograd. The Court modified the equitable distribution credits awarded by retired Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice Carol MacKenzie; reducing from $81,829.15 to $23,350.00 the amount to be paid by a husband to the wife, in addition to the wife acquiring the husband’s interest in the marital residence.

I am not sure whether the decision provides all the numbers used to get to the final result. The marital residence being acquired by the wife was worth $545,000.00 There was a mortgage and a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) that totaled $321,000.00. At first look, there was $224,000.00 in equity.Continue Reading Math in Divorce Decisions: How Much Goes from Where to Where and Why?

In a divorce, to what extent may a court award property rights to the parties’ cryopreseved embryo?

In its June, 2018 decision in Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, the Appellate Division, First Department, determined that the parties’ agreement with the fertility center they used would control. That agreement enabled the husband to withdraw his consent to the use of the embryo. Accordingly the Court enabled the center to dispose of the embryo as required by that agreement.

The parties were married in 2011. In 2012, they engaged the services of the New Hope Fertility Center (NHF) in the hope of conceiving a child via implantation of cryopreserved embryos in the wife’s uterus. They signed an agreement with NHF entitled “Consent for the Cryopreservation of Human Embryo(s)” (the Consent Agreement) in which the parties agreed “to the cryopreservation of embryos for our own use.”

Paragraph 7 of the Consent Agreement, entitled “Voluntary Participation,” provided, “I/We may withdraw my/our consent and discontinue participation at any time . . . .” Paragraph 16, entitled “Authorization,” provided, “This consent will remain in effect until such time as I notify NHF in writing of my/our wish to revoke such consent.”

After five or six further unsuccessful IVF attempts with NHF, the husband, then 58 years old, filed for divorce and requested sole custody of the one remaining cryopreserved embryo. He also moved to enjoin the wife, then 47 years old, from destroying, using, or preserving the embryo. The husband obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order embodying that relief. However, Supreme Court New York County Justice Deborah A. Kaplan later found that the husband had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as there was nothing in the Consent Agreement that would prevent the wife from going ahead with implantation unilaterally. Justice Kaplan issued a preliminary injunction enjoining NHF and the wife from “destroying or transferring the cryopreserved embryo to anyone other than the wife.”Continue Reading Divorce Award of Frozen Embryo Based on Agreement with Fertility Clinic

What happens on divorce when during the marriage, the marital residence that had been owned by one spouse prior to the marriage is conveyed during the marriage to the parties jointly? That was the issue addressed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its decision this month in Spencer-Forrest v. Forrest.

The parties were married on March 31, 1984. There were no children of the marriage, but children from each of the parties’ prior marriages resided with the parties in the marital residence during the children’s respective minorities. Both parties were employed for the majority of the marriage, and the wife provided care for the husband’s children, who were younger and resided in the marital residence longer than her children.

The husband had purchased the marital residence prior to the marriage, and transferred the property to himself and the wife as joint tenants in 1989. Other than the marital residence, the parties’ assets were held in their respective names. Both parties contributed to the household expenses, although the husband contributed a larger sum to household expenses and maintenance of the marital residence, and the wife ceased financial contributions in 2006 or 2007, after she retired.

In August, 2012, the wife commenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief. The wife was 68 years old and the husband was 67 years old at the time of trial.

Except for the marital residence, Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Stacy D. Bennett divided the marital property) equally (other than the vehicles and personal items) regardless of the party holding title. As to the residence, Justice Bennett awarded the wife 20% of the appreciation in the value of the marital residence from 1989 (when the husband conveyed the home to the parties jointly) through the date of the commencement of the action, an award amounting to $30,000. The court declined to award the parties credits sought for assets allegedly secreted or wasted by the other party and denied the wife an award of maintenance.Continue Reading When One Spouse Transfers Sole Title to the Home to Both Spouses Jointly