Bigamy.jpgDistinguishing the 2009 Court of Appeals decision in Mahoney–Buntzman v. Buntzman, the Second Department, in its October 24, 2012 decision in Levenstein v. Levenstein, has held that if marital funds are used to pay pre-marital support arrears, the non-obligated spouse may be awarded a credit towards equitable distribution.

In 1995, before the current marriage, Mr. Levenstein was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, for the failure to pay child support (see 18 USC § 228). Incident to the criminal conviction, he was directed to pay arrears of $132,718.49 to his first wife by July 13, 1995. Mr. Levenstein failed to fully satisfy that obligation by that deadline.

Thereafter, the husband remarried twice. The second remarriage took place four years after the criminal conviction, but before the husband secured a divorce from his second wife. During the purported third marriage, the husband paid the remainder of his criminal restitution obligation, and made additional child support payments to his first wife that became due during the purported marriage.

In 2006, the third wife sought an annulment for bigamy. In 2008, grounds were established and a trial was held to determine the apportionment of the putative marital debt. In a decision dated February 25, 2009, now-retired Rockland County Supreme Court Justice Alfred J. Weiner awarded the wife a credit of 50% of the marital funds used to satisfy premarital maintenance and child support obligations that the defendant had paid to his first wife, including the amounts due under the criminal judgment. A judgment of annulment was entered in April, 2009.

One month later, in May, 2009, the Court of Appeals held in Mahoney–Buntzman v. Buntzman (12 N.Y.3d 415) that a spouse is not entitled to a credit for marital funds paid to a former spouse or a child pursuant to an order of maintenance or child support.

Based on Mahoney–Buntzman, Mr. Levenstein moved for a reconsideration of the decision which had granted the 50% credit. Justice Weiner granted the husband’s motion and denied the credit. The putative marital debt was reapportioned accordingly.

On appeal, the Second Department reinstated the credit. The appellate court noted that in Mahoney–Buntzman, the wife had sought credit for maintenance payments made to the husband’s former spouse that had become due and were paid during the marriage. In holding that such payments were not subject to recoupment by the wife, the Court of Appeals reasoned that maintenance obligations to a former spouse and to children pursuant to a support order “are obligations that do not enure solely to the benefit of one spouse.” Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals cautioned:

This is not to say that every expenditure of marital funds during the course of the marriage may not be considered in an equitable distribution calculation. … There may be circumstances where equity requires a credit to one spouse for marital property used to pay off the separate debt of one spouse or add to the value of one spouse’s separate property.”

Continue Reading Payment of Husband's Pre-marital Support Arrears Results in Equitable Distribution Credit to the Wife

Marital Residence.jpgA spouse contributing separate property (most commonly pre-marital, gifted, or inherited funds) to the purchase of the marital residence does not make a gift of (half of) that payment to the other spouse, even if the residence is held by the parties jointly.

So was the holding of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in its

Retirement egg.jpg
Almost all ERISA-Qualified Defined Benefit Plans (commonly known as “pensions”) are required to offer annuities (a stream of monthly payments). Where there is no divorce, the annuity must be paid as a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity unless the Participant’s spouse consents in writing at the time of retirement to a different form of payment. Moreover, any plan that offers an annuity option must also provide a Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor Annuity that will pay the surviving spouse of a Participant an annuity for the spouse’s life if the Participant dies before actually retiring.
If a Participant and his spouse divorce, then the Participant’s (former) spouse may be designated as an Alternate Payee in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). This will enable the divorced spouse to be treated as the Participant’s “surviving spouse.” If such a QDRO is entered, the divorced spouse may insist that the Participant choose a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity with the divorced spouse and also insist that the divorced spouse be designated as the surviving spouse and beneficiary of a Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor Annuity.

By definition, joint and survivor payments potentially will continue longer than a payment continuing only for the life of the Participant. As a result, the monthly payments under a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity will always be less than the payments under a Single Life Annuity. The longer the projected duration, the lower the monthly payment level.

