As of January 31, 2016, the “income cap” for maintenance is $178,000.

The presumptive final maintenance formula on the first $175,000 of the payor’s annual income only just came into effect 6 days before that, for cases filed on or after January 25, 2016 (New York’s Laws of 2015, chapter 269 (D.R.L. §236[B][6][b][4]). For temporary maintenance, the $175,000 income cap under D.R.L. §236(B)(5-a)(b)(4) became effective for cases filed after October 24, 2015.

The Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) to the $175,000 income cap is to be made every two years:

“[B]eginning January thirty-first, two thousand sixteen and every two years thereafter, the income cap amount shall increase by the sum of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPIU) as published by the United States department of labor bureau of labor statistics for the prior two years multiplied by the then income cap and then rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars. The office of court administration shall determine and publish the income cap.”

However, the income cap for child support purposes is still the $141,000 that has been in place since January 31, 2014.

Why? Because under New York’s Laws of 2015, chapter 347, Social Services Law §111-i was amended to change the COLA date from January 31st to March 1st. The child support cap will remain $141,000 until March 1, 2016.

Continue Reading

Service by Facebook of a father’s petition to terminate child support was directed by Richmond County Family Court Support Magistrate Gregory L. Gliedman in a September 12, 2014 decision in Matter of Noel B. v. Maria A. (NYLJ link).

The father filed that application to terminate child support based on the alleged emancipation of his son.

The father was unable to effect service of court papers upon the mother by normal means. He submitted an affidavit that the mother was unknown to the current occupant of the the mother’s last known address. The father called and sent text messages to his 22-year old daughter to ask the mother’s location, but that no one answered the call or replied to his texts and voicemail. He also called and sent a text message to his son (the subject child on the instant petition) requesting that information, but again there was no reply of any kind. The father also did a Google search, but was unable to find any location for the mother.

Magistrate Gliedman noted that the Support Collection Unit (“SCU”) to which the father mailed his support checks still had that same last known address on file for the mother, meaning that all correspondence and communication with respect to the funds she was receiving for child support were being  sent to that address. The magistrate further noted that the mother provided that same address to the court when she sent an electronic testimony application to the court in March, 2013 in connection with a prior matter between the parties.

The father told the court that the mother maintains an active social media account with Facebook. The mother’s current spouse maintains her own Facebook account, and has posted photos that have been “liked” by the mother as recently as July, 2014.

Magistrate Gliedman described Facebook as a social networking website that allows its users to interact with friends, relatives, acquaintances and individuals with common interests. Due to its online nature, there are no geographic limitations on Facebook — people with whom an individual interacts with on Facebook can be as close as the house next door or as far away as a continent on the other side of the world.


Continue Reading

New York’s Domestic Relations Law §25, enacted in 1907, provides that a marriage is valid, even in the absence of a marriage license, if it was properly solemnized. However, New York County Supreme Court Justice Matthew F. Cooper, in his May 29, 2014 decision in Ponorovskaya v. Stecklow held that D.R.L. §25 could not be used to validate a marriage ceremony that failed to meet the  legal requirements of Mexico where the ceremony was performed. While so holding, Justice Cooper called for the statute to be amended or repealed, and joined the debate on whether Universal Life Church “ministers” could “properly solemnize” marriages.

Justice Cooper’s recitation of the facts merits quotation:

[Ms. Ponorovskaya], who is a clothing designer and business owner in Manhattan, and [Mr. Stecklow], a lawyer, began their relationship in 2004. While in Mexico for a 2009 New Year’s celebration, [Mr. Stecklow] proposed to [Ms. Ponorovskaya] overlooking the Mayan ruins in Tulum. The parties subsequently planned a Mexican destination wedding at the Dreams Tulum Resort & Spa. . . . On February 18th, the couple had a wedding ceremony on the resort’s beach. The ceremony was performed under a chuppah, a canopy under which a couple stands during a Jewish wedding. Certain Hebrew prayers were recited, vows were exchanged, and there was a glass-breaking ritual, as is customary at Jewish weddings.

Despite these traditions, the ceremony was not performed by a rabbi. Instead it was conducted by [Mr. Stecklow]’s cousin, Dr. Keith Arbeitman, a dentist who lives in New York. In 2003, in order to perform a marriage for friends, he became an ordained minister of the Universal Life Church (“ULC”), a distinction easily achieved by paying a fee on the ULC’s website. . . . [A]t oral argument on the motion, [Ms. Ponorovskaya]’s counsel produced a certificate that he printed off the internet certifying that Dr. Arbeitman is indeed a minister in good standing with the ULC. Likewise, during the ceremony Dr. Arbeitman told the audience, “I am an ordained minister — this will be a legal union.”


