Christopher J. Chimeri

The Child Support Standards Act authorizes parents to agree to a child support obligation that deviates from the presumptive formula provided in that statute. However, if they are going to deviate from the formula, the parents must state what the obligation would have been if the formula were to be applied, and the reasons why the parties have agreed to deviate.

In its September 26, 2018 decision in Fasano v. Fasano, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that if one of those reasons no longer applies, such is a “substantial change in circumstances” warranting a new child support determination.

The parties were married in 1993 and have two children together. In October, 2012, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement of a prior divorce action after which that action was discontinued.

That stipulation provided that although the husband’s monthly child support obligation using the C.S.S.A. calculation would be $1,994.45 on the first $130,000.00 of combined parental income (then, the “cap”) and $2,575.61 on the total combined parental income, the parties had agreed that the husband’s monthly child support obligation would be $1,500.00. The stipulation also provided that there would be no “add-ons” or “additional health costs” added to these child support payments, even though the C.S.S.A. generally provides that each parent’s share of unreimbursed health care expenses is to be prorated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income.

The stipulation contained an explanation that the deviation from the C.S.S.A. calculation was necessary “to allow the [husband] to retain the marital residence as a place for the children to be with him when they are together” and had “been agreed by the parties to be in the best interests of the children to provide them continuity and stability in their living and educational environments.”

Continue Reading A Child Support Redetermination Is Warranted If a Stated Reason Parties Deviated From CSSA No Longer Applies

It’s one of my pet topics. How do you provide — how do you write a provision awarding one spouse credit for paying down the mortgage principal while a divorce action is pending or thereafter?

Consider the August 29, 2018 decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Westbrook v. Westbrook.

In April 2008, the wife commenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief. In a pendente lite order, the Supreme Court, inter alia, directed the husband to pay temporary child support in the sum of $150 per week. The court also directed the husband to pay a majority of the carrying charges on the marital residence, which included a first mortgage on the two-thirds share of the value of the marital residence that had been purchased from the husband’s siblings, as well as a home equity line of credit (hereinafter HELOC) that was secured by the marital residence.

On or about November 24, 2009, the parties executed a stipulation agreeing, inter alia, that the husband would have exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence effective December 1, 2009, and that the husband would pay child support to the wife in the sum of $350 per week commencing on December 1, 2009. Thereafter, the wife moved, inter alia, to increase the husband’s temporary child support obligation. In a pendente lite order dated May 21, 2010, the Supreme Court directed the husband to pay $700 per week in temporary child support during the pendency of the action.

Following the trial, as is here relevant, Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice Marlene L. Budd declined to award the husband a credit for the payments made by him during the pendency of the action to reduce the principal balances of the first mortgage and the HELOC. In addition, the court directed that the marital residence be listed for sale, and that the husband make the payments towards the first mortgage and the HELOC if he continued to reside in the marital residence until the residence was sold.

Continue Reading Calculating Divorce Credits for Mortgage and HELOC Payments

Parental Alienation RibbonThe mother’s alienation of the children from the father was the sole basis stated by the Second Department while upholding a change of custody to the father. In its March 25, 2015 decision in Halioris v. Halioris, the court affirmed an order of Suffolk County Family Court Judge Bernard Cheng.

The Second Department noted that modification of an existing court-sanctioned custody arrangement is permissible only upon a showing that there has been a change in circumstances such that modification is necessary to ensure the best interests of the child.

Parental alienation of a child from the other parent is an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the offending parent is unfit to act as custodial parent.

As custody determinations turn in large part on assessments of the credibility, character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, Judge Cheng’s findings in connection with these issues would not be disturbed unless they lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record. Here, the Second Department found that Judge Cheng’s determinations that there had been a change in circumstances, and that a transfer of sole custody to the father would be in the children’s best interests, had such a sound and substantial basis in the record.

Moreover, the Second Department upheld Judge Cheng’s holding the mother in contempt for failing to cooperate with family therapy. Generally, in order to prevail on a motion to hold a party in civil contempt, the movant is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence:

  1. that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect;
  2. that the order was disobeyed and the party disobeying the order had knowledge of its terms; and
  3. that the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct.

Here, the father met his burden. Specifically, the father showed, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother, with full knowledge of its requirements, violated a so-ordered stipulation that in part unequivocally mandated that the parties and the subject children engage in, cooperate with, and attend family therapy. The violation of the stipulation by the mother resulted in prejudice to the father. Accordingly, Judge Cheng properly granted the father’s petition to hold the mother in contempt for disobeying the stipulation.

Christopher J. Chimeri, of Hauppauge, represented the mother. The father represented himself. Domenik Veraldi, Jr., of Islandia, served as attorney for the children.

In its January 28, 2015 decision in Carlin v. Carlin, the Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld the removal of the forensic evaluator previously court-appointed in the parties’ divorce action.

On the renewed motion for the removal made by the wife, she submitted a letter from the Mental Health Professionals Certification Committee for the First and Second Judicial Departments to the evaluator, informing him that he had been removed from the Mental Health Professionals Panel. On that basis, Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice Joseph Santorelli vacated the prior appointment.

In any case involving custody, visitation and other specified family matters, a judge is authorized to appoint a mental health professional to evaluate the family

The Mental Health Professionals Panel was established by the Appellate Division, First and Second Judicial Departments, to ensure that courts and parties have “access to qualified mental health professionals” who are available to evaluate the parties and to assist courts in reaching appropriate decisions as to, inter alia, custody and visitation (22 N.Y.C.R.R. 623). The Certification Committee is tasked with the responsibility of recommending eligible mental health professionals for appointment to the panel, investigating complaints against panel members, and recommending removal of panel members to the Presiding Justices of the First and Second Judicial Departments.

The panel is comprised of approximately 266 licensed psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, whose names can be accessed in the MHP Resource Directory 2014.

The Departments publish a 2013 Mental Health Professionals Handbook which serves to familiarize the panel with the procedures and protocols for handling court ordered mental health evaluations. It includes relevant regulations and statutory provisions, administrative policies, court forms, and sample orders.

Peter Panaro of Massapequa represented the wife. Christopher J. Chimeri of counsel to Campagna Johnson, P.C., of Hauppauge represented the husband.