What happens when a deceased father failed to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his ex-wife and the children of the marriage entitled to receive support? Is there a claim, against whom, and for how much?

Those were the questions answered by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its August 31, 2016 decision in Mayer v. Mayer.

There, the plaintiff (mother) was the second wife of Paul S. Mayer (father). Pursuant to their 2000 judgment of divorce, the father was, among other things, obligated to pay child support and educational expenses for the children of that marriage, Alanna and Matthew. The judgment of divorce also provided that the father was to maintain a term life insurance policy in the face amount of $1,000,000 for the benefit of Alanna and Matthew, with the mother being named as trustee on their behalf, “until such time as his support obligation is fully satisfied.”

In 2001, the father married Kristen and thereafter had two children, Jonah and Ryan.

In 2005, due to the father’s claimed inability to pay the premiums on the $1,000,000 policy required under the judgment of divorce, the policy was converted into two policies insuring his life, both of which were issued by New York Life. One policy, with a face amount of $200,000, listed the father as the owner and the mother as the beneficiary. The other policy, with a face amount of $100,000, listed the mother as both the owner and the beneficiary. The mother paid the premiums on the $100,000 policy.

In 2006, the mother moved in the Family Court to have the father held in contempt for, among other things, failing to maintain the $1,000,000 policy required by the judgment of divorce. The Family Court found the father to be in contempt and directed him to comply with the life insurance provision of the judgment of divorce. However, apparently the father could not obtain a new policy in the amount of $1,000,000 because of ill health.Continue Reading Redressing the Failure to Maintain Life Insurance Required by Divorce Judgment

Once again, it has been made clear that where either or both spouses have assets or liabilities at the date of marriage, it is foolhardy (or at least imprudent) to enter the marriage without a prenuptial agreement and/or the assembly of proof of the extent, nature and value of those assets or liabilities.

Take the January 8, 2015 decision of the Appellate Division, Third Depatrtment, in Ceravolo v. DeSantis. In that case, the parties were married in July, 1996. The wife commenced the action for divorce in June, 2010. Acting Albany Supreme Court Justice Kimberly O’Connor determined, among other things, that the marital residence, which had been purchased by the husband prior to the marriage, was marital property and awarded the wife, among other things, half of its value. The husband appealed.

The Third Department agreed with the husband that Justice O’Connor erred in classifying the marital residence as marital property. Marital property is defined as “all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage” (Domestic Relations Law §236[B][1][c]), while “property acquired before marriage” is separate property (D.R.L. §236[B][1][d][1]).

Title is a critical consideration in identifying the nature of real property acquired before the marriage. The circumstances surrounding the purchase of the residence and the parties’ intent relative thereto are irrelevant to the legal classification of the residence as separate or marital property.

Here, the husband purchased the marital residence in January 1994 — 2½ years prior to the parties’ marriage — paying $130,000 of his own funds and borrowing an additional $100,000 from his father, secured by a note and mortgage. Although the wife contributed $30,000 of her separate funds to the initial purchase of the residence, the husband took title to the property in his name alone.Continue Reading Title Controls Premarital Contributions To The Acquisition and Expenses of Property

A non-written agreement for cohabitants to share retirement benefits can be enforceable under a breach of contract claim, but will not support claims to impose a constructive trust, or for unjust enrichment or an accounting. Such was the holding of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its November 13, 2013 decision in Dee v. Rakower.

In the majority opinion written by Justice Leonard B. Austin, the appellate court relied heavily on the facts as pleaded in the complaint. The parties had lived together in a committed, same-sex relationship for nearly 18 years. Two children were born of this relationship; each party being the biological parent of one child, legally adopted by the other.

After the relationship ended in 2007 (before the passage of New York’s Marriage Equality Act [see, Domestic Relations Law §§ 10-a, 10-b]), Ms. Dee commenced this action seeking to enforce the alleged oral “joint venture/partnership” agreement. Under that agreement, Ms. Dee was to share in assets, including Ms. Rakower’s retirement contributions and earnings, in exchange for Ms. Dee leaving her full-time job to care for the parties’ children.

Before they had children, each party was employed full-time, earning a salary and retirement benefits. The parties pooled their respective salaries to meet their shared expenses. The parties purchased a house as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.

After the parties’ first child was born, the parties agreed, it was alleged, that given the cost of child care, Ms. Dee would eschew her full-time employment and work part-time so that she could be home with the children and perform other non-financial services for the benefit of the family and for the parties’ partnership and/or joint venture while Ms Rakower would continue to work full-time. Ms. Dee alleged that her decision to leave her full-time employment was based upon the parties’ specific agreement that Ms. Dee would be entitled to one half of Ms. Rakower’s retirement contributions and earnings for the period.

Ms. Rakower moved to dismiss Ms. Dee’s complaint. Kings County Supreme Court Justice Yvonne Lewis granted that motion, determining that the facts did not support causes of action for breach of contract, to impose a constructive trust, for unjust enrichment or for an accounting.Continue Reading Oral Cohabitation Contract Claim Withstands Motion To Dismiss