The wife’s failure to send notice of default as required by the parties’ divorce judgment resulted in no award of counsel fees on her enforcement application. So held the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its August, 2015 decision in Taormina v. Taormina, reversing the wife’s $7,781.25 counsel fee award by Westchester Supreme Court Acting
Sentencing a father (a police officer) to 15 days in jail for sending abusive e-mails to the mother, Supreme Court, Putnam County Justice Victor G. Grossman attempted to stop the war between divorcing parents.
Charging the parties with acting more like children, throwing tantrums, teasing and name-calling, Justice Grossman, in his decision in L.T. v. K.T. noted that both parents behaved like preschoolers. Unfortunately, the Court could send the parties to their rooms. The parties’ three children have two parents whose embarrassing behavior has set a horrible example. the behavior of both parties was “all the more disappointing when one considers the parties should know better.” The father was a police officer, who had been trained to defuse difficult situations. The mother had a Master’s Degree in Psychology. Thankfully, the children had multiple outlets where they can see responsible adult behavior.
The Court also blamed the lawyers, observing “how counsel for each of the parties has personalized the conflict to the point where they are incapable of communicating effectively beyond a litigating posture, to promote their clients’ interests.”
The mother’s alienation of the children from the father was the sole basis stated by the Second Department while upholding a change of custody to the father. In its March 25, 2015 decision in Halioris v. Halioris, the court affirmed an order of Suffolk County Family Court Judge Bernard Cheng.
The Second Department…
The third of four decisions this month with an international context was decided by New York County Supreme Court Justice Manuel J. Mendez.
In Bond v Lichtenstein (pdf), decided July 15, 2014, Justice Mendez granted a mother summary judgment in lieu of complaint under C.P.L.R. §3213 domesticating a $570,110.05 Hong Kong judgment for child support arrears.
The parties lived together for approximately one year beginning in April of 2006. The mother is a citizen of the United Kingdom and the father is a citizen of the United States. Not long after the mother found out she was pregnant, the relationship fell apart, and by April of 2007, the parties had separated.
On August 31, 2007, their female child was born in England. The mother currently resides with the daughter in Hong Kong and with another man.
On November 21, 2008, the mother commenced child support and paternity proceedings in England. There was a trial and resulting December 3, 2010 Support Order from the High Court of England.
The parties then entered into a consent summons for the purpose of obtaining a “mirror order” in Hong Kong reflecting the support obligations obtained by the mother in England and vacating the English Order. In November of 2012, the father submitted to jurisdiction in Hong Kong for obtaining the “mirror order” and resolving other related issues.
In May of 2013, the proceeding brought before the High Court of Hong Kong resulted in a four-day trial concerning child support. The father appeared for the trial by video. He submitted evidence and was represented by attorneys. On June 28, 2013, the High Court of Hong Kong, by Deputy High Court Judge, Bebe Pui Ying Chu, rendered an 87-page Opinion.
A spouse’s pre-divorce judgment death results in the unenforceablitity of divorce action orders, including the automatic orders mandated by Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(2)(b). As a result, Westchester County Supreme Court Justice Paul I. Marx held in his April 17, 2014 decision in A.V.B. v. D.B. that a husband was without a remedy for his wife removing the husband as a beneficiary of her retirment account and life insurance policy.
After 13 years of marriage and two children, the wife commenced this divorce action on September 12, 2012. Pursuant to stipulated Preliminary Conference Orders, it was agreed that the wife would be awarded the divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown, an Attorney for the Child was appointed and the pre-trial schedule was fixed.
On April 22, 2013, the wife committed suicide. During the administration of her Estate, it was learned that on February 14, 2013, while the divorce action was pending, the wife had changed the named beneficiaries on her ING 403(b) account from her husband as her sole beneficiary to the parties’ two children as 50% primary beneficiaries. It was further discovered that on or about March 10, 2013, the wife changed her designation of the husband as the sole named beneficiary on her Prudential life insurance policy to the husband as a 1% primary beneficiary, the parties’ daughter K. as a 49% beneficiary and daughter R. as a 50% beneficiary.
The husband’s counsel then submitted a letter to Justice Marx with a proposed order directing that the named beneficiaries on the wife’s ING account and Prudential life insurance policy revert back to the date of the commencement of the action and directing ING and Prudential to pay out the balance in the wife’s annuity and the “death benefit” under her life insurance policy to the named beneficiaries that existed before the changes were made. At that time, the husband’s lawyer also submitted the supporting affirmation of the attorney for wife’s Estate, declaring that the Estate consented to the proposed order.
Justice Marx declined to sign the proposed order. Instead, the Court scheduled a conference at which the Court directed defense counsel to move by Order to Show Cause. Although no papers were submitted in response to that motion, Justice Marx nevertheless denied it. The relief sought in the motion was not warranted by the law, nor by a good faith extension of the law.
