The Child Support Standards Act authorizes parents to agree to a child support obligation that deviates from the presumptive formula provided in that statute. However, if they are going to deviate from the formula, the parents must state what the obligation would have been if the formula were to be applied, and the reasons why the parties have agreed to deviate.

In its September 26, 2018 decision in Fasano v. Fasano, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that if one of those reasons no longer applies, such is a “substantial change in circumstances” warranting a new child support determination.

The parties were married in 1993 and have two children together. In October, 2012, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement of a prior divorce action after which that action was discontinued.

That stipulation provided that although the husband’s monthly child support obligation using the C.S.S.A. calculation would be $1,994.45 on the first $130,000.00 of combined parental income (then, the “cap”) and $2,575.61 on the total combined parental income, the parties had agreed that the husband’s monthly child support obligation would be $1,500.00. The stipulation also provided that there would be no “add-ons” or “additional health costs” added to these child support payments, even though the C.S.S.A. generally provides that each parent’s share of unreimbursed health care expenses is to be prorated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income.

The stipulation contained an explanation that the deviation from the C.S.S.A. calculation was necessary “to allow the [husband] to retain the marital residence as a place for the children to be with him when they are together” and had “been agreed by the parties to be in the best interests of the children to provide them continuity and stability in their living and educational environments.”Continue Reading A Child Support Redetermination Is Warranted If a Stated Reason Parties Deviated From CSSA No Longer Applies

Two of three November 5, 2014 custody decisions of the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed Family Court determinations.

In the only affirmance in Mondschein v. Mondschein, the Second Department upheld the order of Westchester County Family Court Judge David Klein which, after a hearing, granted a father’s petition to modify the custody provisions of the parties’ divorce (2011) stipulation of settlement, awarding the father sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ two younger children, with supervised visitation to the mother. Affirming Judge Klein, the Second Department noted:

Since custody determinations necessarily depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, deference is accorded the Family Court’s findings. Therefore, its findings should not be set aside unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record.

Here, contrary to the mother’s contention, the appellate court found that Judge Klein had properly considered the totality of the circumstances, and that the record supported his determination that there had been a sufficient change in circumstances requiring a change in custody to protect the best interests of the parties’ two younger children. That record included the hearing testimony and the recommendation of the court-appointed forensic evaluator.

In Burke v. Cogan, the Second Department reversed the determination of Suffolk County Family Court Judge Martha Luft that had dismissed the petition of a mother to modify a prior custody order by awarding her sole residential custody of the parties’ 13 year-old child. The appellate court awarded the mother such custody.Continue Reading Appellate Reversals of Custody Decisions

Father and daughter.jpgParents sometimes enter child support agreements which track the presumptive formula set out in New York’s Child Support Standards Act (Family Court Act §413; Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b]). However, parents in their agreements often deviate from the presumptive formula to reflect various considerations. That deviation for a married couple may reflect the delicate balancing of property rights, spousal maintenance and child support.

For example, parents may reduce the presumptive child support amount where the child(ren) spend more time with the “non-custodial” parent than what might be considered the “normal” alternate weekends and a mid-week dinner.

May the non-custodial parent’s failure to fully exercise visitation rights under an agreement serve as a basis to increase child support?

In its July 11, 2012 opinion in McCormick v. McCormick, the Appellate Division Second Department said, “Yes.” It found that the substantial reduction in a father’s visitation with his child warranted an upward modification of the father’s child support obligation. That reduction in visitation provided the substantial change in circumstances needed to justify a support modification.

[T]he mother established that an increase in the father’s child support obligation was warranted by a change in circumstances … Specifically, the substantial reduction in the father’s visitation with the child, which significantly reduced the amount of money the father was required to spend on the child, “constituted an unanticipated change in circumstances that created the need for modification of the child support obligations.”

The Second Department was quoting from the 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in Gravlin v. Ruppert, 98 NY2d 1, 743 NYS2d 773. That case also addressed a father’s failure to live up to his scheduled substantial parenting time.Continue Reading Father's Failure To Visit Child Is Grounds To Increase Child Support

Gavel main.jpgIn a stipulation which settled a prior dispute between parents, the father agreed to pay child support. The mother had sole custody of the parties’ child.

The father thereafter commenced a Nassau County Family Court proceeding to terminate his child support obligation. Upon the mother’s motion, Support Magistrate Penelope Beck Cahn dismissed the father’s petition.

Handshake 1.jpgParticularly when it comes to agreements fixing child support obligations, “shaking on it” is simply not enough.

Both the Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court Act authorize parents to enter agreements which establish their child support obligations. DRL §§236B(3) and 240(1-b)(h) and FCA §413(1)(h) set out many requirements for such agreements.

Nothing suggests that