Because a Single Life Annuity by definition may have a shorter duration than Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity, it will have a higher monthly payment for the same accrued benefit. The payment level for a joint annuity will depend on the ages of the two persons whose lives are being used to measure its duration.

Generally, where a Participant’s annuity is not yet in pay status, there are four ways in which that annuity may be divided between him and an Alternate Payee who is his spouse or former spouse.

A. Shared Single Life Annuity on Life of Participant: Payments will begin when the Participant chooses to retire and will end on the Participant’s death. A divorce court can divide this payment stream for the life of the Participant between the Participant and the divorced spouse.

B. Shared Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity on the Lives of the Participant and Alternate Payee (the divorced spouse): Payments will begin when the Participant chooses to retire and will continue until the death of the last to die of the Participant and the Alternate Payee (divorced spouse). Within this option, it may be possible to choose either:
a 100% joint and survivor option, where after the first death, the full monthly benefit is paid to the survivor for the life of the survivor (until the first death, the monthly benefit is split between the Participant and the divorced spouse); or
a 50% joint and survivor option, where after the first death, half of the full monthly benefit is paid to the survivor for the life of the survivor (until the first death, the monthly benefit is split between the Participant and the divorced spouse).
C. Shared Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity on the Lives of Participant and the Participant’s New Spouse: If the Participant has remarried, the Participant may choose or be forced to choose (if his current spouse will not sign a waiver) a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity with the Participant’s new spouse. Payments under such an annuity may still be divided between the Participant and the divorced spouse, and such payments would continue until either the death the death of the last to die of the Participant or the Participant’s new spouse.
D. Separate Interest Approach: Single Life Annuity on Life of Alternate Payee: This is the choice most divorced spouses prefer. It gives the Alternate Payee complete control over the timing of the commencement of the annuity payments, and the payments will not terminate until the divorced spouse’s death.
The Second Department in McVeigh held that a 50% Shared Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity on the Lives of the Participant and Alternate Payee (the divorced spouse) was to be chosen, unless the Participant (here the husband) elected to insure his wife’s continuing benefit in the event the husband predeceased the wife.
The appellate court was careful to point out that any Qualified Domestic Relations Order must specify that the wife is to receive no more than her 50% share of the marital portion of the husband’s pension. That marital portion is the wife’s awarded equitable share (here 50%) of a fraction of the pension benefit determined by dividing the total months prior to the commencement of the divorce action that the participant was in the pension plan and the parties were married by the total number of months the participant is in the plan prior to retirement. This formula was adopted by the Court of Appeals in Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1984).
The 50% Joint and Survivor Option does, as the Second Department noted in McVeigh (and as the Third Department noted in Erickson v. Erickson, 281 A.D.2d 862, 723 N.Y.S.2d 521 [2001]), come closer to continue the spouse’s benefit in the event the participant predeceases the spouse.
However, why should the Participant, alone, bear the cost of insuring out of this option. As each spouse will benefit by the increased monthly payment incident to electing the Single Life Annuity, why should not the spouse bear the Majauskas share of the cost of a life insurance policy to provide the equivalent of continuing payments to the spouse if the spouse survives the participant. Doing so gives both parties the incentive to choose the option that is right for them.

Absent other agreement between the parties, a divorce court must require a pension plan participant to elect the 50% joint and survivor option (if) offered by the participant’s pension fund. Alternatively, the participant may provide life insurance for the benefit of the spouse sufficient to pay the spouse’s share of the participant’s pension in the event the participant pre-deceases the spouse. So held the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its October 24, 2012 decision in McVeigh v. Curry. In doing so, the Second Department modified the decision of Rockland County Supreme Court Justice Linda S. Jamieson to require the participant’s election of the 100% joint and survivor option (or provide suitable life insurance).

By way of background, almost all ERISA-Qualified Defined Benefit Plans (commonly known as “pensions”) are required to offer annuities (a stream of monthly payments). Where there is no divorce, the annuity must be paid as a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity unless the Participant’s spouse consents in writing at the time of retirement to a different form of payment. Moreover, any plan that offers an annuity option must also provide a Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor Annuity that will pay the surviving spouse of a Participant an annuity for the spouse’s life if the Participant dies before actually retiring.

