College Fund 2.jpg“It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.” Bill Clinton, August 17, 1998

“What does “means” mean?” Justice Richard A. Dollinger, June 22, 2012

By statute, a court may direct a parent to contribute to a child’s education, even in the absence of special circumstances or a voluntary agreement of the parties. Under the Child Support Standards Act (D.R.L. 240[1-b][c][7] and F.C.A. 413[c][7]) the court may award educational expenses:

Where the court determines, having regard for the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and in the best interests of the child, and as justice requires, that the present or future provision of post-secondary, private, special, or enriched education for the child is appropriate.

In my May 9, 2012 blog, I discussed the April 24, 2012 decision in Tishman v. Bogatin, in which the Appellate Division, First Department, held that a parent’s contribution to a child’s college education would not necessarily be limited to a portion of the expense to attend a campus within the State University of New York system: the “SUNY cap.” In making a decision, there is no burden placed on a parent to show that the child’s needs cannot be met adequately at a SUNY college. “Whether to impose a SUNY cap is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the parties’ means and the child’s educational needs.”

In its July 25, 2012 decision in Lynn v Kroenung, the Second Department reaffirmed that unlike the obligation to provide support for a child’s basic needs, support for a child’s college education is not mandatory. Instead, absent a voluntary agreement, whether a parent is obligated to contribute to a child’s college education is “dependent upon the exercise of the court’s discretion, and an award will be made only “as justice requires.”

In L.L. v. R.L., Monroe County Supreme Court Justice Richard A. Dollinger was compelled to determine what “means” meant in a couple’s separation agreement. That agreement provided that the parents would finance the children’s college education “according to their respective means at the time the child attends college, after grants and scholarships have been taken into consideration.”

In 2011, the parties’ oldest son applied, was accepted, and enrolled at Penn State (Harrisburg). Before he left for school, the mother moved for an allocation of the college expenses. In a prior decision, Justice Dollinger reserved this issue. When the couple’s second son recently applied to Hofstra (stated cost $33,000 annually), the mother sought an allocation of those expenses as well.

Justice Dollinger clarified the issue he would be deciding:

This Court is not deciding what the parents should contribute to their children’s college education expenses. The agreement clearly indicates that both parents would contribute something if they had the means to do so. The only issues before the court are questions of contract interpretation and contractual rights: what the parents agreed they would contribute, what obligation may be enforced against either parent under the agreement, and whether either party has, to date, breached their obligations thereunder.

Continue Reading The Divorced Parent's Obligation to Pay for College: It Depends What "Means" Means

Occult.jpgIn a brief August 22, 2012 decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Sano v. Sano, reversed the December, 2011 order of Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Daniel Palmieri and reinstated the provisions of a prior Family Court custody and visitation order under which the mother had been awarded residential custody of the parties’ child.

The father argued that the mother’s interest in spiritual and paranormal phenomena warranted the change of the primary residence of the child.

The Second Department disagreed, noting:

A modification of an existing custody arrangement should be allowed only upon a showing of a sufficient change in circumstances demonstrating a real need for a change of custody in order to insure the child’s best interests.

The appellate court held that the father failed to meet that burden. He had not established that the mother’s interest created a change in circumstances that showed the continued residence of the child with the mother was contrary to the best interests of the child.

The decision did not discuss the particulars of the mother’s “interest,” nor indeed whether this interest of the mother developed after the January, 2011 order of then Family Court Judge Hope Schwartz Zimmerman that initially awarded the mother residential custody (Judge Zimmerman now serves as Supervising Judge of the Nassau County Supreme Court Matrimonial Parts).

The Second Department also noted that the father had presented evidence of an isolated accidental injury of the child while in the mother’s care. That, too, was an insufficient basis on which to change the custodial arrangement.

Accordingly, the Second Department held that Justice Palmieri’s was not supported by “a sound and substantial basis in the record.”

The mother was represented by Stephen W. Schlissel, Neil S. Cohen, Hillary S. Reinharz, of Schlissel Ostrow Karabatos, PLLC, of Garden City. The father was represented by Danielle J. Seid of the Law Office of Anthony A. Capetola, of Williston Park. James E. Flood, Jr., of Massapequa, served attorney for the child.

