Beth Din

Subscribe to Beth Din via RSS

Ketuba- is a special type of Jewish prenuptial agreement. It is considered an integral part of a traditional Jewish marriage, and outlines the rights and responsibilities of the groom, in relation to the bride. Nevertheless, there is no agreement in modern times as to the monetary worth of the ketubah, and in practice it is never enforced

Imposing a higher maintenance obligation on an Orthodox Jewish husband who refused to give his wife a religious divorce (“Get”) would violate constitutional protections. So held Orange County Acting Supreme Court Justice Catherine M. Bartlett in the January 13, 2017 decision in Masri v. Masri.

The parties married in 2002, separated in 2007 and have lived separate and apart since that time. They have 14 and 11 year-old children, the older one being disabled. The wife commenced the present action for a no-fault divorce March 8, 2016.

Since the separation, the wife has attempted without success to secure from the husband a “Get”, which she requires under Jewish law in order for her to remarry. The husband refused to participate in proceedings in 2012 before a Rabbinical Court, asserting that the wife had waived her right to rabbinical arbitration by previously going to a secular court (the divorce judgment in which had been vacated). The Rabbinical Court advised the husband that he had no power to decide the issue of the wife’s alleged waiver on his own, and was required to arbitrate that issue before the Rabbinical Court. The husband refused to comply, whereupon the Rabbinical Court declared him to be a “Rabbinical Court evader.”Continue Reading Unconstitutional to Consider Husband’s Refusal to Give Religious Divorce (Get) When Granting Support

Rip up contract 3.jpgShlomo Scholar and Shoshana Timinisky married in 2005. They had one child the next year.  The year after that they entered a stipulation of settlement to resolve their divorce action.

Included in that stipulation was the parties agreement that Ms. Timinisky would have sole custody of the parties’ child. However, the parties also agreed that custody rights be limited by an agreement to share decision-making on all issues relating to the child’s education. The parties pre-selected an arbitrator to resolve their failure to agree on such issues.

Such a disagreement arose. However, in a September 9, 2010 order, Queens County Supreme Court Justice Thomas Raffaele denied the father’s motion to enforce the parties’ stipulation. Instead, without a hearing, the mother was granted sole decision-making authority with respect to the child’s education in the event that the parties were unable to agree to a parenting coordinator (traditionally employed to facilitate parent communication and the mediation of disputes).  Justice Raffaele also disqualified “a certain individual from arbitrating issues regarding the education of the child.” Finally, on its own motion, Justice Raffaele enjoined Mr. Scholar from bringing any further motions without the permission of the Supreme Court.

In an August 9, 2011 decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Scholar v. Timinisky, that Order was affirmed. The appellate court ruled that Justice Raffaele properly determined that a change of circumstances required a modification of the parties’ stipulation of settlement to protect the best interests of the child. New York’s best interest standard was to be applied to resolve a dispute regarding parental joint decision-making authority.Continue Reading Court Avoids Parents' Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes Over Education of Child