With litigation so expensive, what claims between former spouses may be heard in small claims court?

In this small claims action, the former wife sought to recover $2,500 from her former husband because he allegedly wrongful retained health insurance reimbursement checks. The wife alleged that she, rather than the ex-husband, had paid the sums to her health providers for which the ex-husband had been reimbursed.

The ex-husband moved to dismiss the small claims action, claiming that the ex-wife’s claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Family Court. In addition, the ex-husband claimed that, based on the Supreme Court judgment in the parties’ matrimonial action, the ex-wife, whose two prior small claims actions had been dismissed, was precluded from bringing this action under the doctrine of res judicata.

In an order dated November 6, 2015, Nassau County District Court Judge Paul L. Meli, granted the ex-husband’s motion to dismiss this action, concluding that small claims court lacked jurisdiction and that the matter in issue had, in any event, been previously litigated.


Continue Reading

Service by Facebook of a father’s petition to terminate child support was directed by Richmond County Family Court Support Magistrate Gregory L. Gliedman in a September 12, 2014 decision in Matter of Noel B. v. Maria A. (NYLJ link).

The father filed that application to terminate child support based on the alleged emancipation of his son.

The father was unable to effect service of court papers upon the mother by normal means. He submitted an affidavit that the mother was unknown to the current occupant of the the mother’s last known address. The father called and sent text messages to his 22-year old daughter to ask the mother’s location, but that no one answered the call or replied to his texts and voicemail. He also called and sent a text message to his son (the subject child on the instant petition) requesting that information, but again there was no reply of any kind. The father also did a Google search, but was unable to find any location for the mother.

Magistrate Gliedman noted that the Support Collection Unit (“SCU”) to which the father mailed his support checks still had that same last known address on file for the mother, meaning that all correspondence and communication with respect to the funds she was receiving for child support were being  sent to that address. The magistrate further noted that the mother provided that same address to the court when she sent an electronic testimony application to the court in March, 2013 in connection with a prior matter between the parties.

The father told the court that the mother maintains an active social media account with Facebook. The mother’s current spouse maintains her own Facebook account, and has posted photos that have been “liked” by the mother as recently as July, 2014.

Magistrate Gliedman described Facebook as a social networking website that allows its users to interact with friends, relatives, acquaintances and individuals with common interests. Due to its online nature, there are no geographic limitations on Facebook — people with whom an individual interacts with on Facebook can be as close as the house next door or as far away as a continent on the other side of the world.


Continue Reading

In the fourth “international” decision this month, Westchester County Supreme Court Justice Paul I. Marx dismissed a divorce action over which the Court had jurisdiction, deciding, however, that Nicaragua was the better forum. In L.A.B. v. B.M.decided July 9, 2014, the importance of the majority of witnesses and assets being in Nicaragua overcame the wife’s choice of court.

The wife was born and raised in Nicaragua, holding only a Nicaraguan passport. The husband is a U.S. citizen with a U.S. passport. The parties met in Nicaragua and were married in Nicaragua in a civil ceremony in 2003 and a religious ceremony in 2004. After they were married, the parties lived together in the husband’s Manhattan apartment. The parties have two children, the first born in Manhattan; and the younger, born in Nicaragua.

Shortly after the birth of their first son, the wife moved back to Nicaragua. She remained there as a homemaker residing with the parties’ children in one of the parties’ properties in Managua, Nicaragua. The husband is a Risk Manager at Credit Suisse Securities, LLC, residing in a condominium in White Plains, New York.

According to the wife, the husband obtained permission from his employer to work remotely from Nicaragua for several days each month.This allowed The husband to travel each month between New York and Nicaragua, where the wife and the parties’ child (and later children) resided.

The parties owned three properties in Nicaragua. In addition, the husband owned a condominium in Westchester. The parties established a corporation in Nicaragua to purchase two of their Nicaraguan properties and proceeded to build homes on those two properties.

The parties’ marital difficulties began in Fall 2013. In October, the wife notified her husband of her desire to divorce. On December 23, 2013, she wife filed a divorce summons with notice in New York asserting no-fault grounds. On January 13, 2014, the husband filed for divorce in Nicaragua.

The wife moved for an interim award of counsel fees. The husband cross-moved to dismiss the action, arguing that New York was without jurisdiction to hear this divorce action under DRL §§ 230 and 231 and that New York was an improper and inconvenient forum (forum non conveniens).

Justice Marx first held that the court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction; it had the authority to decide the divorce issues. The residency requirements of D.R.L. §230 had been met. It was undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife in Manhattan for approximately three years. The parties further agreed that the wife was not a New York resident.


Continue Reading

The second of four decisions this month with an international flavor was also decided by New York County Supreme Court Justice Ellen Gesmer.

