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Despite repeated efforts to bring predictability and consistency to temporary support awards, that goal remains elusive. Consider the December, 2017 decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Rouis v. Rouis.

The parties were married in 1993 and had two children. After the husband departed the marital residence, the wife commenced this action for divorce in 2014. Applying the pre-2015 temporary maintenance formula on the wife’s motion for temporary relief, Sullivan County Supreme Court Justice Mary MacMaster Work granted the wife, among other things, temporary maintenance ($1,958 per month) and child support ($2,720 per month) and required the husband to pay for the carrying costs and upkeep of the marital home ($4,859 per month), private school for the youngest child ($848 per month), health insurance for the family ($1,921 per month), interim counsel fees ($10,000) and the wife’s vehicle and fuel costs ($644 per month). The husband appealed.

Recognizing that the combined monthly awards amounted to an annual award of $155,400 plus $10,000 in interim counsel fees, to be paid from the husband’s annual gross income of $183,300.50 (the wife’s pre-award income was $11,700.00), the Third Department agreed that the temporary awards were excessive and should be modified.

The appellate court noted that the (pre-2015) temporary maintenance formula resulted in a presumptive monthly temporary maintenance amount of $4,387.50. Justice Work also granted the wife’s request that the husband also pay the $4,859 in expenses, including the mortgage, taxes, utilities, insurance and upkeep. Justice Work recognized that it would not be equitable to require the husband to pay full maintenance, child support and all carrying costs on the marital home, and therefor essentially credited the husband for one half of the carrying costs on the home ($2,429.50 per month) by reducing the presumptive maintenance award by that amount, resulting in a temporary maintenance award of $1,958 per month. The lower court also ordered the husband to pay the full monthly carrying costs on the home ($4,859) in which he did not reside. The appellate court noted that when the wife’s vehicle expenses were added ($644 per month), the total combined monthly award was $7,461, plus tuition ($848 per month) and child support. The net effect of Supreme Court’s order was that the husband was ordered to pay the full presumptive maintenance award plus one half of the carrying costs on the home and the wife’s vehicle expenses.Continue Reading Do Temporary Support Awards Include Marital Residence Expenses?

Calulator on 100s 6 redUntil the amendment of the Child Support Standards Act effective January 24, 2016 (D.R.L. §240[1-b][b][5][iii][I]; Laws of 2015, c. 387, §3), the rule had been that when a divorce court awards maintenance to a spouse, the amount of annual maintenance is to be deducted from the payor’s income when calculating parental income. However, for those same C.S.S.A. calculations, maintenance was not to be added to the recipient’s income. Thus, for example if in its award, a divorce court awarded a wife (the custodial parent) who had no other income $60,000 per year in maintenance from a husband earning $250,000 per year, the husband’s income for C.S.S.A. purposes would equal $250,000 less FICA, Medicare, and the $60,000 in maintenance, but the wife’s income would still be $0.

The recent amendment changed that anomaly. Effective January 24, 2016 , the alimony or maintenance actually paid or to be paid to a spouse is to be added to the income of the recipient when calculating parental income.

Although it does not expressly so state, it has been held that this amendment is to be applied to cases commenced on or after January 24, 2016, and not to cases commenced before that date. R.I. v. T.I., 2016 NY Slip Op 50664(U), 51 Misc. 3d 1215(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings 2016); C.G. v. F.G., 2016 NY Slip Op 26220, 53 Misc. 3d 229, 235-36, 34 N.Y.S.3d 882, 887-88 (Sup. Ct. Richmond 2016).

Until the amendment, the rule had been that it was error to include maintenance awards as income to the recipient when computing the child support obligation. Krukenkamp v. Krukenkamp, 54 A.D.3d 345 (2nd Dept. 2008); Wallach v. Wallach, 37 A.D.3d 707, (2nd Dept. 2007); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 35 A.D.3d 585 (2nd Dept. 2006); Lee v Lee, 18 A.D.3D 508 (2nd Dept. 2005).

In its November 9, 2016 decision in Castello v. Castello, the Second Department ruled differently. In that case, the court modified a 2013 divorce judgment by changing the child support calculation.Continue Reading The Effect of Spousal Support on Child Support: Did the Second Department Jump the Gun?

Calulator on 100s 6 redThe Third Department gave us insight into its analysis of child support awards in two recent decisions in which it increased those awards.

