Collaborative Practice Logo.jpgMonica and Mitchell Mandell were married in 1998. They have three children. After Mr. Mandell moved out last year, his wife retained attorney Ellen Jancko-Baken to represent her. Ms. Mandell was interested in pursuing the “Collaborative Law” process.

After three perhaps “preliminary” meetings, the contemplated Collaborative Process fell apart. Ms. Mandell used her same attorney to commence a divorce action. Her husband, then, looked to disqualify his wife’s lawyer, claiming such representation was barred by the rules of Collaborative practice.

As noted by Westchester Supreme Court Justice Alan D. Scheinkman in his June 28, 2012 decision in Mandell v. Mandell, the Collaborative Process is a form of dispute resolution in which the parties retain counsel specially trained in collaborative law and enter into a contract to negotiate a settlement without involving the Court.

As Justice Scheinkman noted, one of the principal features of the Collaborative Process is that, if the matter is not resolved, the attorneys who represented the parties in the unsuccessful effort to reach a settlement may not thereafter represent the parties in contested litigation. Among other benefits, this hallmark of the process:

  • eliminates pre-litigation posturing;
  • provides clients with a greater degree of influence in candid negotiations in which the clients participate directly;
  • motivates the parties to continue working toward a mutually agreeable resolutiont due to the prospective expense of having to hire new lawyers if the matter has to go to court;
  • makes it clear that counsel are committing themselves to the process of dispute resolution by having counsel agree to absent themselves from any future litigation;
  • gives counsel an economic incentive to stick with the process;
  • discourages counsel from abandoning the process since their role, and their fees, would end; and
  • conversely, provides counsel with no personal monetary incentive to encourage litigation.

In light of his wife’s interest in using the Collaborative Process, the husband retained Neil Kozek. Both Ms. Jancko-Baken and Mr. Kozek are members of the International and New York Associations of Collaborative Professionals.Continue Reading Counsel Not Disqualified From Litigation Where Collaborative Divorce Participation Agreement Not Signed

Connolly Francesca.jpgThere are may circumstances which courts recognize warrant revisiting a divorce resolution. On the other hand, ongoing litigation is often unfounded and a result of the anger, bitterness, sadness, desire for revenge, etc.

In her February 3, 2012 decision in D.W. v. R.W., Westchester County Supreme Court Justice Francesca E. Connolly imposed $17,500.00 in sanctions and another $42,707.29 in counsel fees against a pro se (self-represented) ex-wife who refused to abide by repeated rulings requiring the ex-wife to discontinue her attacks on a divorce settlement reached over seven years earlier.

Following that settlement, the ex-wife had engaged in extensive post-judgment litigation to vacate the underlying agreement on the grounds that she lacked the mental capacity to understand and agree, and that the agreement was unfair, unconscionable, the product of overreaching, fraud, or some variation thereof. Her numerous attempts to challenge the stipulation were considered and rejected by several lower and appellate courts.

Nevertheless, in October, 2010, the ex-wife commenced another action against 23 defendants, including her ex-husband, her children, her former in-laws, her ex-husband’s former attorneys, and other entities. In an 81-page complaint, she claimed breach of contract and fraud for the failure to disclose various assets during the divorce proceedings. She claimed to have discovered documents showing the fraud by going through her ex-husband’s garbage cans outside his residence.Continue Reading Sanctions and Fees Totaling $60,000 Imposed Against Ex-Wife; Divorce Litigation Often Keeps Going, and Going, and Going . . .

We are not moving cropped.jpg

The May 5, 2011 decision of the Appellate Division Third Department in Munson v. Fanning, highlights the need for difficult discussions and prioritization before taking life-altering steps. It is also another call for the expanded use of the Collaborative Law Process.

In this case, the parties’ 12-year old daughter had been born after her parents had separated and divorced. The mother sought and permission to move with the child to California to join her new husband who had taken a new job. Saratoga Family Court Judge Courtenay W. Hall denied that relief, but revised the father’s visitation schedule to allow the mother to join her husband for extended periods during school recesses.

The appellate court reviewed whether the mother met her burden of proving by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the relocation was in the child’s best interests. Quoting the 1996 landmark decision of the Court of Appeals in Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575, the court stated:

The factors to be considered in making such a determination include “each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child’s future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial parent’s and child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements.”

The court recognized the healthy relationship the daughter developed the mother’s new husband, as well as her other children, all of whom were to reside in California. The step-father’s new job in California would allow her to stay at home and raise her children. The attorney for the daughter (formerly called the Law Guardian) supported the relocation.Continue Reading Relocation to California Denied Mother with 12-year Old Daughter