Ambiguous

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Is a divorce settlement agreement that mandates that the children attend school within a particular school district satisfied by the children being home schooled within that district? Maybe, held the Third Department in its June 17, 2021 decision in Matter of John U. v. Sara U.

The parties were the divorced parents of two children (born in 2010 and 2012). They entered a separation agreement in October 2017, which was modified in September 2019. The agreement provided for joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the children. As is here relevant, it contained a provision that:

[s]o long as the [father] maintains a residence in [a certain school district,] the children shall continue to attend school within [that school district] unless both parties expressly agree in writing to change the schools of the children.

Prior to the 2019-2020 school year, the children had attended a certain public elementary school in that school district. The children had a religious exemption from vaccination. After a June 2019 change in state law eliminated such religious exemptions for students (see Public Health Law § 2164), and after the district’s denial of the mother’s requests for medical exemptions, the unvaccinated children were removed from their school in September 2019 and the mother began home schooling instruction at her home.Continue Reading Is Home-Schooling “Attending” School?

College Fund 3Should a court reinterpret a divorce settlement agreement in light of New York’s public policy? It is one thing to void a contract provision as violative of that policy. It’s another to pretend that the contract was intended to be consistent with that policy.

Take, Monroe County Supreme Court Justice Richard A. Dollinger’s recent decision in Luken v. Luken. There, the parties’ June, 2014 separation agreement provided that the couple would jointly finance the college education for their sons. At the time of the agreement the older son had completed his first year of college; the younger son was in high school. The husband was to pay 70 percent of the college cost, the wife the remaining 30 percent, up to a combined cap of $42,000. The agreement also gave the husband a college expense credit against his child support obligation:

The father shall be entitled to receive a credit against his child support for payments for college educational expenses as set forth herein.

The agreement had obligated the father to pay child support of $33,996 annually for his two sons. The amount was calculated using the $141,000 C.S.S.A. “cap,” even though the couple’s combined family income substantially exceeded that amount (the wife estimated the husband’s income at $600,000).Continue Reading Crediting Child Support With Payments for College Expenses

What is a “mandatory” college expense to be shared by the parents?

In its January 15, 2014 decision in Shaughnessy v. Cox, the Second Department upheld the order of Nassau County Family Court Judge Robin M. Kent (which in turn upheld the determination of Support Magistrate Neil Miller) directing the father to pay 50% of the college expenses of the parties’ children regardless of their emancipation. The parties’ stipulation of settlement of their divorce action so provided. Moreover, the father’s obligation included the repayment of expenses which were paid from the proceeds of student loans.

However, Magistrate Miller had required the father to pay those expenses “upon the mother’s presentation of proper documentation directly to him . . . .” This, the Second Department held was error. Rather, the documentation should be provided by the mother first to the Family Court. The Court would determine whether the expenses were mandatory and, therefore, payable by the father pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

Setting up a situation in which parties are required to go, in the first instance, to a court to determine whether a college expense is “mandatory,” seems like extra work is being created. Here, it is not explained why the mother did not present proper documentation of expenses prior to Magistrate Miller making his ruling. Alternatively, the appellate court could have set up a procedure by which only if the father disputed the mandatory nature of expenses claimed by the mother would further Family Court proceedings be necessary.

Once again, the controversy results from the failure of an agreement to properly set forth the categories of college expenses to be shared. Apparently this agreement only specified “mandatory” expenses.Continue Reading Ambiguous Agreements to Pay for Children's College Expenses

How.jpgIn its November 20, 2012 decision in Kang v. Kim, the First Department affirmed what appears to be an unwarranted interpretation of a divorce settlement marital residence buyout provision. In doing so, the appellate court yielded to the construction of the provision used by the “trier of fact” to resolve the ex=wife’s post-divorce motion to enforce the parties’ property settlement agreement.

That agreement gave the ex-wife the right to purchase the husband’s interest in the marital residence, a cooperative apartment. The clause provided:

If the parties are unable to agree as to the terms for such purchase within 30 days of the day that the Wife gave notice to the Husband then the value of the Husband’s interest (the ‘buy-out price’) shall be one half of the value of the apartment as determined by a Real Estate Appraisers [sic ] agreed to by the parties less the outstanding amount owed upon the First Mortgage.

The wife claimed that the provision was unambiguous. The price (“P”) she was to receive was one half of the value of the apartment (“V”) less the entire outstanding mortgage (“M”). The entirety of the mortgage was to be subtracted from the ex-husband’s half-share of the gross value.

Recalling math class from, oh, so many years ago, the wife successfully argued:

P = (V/2) – M

The husband had argued that the buyout price was half the value of the apartment less the wife’s one-half share of the outstanding amount of the mortgage. Mathematically, the husband argued:

P = V/2 – M/2

Thus, the husband asserted that the buyout price was one half of the equity in the apartment. This might also be written:

P = (V-M)/2

The First Department noted that the lower court, New York County Supreme Court Justice Matthew F. Cooper, found the provision “unambiguous.”

However, the First Department disagreed on the issue of ambiguity, nevertheless deferring to the construction used by the lower court. The appellate court found that:

upon examination of the settlement agreement in its entirety, and considering the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which it was executed, the agreement is ambiguous because the provision is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation.

Indeed, the First Department noted, the settlement agreement also provided that all marital property was to be divided 50/50 and that if the premises were sold to a third party, the “net proceeds of sale” were to be divided equally.Continue Reading Drafting Formulas in Divorce Stipulations of Settlement: Use Examples and Math Concepts