What to do when the parents’ combined income exceeds the Child Support Standards Act (C.S.S.A.) cap, now $141,000, appears to be, at the trial level, often county-, if not judge-dependent. Use by the lower courts around the state upon these decisions will vary, perhaps greatly.

In Petersen v. Petersen, decided February 26, 2015, the Third Department increased the divorce-action award of Albany Supreme Court Justice Eugene P. Devine (now, himself, sitting on the Third Department).

The parties had one child, born in 1999. After the parties separated and lived apart for several years, the husband commenced this divorce action based on the parties’ separation agreement. After finding that the child support provision of the separation agreement did not comply with the Child Support Standards Act, a trial was held to address, among other things, child support.

Justice Devine granted the divorce, incorporated the parties’ separation agreement except for the weekly child support provision, and ordered the husband to pay child support in the amount of $414 per week, declining to order child support on any income above the C.S.S.A. statutory cap, then $136,000 (and now $141,000). The wife appealed.Continue Reading Increasing Child Support On Appeal: Awards On Income Over The Cap

What is a “mandatory” college expense to be shared by the parents?

In its January 15, 2014 decision in Shaughnessy v. Cox, the Second Department upheld the order of Nassau County Family Court Judge Robin M. Kent (which in turn upheld the determination of Support Magistrate Neil Miller) directing the father to pay 50% of the college expenses of the parties’ children regardless of their emancipation. The parties’ stipulation of settlement of their divorce action so provided. Moreover, the father’s obligation included the repayment of expenses which were paid from the proceeds of student loans.

However, Magistrate Miller had required the father to pay those expenses “upon the mother’s presentation of proper documentation directly to him . . . .” This, the Second Department held was error. Rather, the documentation should be provided by the mother first to the Family Court. The Court would determine whether the expenses were mandatory and, therefore, payable by the father pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

Setting up a situation in which parties are required to go, in the first instance, to a court to determine whether a college expense is “mandatory,” seems like extra work is being created. Here, it is not explained why the mother did not present proper documentation of expenses prior to Magistrate Miller making his ruling. Alternatively, the appellate court could have set up a procedure by which only if the father disputed the mandatory nature of expenses claimed by the mother would further Family Court proceedings be necessary.

Once again, the controversy results from the failure of an agreement to properly set forth the categories of college expenses to be shared. Apparently this agreement only specified “mandatory” expenses.Continue Reading Ambiguous Agreements to Pay for Children's College Expenses

Considering the add-ons for private school, health care, child care, and extra-curricular activities, imposing a base child support obligation upon a father (the less-moneyed spouse) in excess of his pro rata share of the first $136,000 of combined parental income would be unjust and inappropriate. Such was the holding of Acting Supreme Court Kings County Justice Debra Silber in her August 12, 2013 decision in A.C. v. J.O.

That ruling, at first blush, would appear to be at odds with the Second Department’s August 14, 2013 decision in  Beroza v. Hendler, the subject of Monday’s blog post. There, the appellate court held it was improper for the trial court to have limited the base child support obligation of the father (the less moneyed spouse) to less than his pro rata share of the first $400,000 in combined parental income.

Any comparison, however, must be clouded by the vast number of factors that Justice Silber considered when deciding all of the issues incident to the parties’ divorce.

In A.C. v. J.O., at the time of the commencement of the divorce action in May, 2011, the parties had been married for almost 13 years. They had two children, a daughter now 12 and a son now 10. The parties were still living together. The wife, 52 years old, had her own dental practice, with income stipulated to be $251, 395. The husband, 47, worked as a first assistant director, primarily for television. He also wrote screenplays and recently made a full length film, which he both wrote and directed. The husband’s income was stipulated to be $171,706.

In a lengthy opinion, Justice Silber awarded the mother both physical and legal (decision-making) custody of the two children. Although both parents could handle parenting responsibilities alone, joint custody was not appropriate as the parents’ “cannot easily agree upon anything.” Justice Silber provided a detailed plan for the father’s “parental access” and consultation on major decisions.Continue Reading No Child Support Awarded Upon Combined Parental Income in Excess of $136,000 Statutory Cap

In his January 7, 2013 decision in Gluck v. Gluck, Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Daniel R. Palmieri, determined that the wife pay 80% of the counsel fees incurred by the husband, as such reflected the wife’s pro rata share of the parties’ total income.

