The general rule is that joint or shared custody, requiring both parents to agree on decisions, is inappropriate where parents have demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to cooperate
The policy was upheld in the October 22, 2013 decision of the First Department in Jennings v. Walcott. The appellate court reversed the determination of …
Where the parties’ joint legal custody agreement only provided for each parent to have equal input on all major decisions, including education, but did not provide for conflict resolution, the mother, after a hearing, was awarded temporary decision-making authority. Such was the holding of the April 11, 2013 decision of the Appellate Division, First Department,…
In last week’s blog, I discussed the extraordinary analysis undertaken by Monroe County Supreme Court Justice Richard A. Dollinger in L.L. v. R.L. in order to apply the agreement made by parents at the time of their divorce to finance their children’s college education “according to their respective means at the time the child…
In my December 12, 2011 blog, I discussed the October 14, 2011 decision of New York County Supreme Court Justice Matthew F. Cooper, directing a father to pay 40% of his child’s private college expenses. In its April 24, 2012 decision in Tishman v. Bogatin, the First Department affirmed. A parent’s contribution…
Allowing a state of facts to exist for a period of time without objection will often lead a court to continue those facts. Here, the court required a father to contribute to the cost of his son’s private school education, where the child had been attending the school for some 10 years, even though a…
A recent decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department, appears to unduly expand the basis upon which a parent may be obligated to contribute to the college education expenses of a child beyond age 21.
Generally, a parent’s obligation to support a child terminates when the child reaches age 21. That general rule, of course, may be varied by the parents themselves by agreement.
Indeed, it is quite common to extend by agreement a parent’s support obligation, beyond the date on which a child turns 21, in a written separation agreement or divorce action stipulation of settlement, whether written or entered in open court. Such agreements often have an “emancipation” clause which defines the circumstances under which a child will be deemed emancipated for the purposes of the parent’s support obligation to a time either before or after child reaches age 21. Again, it is common to delay emancipation until the child turns 22 or thereafter, if the child is enrolled on a full-time basis in an accredited college, university or other post-high school educational program. If properly entered, such agreements are routinely incorporated into divorce judgments or other support orders. They are enforceable in both Supreme and Family Courts.
In its January, 2012 decision in Shapiro v. Shapiro, the Third Department affirmed a divorce judgment which, in part, obligated a father to contribute his pro rata share of college expenses until each child reaches the age of 22.
The court acknowledged that absent an agreement extending the obligation, a parent is not legally obligated to pay college costs for a child that has reached the age of 21. However, the court found that such an agreement could be inferred from statements which did not expressly exclude post-21 expenses from a statement agreeing to contribute to college. The sole basis of the Third Department’s decision was as follows:
Plaintiff acknowledged in his testimony that he had, in fact, agreed to pay part of the children’s college education costs, there was no indication that he intended to limit his payments to the children’s first three years in college, and proof at trial established that funds had been previously set up to assist in such costs. Under these circumstances, it was not error for Supreme Court to direct plaintiff to pay a portion of the children’s college costs until they reach the age of 22.
It is not uncommon for divorce settlement agreements to limit a parent’s contribution to a child’s college education to a portion of the expense to attend a campus within the State University of New York system. This is known as the “SUNY cap.”
A scholarly October, 2011 decision of New York County Supreme Court Justice Matthew F. Cooper tackled head-on the assumption that a court would not impose on a parent a share of the expenses of a private college education.
Pamela T. v. Marc B., involved the parents of 16- and 18-year old sons. The older boy, a child with “moderate emotional difficulty,” was a freshman at Syracuse University intending to study computer engineering and computer graphics. He was a graduate of a selective public Manhattan high school. The decision resolved the father’s objection to paying more than his share of a SUNY education.
A SUNY education would cost approximately $18,000 per year. Syracuse University, on the other hand, costs three times that amount, some $53,000 per year.
Both parents were lawyers, with private college and law school backgrounds. Each parent earned just over $100,000 per year. The mother had some $1,230,000 in savings and retirement accounts; the father $580,000.
Justice Cooper directed the father to bear 40% of the costs of that Syracuse University education. There is no SUNY cap mandated by New York law. The thrust of Justice Cooper’s decision was that:
the SUNY cap–to the extent that it stands for the proposition that before a parent can be compelled to contribute towards the cost of a private college there must be a showing that a child cannot receive an adequate education at a state college–is a doctrine that in many cases is harmful to the children of divorced parents, acts to discriminate against them, and is largely unworkable.
Shlomo Scholar and Shoshana Timinisky married in 2005. They had one child the next year. The year after that they entered a stipulation of settlement to resolve their divorce action.
Included in that stipulation was the parties agreement that Ms. Timinisky would have sole custody of the parties’ child. However, the parties also agreed that custody rights be limited by an agreement to share decision-making on all issues relating to the child’s education. The parties pre-selected an arbitrator to resolve their failure to agree on such issues.
Such a disagreement arose. However, in a September 9, 2010 order, Queens County Supreme Court Justice Thomas Raffaele denied the father’s motion to enforce the parties’ stipulation. Instead, without a hearing, the mother was granted sole decision-making authority with respect to the child’s education in the event that the parties were unable to agree to a parenting coordinator (traditionally employed to facilitate parent communication and the mediation of disputes). Justice Raffaele also disqualified “a certain individual from arbitrating issues regarding the education of the child.” Finally, on its own motion, Justice Raffaele enjoined Mr. Scholar from bringing any further motions without the permission of the Supreme Court.
In an August 9, 2011 decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Scholar v. Timinisky, that Order was affirmed. The appellate court ruled that Justice Raffaele properly determined that a change of circumstances required a modification of the parties’ stipulation of settlement to protect the best interests of the child. New York’s best interest standard was to be applied to resolve a dispute regarding parental joint decision-making authority.…
The November/December issue of Scientific American Mind magazine presents the article, What Makes a Good Parent? A growing body of research conducted over the past 50 years shows fairly clearly that some parenting practices produce better relationships between parent and child and happier, healthier, better functioning children.
A new study by the article’s author, Robert…