In M v. M, 2014 N.Y.Misc. Lexis 3201, decided July 3, 2014, Justice Gesmer again voided a marital agreement, this time applying the laws of Spain and the Dominican Republic.

On June 27, 2001, one year and five months before their marriage, the parties signed an Agreement in Madrid, Spain, that purported to govern the disposition of property in the event of marriage and divorce. As with the Agreement in J.R. (see yesterday’s blog post), it provided that the parties would marry in a system of absolute separation of property.

At the time of the Agreement, the wife, born in the Dominican Republic, had Italian citizenship and was a domiciliary of Spain. The Husband is a citizen of Spain.

The parties were married in the Dominican Republic on December 12, 2002. Their marriage certificate, and the certification issued by the Office of Vital Statistics from the local government district, so listed the husband as a Spanish citizen, domiciled in Spain, and the wife as an Italian citizen, domiciled in Spain.

The wife commenced this divorce action in New York in 2012. Seeking now to invalidate the Agreement, the wife alleged that she never read the Agreement before signing it, that no one else read it to her, and that no formalities, particularly an oral recitation of the Agreement, were conducted when it was signed. She claimed that the husband brought her to the office of his attorney, and asked her to sign an accounting document drafted by his attorney to help him protect assets from business dealings. She claimed she never saw the document before the evening she signed it, and never saw or discussed it with the husband again until he raised it after commencement of this action. The husband disputed the wife’s claimed lack of awareness of the contents and significance of the Agreement.


Continue Reading

Among the challenges for the matrimonial bench and bar is the need to become instantly familiar with any type of business and any family situation. Applying the ever-changing New York family law to matters routine and novel is a Herculean task, worthy of  Dwayne “the Rock” Johnson’s IMAX 3D movie opening this weekend.

New York’s cosmopolitan population often presents still another layer of law and fact through which our judges must navigate. Four decisions this month reveal the breadth and complexity of those international issues.

In a July 21, 2014 decision in J.R. v. E.M.New York County Supreme Court Justice Ellen Gesmer decided to apply New York law to set aside a marital agreement for its failure to meet New York formalities, although the procedure followed in the Spanish Consulate where it was signed may have been far better able to achieve the goals New York’s formalities were designed to achieve.

On March 3, 2004, the day after they were married in New York City, the parties signed a “Matrimonial Property Agreement” before the Spanish Consul at the Consulate in New York City.

The wife is a Peruvian citizen; her husband is a Spanish citizen. Justice Gesmer noted that both parties are well-educated and accomplished native Spanish-speaking professionals, both currently employed by the United Nations.

After commencing her divorce action in 2013, the wife moved to set aside the marital agreement. She claimed that although the Agreement had been drafted before the parties went to the Consulate, she did not first see it until arriving at the Consulate on March 3, 2004.


Continue Reading

Not according to Richmond County Civil Court Judge (and Acting Suprme Court Justice) Philip S. Straniere, seemingly running afoul of a contrary body of case law, particularly in the Second Department.

Small Claims Court proceedings may well be the only practical way to redress relatively modest, but often important breaches of divorce settlement agreements as to matters of support and property. Such proceedings are quick, inexpensive, can be pursued without lawyers, and do substantial justice. Eliminating Small Claims Court as a proper forum for such relief would often leave parties without a reasonable remedy.

In his February 19, 2014 decision in Pivarnick v. Pivarnick, Judge Strainiere, held that Small Claims Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a divorce settlement agreement.

Doing so, he vacated an arbitrator’s $4,000 award to an ex-wife for counsel fees she incurred in connection with her submission to the Supreme Court of a proposed Qualified Domestic Relations Order to implement a division of the ex-husband’s pension and her defense of the ex-husband’s motion to dismiss that proposed QDRO. The ex-wife had cross-moved for sanctions “in the form of ‘attorneys’ fees for his engagement in frivolous conduct.’” Those post-divorce Supreme Court submissions were resolved by a so-ordered stipulation under which the entitlement of the ex-wife to share in the ex-husband’s pension was restated. No reference in the stipulation was made to the wife’s “attorneys’ fee claim” by cross-motion.

Thereafter, the ex-wife sought her counsel fees in Small Claims Court. The arbitrator had awarded the claimant legal fees in the amount of $4,000.00 and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for his own counsel fees.


Continue Reading

Handshake 1.jpgParticularly when it comes to agreements fixing child support obligations, “shaking on it” is simply not enough.

Both the Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court Act authorize parents to enter agreements which establish their child support obligations. DRL §§236B(3) and 240(1-b)(h) and FCA §413(1)(h) set out many requirements for such agreements.

Nothing suggests that