While it is regrettable that Plaintiff violated the automatic orders and seems to have reached beyond the grave to thwart Defendant’s efforts to recover his share of her assets, this Court is unable to remedy the violation in this proceeding.
Unemployment, alone, is not sufficient to avoid incarceration for the willful failure to pay child support. So held the First Department when on April 8, 2014 it affirmed the determination of Bronx County Family Court Judge Sidney Gribetz in Gina C. v. Augusto C.
Based upon the fact-finding determination of the Support Magistrate, Judge Gribetz…
Not according to Richmond County Civil Court Judge (and Acting Suprme Court Justice) Philip S. Straniere, seemingly running afoul of a contrary body of case law, particularly in the Second Department.
Small Claims Court proceedings may well be the only practical way to redress relatively modest, but often important breaches of divorce settlement agreements as to matters of support and property. Such proceedings are quick, inexpensive, can be pursued without lawyers, and do substantial justice. Eliminating Small Claims Court as a proper forum for such relief would often leave parties without a reasonable remedy.
In his February 19, 2014 decision in Pivarnick v. Pivarnick, Judge Strainiere, held that Small Claims Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a divorce settlement agreement.
Doing so, he vacated an arbitrator’s $4,000 award to an ex-wife for counsel fees she incurred in connection with her submission to the Supreme Court of a proposed Qualified Domestic Relations Order to implement a division of the ex-husband’s pension and her defense of the ex-husband’s motion to dismiss that proposed QDRO. The ex-wife had cross-moved for sanctions “in the form of ‘attorneys’ fees for his engagement in frivolous conduct.’” Those post-divorce Supreme Court submissions were resolved by a so-ordered stipulation under which the entitlement of the ex-wife to share in the ex-husband’s pension was restated. No reference in the stipulation was made to the wife’s “attorneys’ fee claim” by cross-motion.
Thereafter, the ex-wife sought her counsel fees in Small Claims Court. The arbitrator had awarded the claimant legal fees in the amount of $4,000.00 and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for his own counsel fees.
In its January 15, 2014 decision in Shaughnessy v. Cox, the Second Department upheld the order of Nassau County Family Court Judge Robin M. Kent (which in turn upheld the determination of Support Magistrate Neil Miller) directing the father to pay 50% of the college expenses of the parties’ children regardless of their emancipation. The parties’ stipulation of settlement of their divorce action so provided. Moreover, the father’s obligation included the repayment of expenses which were paid from the proceeds of student loans.
However, Magistrate Miller had required the father to pay those expenses “upon the mother’s presentation of proper documentation directly to him . . . .” This, the Second Department held was error. Rather, the documentation should be provided by the mother first to the Family Court. The Court would determine whether the expenses were mandatory and, therefore, payable by the father pursuant to the parties’ agreement.
Setting up a situation in which parties are required to go, in the first instance, to a court to determine whether a college expense is “mandatory,” seems like extra work is being created. Here, it is not explained why the mother did not present proper documentation of expenses prior to Magistrate Miller making his ruling. Alternatively, the appellate court could have set up a procedure by which only if the father disputed the mandatory nature of expenses claimed by the mother would further Family Court proceedings be necessary.
Once again, the controversy results from the failure of an agreement to properly set forth the categories of college expenses to be shared. Apparently this agreement only specified “mandatory” expenses.
The Second Department used its December 18th decision in El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan to clarify the parties’ relative burdens of proof on an application for contempt where the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked. The court also harmonized inconsistencies in case law as to the elements of civil contempt. The court held that there was no element of willfulness which needed to be shown to establish civil contempt, and that an adverse inference could be drawn from the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
It is not necessary that the disobedience be deliberate or willful; rather, the mere act of disobedience, regardless of its motive, is sufficient if such disobedience defeats, impairs, impedes, or prejudices the rights or remedies of a party.
In this matrimonial action, Kings County Supreme Court Justice Eric I. Prus had held the husband in contempt of court for disobeying a court order dated January 29, 2010, which required him to deposit with the wife’s attorney the proceeds of a certain 2009 real estate transaction. Justice Prus imposed a civil sanction which allowed him to purge the contempt to avoid incarceration.
The husband appealed, contending that the wife failed to satisfy her burden of proof and that the Supreme Court improperly drew an adverse inference against him for invoking his privilege against self-incrimination during the contempt hearing.
No retroactive fine or suspension of maintenance is to be imposed against a wife who violated her so-ordered stipulation not to allow her paramour into the marital residence. Instead, suspension of maintenance and a fine would only be imposed prospectively and only until the wife complied with that stipulation. Civil contempt fines are not intended…