Continue Reading

A spouse’s pre-divorce judgment death results in the unenforceablitity of divorce action orders, including the automatic orders mandated by Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(2)(b). As a result, Westchester County Supreme Court Justice Paul I. Marx held in his April 17, 2014 decision in A.V.B. v. D.B. that a husband was without a remedy for his wife removing the husband as a beneficiary of her retirment account and life insurance policy.

After 13 years of marriage and two children, the wife commenced this divorce action on September 12, 2012. Pursuant to stipulated Preliminary Conference Orders, it was agreed that the wife would be awarded the divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown, an Attorney for the Child was appointed and the pre-trial schedule was fixed.

On April 22, 2013, the wife committed suicide. During the administration of her Estate, it was learned that on February 14, 2013, while the divorce action was pending, the wife had changed the named beneficiaries on her ING 403(b) account from her husband as her sole beneficiary to the parties’ two children as 50% primary beneficiaries. It was further discovered that on or about March 10, 2013, the wife changed her designation of the husband as the sole named beneficiary on her Prudential life insurance policy to the husband as a 1% primary beneficiary, the parties’ daughter K. as a 49% beneficiary and daughter R. as a 50% beneficiary.

The husband’s counsel then submitted a letter to Justice Marx with a proposed order directing that the named beneficiaries on the wife’s ING account and Prudential life insurance policy revert back to the date of the commencement of the action and directing ING and Prudential to pay out the balance in the wife’s annuity and the “death benefit” under her life insurance policy to the named beneficiaries that existed before the changes were made. At that time, the husband’s lawyer also submitted the supporting affirmation of the attorney for wife’s Estate, declaring that the Estate consented to the proposed order.

Justice Marx declined to sign the proposed order. Instead, the Court scheduled a conference at which the Court directed defense counsel to move by Order to Show Cause. Although no papers were submitted in response to that motion, Justice Marx nevertheless denied it. The relief sought in the motion was not warranted by the law, nor by a good faith extension of the law.

While it is regrettable that Plaintiff violated the automatic orders and seems to have reached beyond the grave to thwart Defendant’s efforts to recover his share of her assets, this Court is unable to remedy the violation in this proceeding.


Continue Reading

In a May 8, 2013 decision in Mejia v. Mejia, the Appellate Division, Second Department, modified a divorce judgment’s provisions concerning the cap on combined parental income, the disposition of the marital residence, college expenses for three children ages 14, 10 and 6, and judgment inconsistencies with the underlying decision and judgment  formalities.

After the parties separated, they each petitioned the Family Court for custody of the children. The parties consented that they share joint legal custody, and that the father have primary physical custody.

After a non-jury trial on certain financial issues, the Family Court considered the first $200,000 of combined parental income in determining child support, based upon, among other things, “the economic reality of life in Rockland County,” and a determination that the gross income of the mother was substantially less than that of the father. The mother’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation was 37% of 29% of the first $200,00 of combined parent income was fixed at $1,789 per month in the 2011 Family Court order.

The marital residence, titled in the parties’ joint names, was awarded to the father and the children, based upon the father’s claim that there was no equity in the house. The court further concluded in its decision that the father should maintain health insurance for the children, and that the mother should pay 37% of the college expenses of the children.

The Second Department lowered to $150,000 the applied cap on combined parental income, “considering the substantial difference between the parties’ income, the fact that the [mother] has less income than the [father], and the amount of parenting time awarded to the [mother].” Calculated on that basis, the mother’s pro rata share of the child support obligation was $1,341 per month.


Continue Reading

Islam symbol.jpgIt seems that every decision after trial rendered by Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine is a divorce law treatise. His July 4, 2012 decision in Mojdeh M. v. Jamshid A. is no exception.

In addition to issues of property division, spousal maintenance for the husband, child support, and insurance, Justice Sunshine also

Handshake 1.jpgParticularly when it comes to agreements fixing child support obligations, “shaking on it” is simply not enough.

Both the Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court Act authorize parents to enter agreements which establish their child support obligations. DRL §§236B(3) and 240(1-b)(h) and FCA §413(1)(h) set out many requirements for such agreements.

Nothing suggests that