Under appropriate circumstances, post-divorce spousal support may last much longer than the marriage itself. So held the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its September 2019 decision in Murphy v. Murphy.

The parties were married in 2004. They had no children together. Prior to the marriage, the wife was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.

In 2013, after 8½ years of marriage, the wife commenced this action for a divorce. After three years, the parties were able to enter a stipulation resolving the issue of equitable distribution. The issue of maintenance was tried before Supreme Court, Suffolk County Justice Carol MacKenzie. At the time of trial, the wife was 42 years old and the husband 47.

The critical issue presented was whether the wife was capable of working, and if so, in what capacity, as a result of the symptoms that she alleged she experienced due to multiple sclerosis. Justice MacKenzie concluded that the wife was incapable of maintaining employment. The wife was awarded maintenance of $10,760 per month terminating 25 years after trial when the wife turned 67 years old.


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Calculator formulaOn June 24, 2015, the New York State Senate passed Bill A7645-2015 relating to the duration and amount of temporary and post-divorce spousal maintenance. The bill passed the State Assembly on June 15th. It awaits approval by Governor Cuomo.

The law’s formulas apply to actions commenced on or after the 120th day after they become law (except for the temporary maintenance formulas which apply to actions commenced on or after the 30th day after they become law). The new law may not be used as a basis to change existing orders and agreements.

The law will undoubtedly be the subject of numerous articles and legal seminars. Years of decisions will be forthcoming that particularly focus on matters of discretion, just as they followed the enactment of the Child Support Standards Act in 1989.

Before getting to the new formulas, the law eliminates a major thorn in side of the matrimonial bench and bar: When equitably distributing the assets of the parties, the court is no longer to consider as a marital asset the value of a spouse’s enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement (however, it may be condidered when making other distributive awards).

As to maintenance, the following highlights may be noted, many of which are contained in the Sponsor’s Memo:


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A couple that used “employment” of the ex-wife by the ex-husband as a device to provide post-remarriage support to the ex-wife was bound to employment rules. The wife could be fired for misconduct. So held the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in its September 26, 2014 decision in Anderson v. Anderson.

The Separation and Property

The IRS is enhancing processes to address the discrepancies between the deductions taken by alimony payers and the income reported by alimony recipients. This is in response to a report of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration issued March 31, 2014 (TIGTA #2014-40-022).

Alimony is a payment to or for the benefit

When calculating a child support obligation, what effect does a simultaneous spousal maintenance award have? The November 21, 2013 decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Alecca v. Alecca reveals the conflict among the Departments, questions of logic, and the need for action by the Legislature.

Agreeing with Judge Anthony McGinty, deciding for the Ulster County Supreme Court, the appellate court held in Alecca that if a spousal maintenance award does not terminate until after all children have been emancipated, the maintenance award may not be deducted from the payor’s income for child support calculation purposes. Spousal maintenance does get deducted if it terminates before all children are emancipated and the awarding court provides for a specific adjustment of child support at the time of the maintenance termination.

Child support is presumptively the function of the Child Support Standards Acct (C.S.S.A.) formula (D.R.L. §240 [1-b]; F.C.A. §413). Depending upon the number of children to be supported, the presumptive formula is a certain percentage of parental income, with the obligation of the support payor being the payor’s pro rata portion of the combined parental income of both parents. In addition to the basic child support obligation, the parents’ obligation to pay additional amounts for health and child care expenses  is also presumptively a function of the parents’ pro rata shares of their combined income. Although relevant, an add-on obligation for educational expenses (if warranted by the circumstances, justice, and the best interests of the child) is not expressly a function of pro rata shares.


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1040.jpgThe Appellate Division, Second Department, has again told J.H.O. Stanley Gartenstein that it was improper for him to award nontaxable spousal maintenance.

In Siskind v. Siskind, in addition to awarding the wife $65,000 per year in nontaxable maintenance until the wife reached her 65th birthday, J.H.O. Gartenstein equitably distributed the parties’ assets, awarded child support and a $340,000 counsel fee, and secured the husband’s support obligations with a $4 million life insurance policy (reduced on appeal to $3 million).

In its November, 2011 modification of that award, the Second Department recognized the presumption that spousal maintenance should be taxable income to the recipient spouse, and deductible to the payor. The appellate court stated:

. . . there was insufficient evidence justifying the Supreme Court’s direction that maintenance be nontaxable to the plaintiff, which is “a departure from the norm envisioned by current Internal Revenue Code provisions.”

In 2007, in Grumet v. Grumet, the Second Department had modified J.H.O. Gartenstein’s award to the wife of non-taxable maintenance, declaring that in the absence of a stated rationale for a departure from the norm envisioned by the Internal Revenue Code provisions, a maintenance award should be taxable.

Maintenance is appropriately taxable income to the recipient. Baron v. Baron (2nd Dept. 2010), Markopulous v. Markopulos, 274 A.D.2d 457, 710 N.Y.S.2d 636 (2nd Dept. 2000) ; see also Taverna v. Taverna (2008), where the Second Department modified the trial court award by making maintenance taxable. Such may have been the holding because the trial court properly declined to consider the husband’s tax liabilities resulting from the liquidation and distribution of investment accounts incident to equitable distribution, as the husband had failed to offer any competent evidence concerning the liabilities which would be incurred. See Fleishmann v. Fleischmann (2010 Supreme Westchester Co., Lubell, J.)


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