Justice Deborah A. Kaplan

In 2011, after the parties separated, the mother received sole custody of the parties’ only child, who resided with her. The father was awarded access every weekend. The father subsequently filed a petition seeking increased access. After a hearing, Kings County Family Court Judge Maria Arias denied the pro se father’s petition.

The father appealed, contending that the Family Court should have granted his request for a copy of a forensic report prepared by a court-appointed forensic evaluator, and that the court erred in admitting the forensic report into evidence. In its July 10, 2019 opinion in Raymond v. Raymond, the Second Department affirmed.Continue Reading Pro Se Father Denied Copy of Forensic Report Although Received in Evidence

In this divorce action, Strauss v. Strauss, the husband had obtained access to wife’s iPad and private text messages. He falsely told her that he did not have the iPad and that it was lost. The husband did provide the text messages to his counsel. However, it was not until two years after the fact that it was disclosed that the husband was in possession of the iPad and text messages They announced that they intended to use the text messages at the parties’ custody trial. The husband did not explain how or why he was legally permitted to retain wife’s iPad without her knowledge, and to access and take possession of wife’s personal data located on her iPad.

The lower court, New York County Supreme Court Justice Deborah A. Kaplan, granted the wife’s motion for sanctions and awarded $180,000.00 in fees to the wife’s counsel, Cohen Clair Lans Greifer Thorpe & Rottenstreich LLP, for the “frivolous conduct” of her husband and his counsel.Continue Reading Husband and Counsel Sanctioned for Taking Wife’s iPad and Keeping Secret for 2 years

In a divorce, to what extent may a court award property rights to the parties’ cryopreseved embryo?

In its June, 2018 decision in Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, the Appellate Division, First Department, determined that the parties’ agreement with the fertility center they used would control. That agreement enabled the husband to withdraw his consent to the use of the embryo. Accordingly the Court enabled the center to dispose of the embryo as required by that agreement.

The parties were married in 2011. In 2012, they engaged the services of the New Hope Fertility Center (NHF) in the hope of conceiving a child via implantation of cryopreserved embryos in the wife’s uterus. They signed an agreement with NHF entitled “Consent for the Cryopreservation of Human Embryo(s)” (the Consent Agreement) in which the parties agreed “to the cryopreservation of embryos for our own use.”

Paragraph 7 of the Consent Agreement, entitled “Voluntary Participation,” provided, “I/We may withdraw my/our consent and discontinue participation at any time . . . .” Paragraph 16, entitled “Authorization,” provided, “This consent will remain in effect until such time as I notify NHF in writing of my/our wish to revoke such consent.”

After five or six further unsuccessful IVF attempts with NHF, the husband, then 58 years old, filed for divorce and requested sole custody of the one remaining cryopreserved embryo. He also moved to enjoin the wife, then 47 years old, from destroying, using, or preserving the embryo. The husband obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order embodying that relief. However, Supreme Court New York County Justice Deborah A. Kaplan later found that the husband had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as there was nothing in the Consent Agreement that would prevent the wife from going ahead with implantation unilaterally. Justice Kaplan issued a preliminary injunction enjoining NHF and the wife from “destroying or transferring the cryopreserved embryo to anyone other than the wife.”Continue Reading Divorce Award of Frozen Embryo Based on Agreement with Fertility Clinic

In its October 30, 2014 decision in Hoffer-Adou v. Adou, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the granting of summary judgment awarding a no-fault divorce solely upon the plaintiff’s (here the wife) sworn statement. That award had been made below by Supreme Court, New York County Justice Deborah A. Kaplan.

In so holding the First Department joined the Fourth Department in holding that whether there has been an irretrievable breakdown is purely subjective. In a decision issued November 9, 2012 in Palermo v. Palermo, the Fourth Department (December 13, 2012 blog post) had affirmed a decision of Monroe County Supreme Court Justice Richard A. Dollinger (January 30, 2012 blog post) for the reasons stated in Justice Dollinger’s opinion: a party’s sworn statement of irretrievable breakdown is incontestable. It is not subject to attack at trial.

The First Department, here, held:

Contrary to the husband’s contention, the wife was entitled to a judgment of divorce under the no-fault provision of DRL § 170(7), since her statement under oath that the marriage was irretrievably broken for a period of six months was sufficient to establish her cause of action for divorce as a matter of law.

However, as noted in prior blog posts, the subject has not been without debate. Two decisions of the Nassau County Supreme Court, Townes v. Coker (relied upon by the First Department and discussed in the blog post of February, 20, 2012), and A.C. v. D.R. (discussed in the April 4, 2011 post), both held that New York’s new no-fault ground was purely subjective.Continue Reading A Party’s Sworn Statement Of Irretrievable Breakdown Is Incontestable: The First Department Weighs In

On the wife’s motion for temporary relief, Supreme Court, New York County Justice Deborah A. Kaplan in Lennox v. Weberman, awarded the wife tax-free maintenance of $38,000 per month, plus the wife’s unreimbursed medical expenses up to $2,000 per month, interim counsel fees of $50,000, and expert fees of $35,000.

By its February 26, 2013 decision, the First Department modified that order, on the facts, to provide that such pendente lite relief would be treated as an advance on the 50 percent of the parties’ joint funds to which the wife is entitled pursuant to the parties’ prenuptial agreement.

Notwithstanding that the wife had waived any claim to a final award of alimony or maintenance in the parties’ prenuptial agreement, Justice Kaplan was entitled, in her discretion, to award pendente lite relief in the absence of an express agreement to exclude an award of temporary maintenance.

As to the amount of the temporary maintenance award, the appellate court found that Justice Kaplan properly applied the new temporary maintenance formula set forth at Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5–a)(c)(2)(a). Specifically, Justice Kaplan had listed all 19 of the enumerated factors, explained how 7 of them supported an upward deviation to $38,000 per month from the $12,500 a month in guideline support, and found that $38,000 per month was not “unjust or inappropriate.”Continue Reading Pendente Lite Award Prospectively Charged as an Advance Against Wife’s Share of Marital Property