Following a 13-day trial, the parties agreed that the Court would consider the legal fee applications of  both parties on submitted papers. The defendant-husband (the less-monied spouse) sought $125,000.00 in counsel fees under Domestic Relations Law §237 for services rendered by the two law firms that had represented him consecutively in this action.

Justice Palmieri noted that earlier, and after the Court issued its Decision and Order on the issues of custody and parental access, the parties had entered into a stipulation regarding child support and certain holidays. Certain child care expenses were apportioned 80% to the wife and 20% to the husband. The Court adopted those proportions as appropriately based on the incomes of the parties (approximately $360,000.00 and $90,000.00, respectively).

In opposition to the husband’s application, the wife contended that the husband’s obstructionist tactics and unreasonable demands unnecessarily prolonged and delayed the action, going to trial and unreasonably refusing to settle. This, the wife claimed, unnecessarily added to her own counsel fees which were in excess of $200,000.00.

Neither party claimed that the bills of opposing counsel were excessive or not reflective of work performed.

Mary Ann Aiello, Esq., the husband’s latter attorney, conducted the trial and negotiated stipulations in March 2012 regarding the sale of the marital residence and in August 2012 on the issues of equitable distribution and maintenance. After the trial of the remaining issues, the parties settled the issue of child support and certain holiday visitation.Continue Reading Divorce Counsel Fee Awards: Beware Formulaic Approaches

College Fund 1.jpgAugust is off-to-college month. For divorced parents, the joys and sorrows of a child leaving the nest are often compounded by the parents’ disagreement over their division of college expenses.

Last Spring’s decision of the Second Department in Yorke v. Yorke provides guidance.  The parties are the parents of a child who entered college beginning in the Fall 2007 semester.  By two 2007 orders, the father was directed to pay 83% of the college tuition for the subject child prior to March 2009, and 82% of the tuition thereafter.

Those orders provided that the father was not responsible for contributing towards the child’s room and board at college.  This 2011 opinion did not discuss why room and board had been excluded, or the basis for the prospective (2009) change in the allocated percentages.

Instead, this 2010 Family Court, Orange County, proceeding involved only the calculation of the father’s  share of tuition. At the heart of the dispute was the effect of the child’s financial aid package, both as it reduced the tuition expense, but also as it was required to be spread over the costs for room and board.Continue Reading College Financial Aid and Calculating the Divorced Parent's Pro Rata Obligation for Tuition

Calulator on 100s 2.jpgIn this second of two blogs discussing Supreme Court Nassau County Justice Anthony J. Falanga‘s March 28, 2011 decision in A.C. v. D.R., we look at the Court’s temporary financial relief rulings under the recent amendments to D.R.L. §§236B(5-a) and 237. Last Monday’s blog discussed the joinder for trial of the wife’s post-no-fault action with the husband’s pre-no-fault action, as well as the Court’s denial of the wife’s partial summary judgment motion on her no-fault claim, although the Court recognized no defenses were available to a subjective irretrievable breakdown claim.

The parties were married in 1992 and have 3 children, ages 13, 10 and 7. The parties continue to reside in the marital residence.

The husband, a 52-year old physician, had 2009 earnings of $530,645.00, although the Court noted that he has $15,833.00 in monthly gross W-2 income from private practice. The wife, a 46-year old homemaker, had $8,516.00 in 2009 dividend income.

At the Preliminary Conference, the husband stipulated to pay the marital residence realty taxes (there is no mortgage), gas electric, telephone including cell, water, homeowner’s, automobile, umbrella, medical and disability insurance, cable TV and Internet, alarm, domestic help, gardening and landscaping, snow removal, sanitation and exterminating, and in-network health expenses. The husband claimed the fixed expenses totaled $7,274.00 per month ($87,288.00 per year).

Based on its determination that the husband’s income net of FICA and Medicare taxes was $529,857.00, the Court first applied the new temporary support formula to determine that the presumptive temporary maintenance award would be $148,297.00 (30% of $529,857.00 minus $8,516.00, as that result is less than 40% of the parties’ combined income less the wife’s income). The Court, then, noted that blind adherence to this formula was likely to lead to inequitable results:

. . . [I]n this court’s view, the statute requires some remedial language as strict application in almost every case will not effectuate the statute’s purpose and will result in awards that are unjust and inappropriate . . . .

Continue Reading Court Tempers Temporary Maintenance Formula and Temporary Child Support with Reality Check