Where there is a divorce, the Participant’s (former) spouse may be designated as an Alternate Payee in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). This will enable the divorced spouse to be treated as the Participant’s “surviving spouse.” If such a QDRO is entered, the divorced spouse may insist that the Participant choose a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity with the divorced spouse and also insist that the divorced spouse be designated as the surviving spouse and beneficiary of a Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor Annuity.

By definition, as joint and survivor payments will continue potentially longer than payments continuing only for the life of the Participant. As a result, the monthly payments under a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity will always be less than the payments under a Single Life Annuity. The longer the projected duration, the lower the monthly payment level.

Because a Single Life Annuity by definition may have a shorter duration than Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity, it will have a higher monthly payment for the same accrued benefit. The payment level for a joint annuity will depend on the ages of the two persons whose lives are being used to measure its duration.Continue Reading Mandating a Pension's 50% Joint and Survivor Option in a Divorce

House of cards 2.jpgContinuing to demonstrate New York’s public policy enforcing settlement agreements and the finality they bring to bear on divorce litigation, the Court of Appeals on April 3, 2012 held that the post-agreement discovery that the fact that a marital account had been invested with Bernard Madoff and retained by the husband upon the divorce was not a sufficient basis to set aside that agreement when the Madoff scheme later surfaced.

In 2006, former spouses Steven Simkin and Laura Blank entered a divorce settlement agreement under which Ms. Blank, among other terms, waived spousal support and marital property rights in the value of the husband’s law practice. The husband paid his wife $6.25 million.

Three years later, when the now ex-husband learned he was a victim of Bernard Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, he commenced an action against his former wife asking that the 2006 agreement be “reformed” to reflect the mutual mistake made by the parties, i.e., the assumption  that there was an account with Madoff worth $5.4 million. Mr. Simkin alleged that the payment made to his ex-wife under the 2006 agreement was intended to accomplish an “approximately equal division of [the couple’s] marital assets.” In reliance upon that mistaken assumption, the ex-husband claimed he paid his wife $2.7 million which should now be returned.Continue Reading Husband Keeping Madoff Account in Divorce is Not Basis to Change Pre-Collapse Settlement Agreement

Gay marriage rings.jpgLast week, the Appellate Division, Third Department, exercised its equitable muscle to filling in the gaps while the marriage and divorce laws of the different states catch up with each other.  On July 21, 2011, in Dickerson v. Thompson, the court granted a dissolution of a Vermont civil union.

Under Vermont law, the civil union entered by the gay couple was not a marriage. As a result, a New York divorce, “no-fault” or otherwise, was not the appropriate remedy. The appellate court noted that as “the plaintiff would be entitled to a dissolution of a civil union in Vermont,” but for her failure to be a current resident of that state. Giving the plaintiff her need relief, the court declared the broad equity powers of the New York Supreme Court were sufficient to declare the Vermont civil union dissolved. Thus, the plaintiff would now be free to marry, domestically partner, or re-unite with another.

While New York tore asunder one gay couple, more than 800 gay couples were able to marry on July 24, 2011, the first day of such unions under New York’s same-sex marriage legislation.  New York is still coming to grips with joining the rest of the country by making the dissolution of a marriage a matter of one spouse’s choice: a simple declaration that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. That law is just under 10 months old.Continue Reading Defining or Questioning the Marriage Contract: Gay Marriages, No-Fault Divorce and Dissolved Civil Unions

Retirement Plan.jpgAfter 36 years of family law practice, I pride myself on having a good idea of what I don’t know.

The good news is that I can reach out for the help needed to make sure the bases are covered when drafting a divorce settlement agreement.  Matrimonial litigation has spawned a host of forensic specialities

Calulator on 100s 11 red.jpgThe way you phrase the credit is just as important as the amount.

Let’s assume that when the divorce action was filed, the parties’ marital residence was encumbered by a mortgage with a principal balance of $250,000.

Let’s further assume that while the divorce action is pending, the wife, only, makes all the mortgage payments.