Focus.jpgUnder a 2004 stipulation of settlement that was incorporated, but survived the entry of the judgment of divorce that ended the parties seven-year marriage, the ex-husband/father was to pay $250,000.00 in annual maintenance and $140,000.00 in annual child support emancipated.

The stipulation further provided that the father would be able to apply for a reduction of his child support and spousal maintenance obligations in the event of an “involuntary, substantial, adverse change” in income. Moreover, if a downward modification were to be granted, the parties’ stipulation would be deemed amended to the extent of any relief afforded. The particular provision provided:

Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, in the event of an involuntary, substantial, adverse change in the Husband’s income, including income produced by his assets (such as involuntary loss of employment), he shall have the right to make application to a court of competent jurisdiction, which must include a sworn statement of net worth, for an appropriate modification of child-related support and/or spousal maintenance obligations hereunder, and if granted, the parties’ Agreement shall be deemed amended to the extent of any relief afforded on such application.

The September 10, 2012 decision of Westchester County Supreme Court Justice John P. Colangelo in Mark P. v. Teresa P., resolved such an application to reduce his support obligations. The father based his application on the reduction of his annual income from $3.3 million in 2004, when the stipulation was signed to $651,000.00 in 2011, and an anticipated $251,000.00 in 2012. The father, a securities trader, claimed that the reduction in his income was due to “changes in the securities industry, the economy and a general decline in securities’ sales volume . . . .”

The ex-wife/mother contended that the agreement’s support reduction paragraph should be read only to provide the threshold setting the father’s right to apply for a support reduction, but not necessarily to obtain such a reduction. The mother claimed that the provision did not alter the standards for granting a reduction in child support (a substantial unanticipated an unreasonable change in circumstances) or spousal maintenance (extreme hardship).

Justice Colangelo agreed with the mother, and denied relief to the father. Although the Court acknowledged that the parties had “sought” in their stipulation to provide a “less restrictive standard than that provided by prevailing law,” the Court held that the any easing of the standard was “more circumscribed” than the father argued. Justice Colangelo noted that “conspicuous by its absence is any standard to apply once the threshold to apply for reduction was met.” Thus, the Court would apply “well established principles of whether a reduction in amount is warranted.” The father failed to meet that standard.

Justice Colangelo discussed several decisions which honored agreement provisions that only lowered the threshold to apply for relief, but also held that meeting the threshold did not mandate a reduction.

Only by an explicit agreement . . . may the parties successfully substitute a different standard for support payment reduction from the well-worn standards established by statutory and case law.

Continue Reading Divorce Stipulations That Change Court Standards Must Be Precise

Palmieri.jpgResolving the rights and obligations of a couple incident to their divorce often involves the delicate balancing of property rights, spousal and child support, and custody and parenting issues. Attempting an orderly resolution in different forums simultaneously may be impossible.

The July 26, 2012 decision of Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Daniel Palmieri in Loike v. Kletenik, shows just how messy things can get. That decision resolved a husband’s application to vacate the award of a Jewish tribunal, a “Beth Din,” and to downwardly modify a Consent Order of support entered October 25, 2010 before Nassau County Family Court Support Magistrate Neil Miller. That order directed the husband to pay bi-weekly support for the three minor children of the marriage.

In the subsequently commenced Supreme Court divorce action, Justice Jeffrey S. Brown issued a pendente lite order that denied a request for temporary child support because the Consent Order was in place. This, Justice Palmieri opined, lent additional judicial force to the terms of the Consent Order and effectively adopted it in lieu of a separate order for temporary child support.

The wife thereafter moved to hold her husband in contempt for his failure to comply with the temporary support order.  However, that contempt motion was withdrawn on March 7, 2011 when the parties entered into a written agreement to arbitrate their financial and other issues before the Beth Din.

After the parties entered that agreement, the Family Court on June 7, 2011 issued a Final Order of Custody and Parenting Time (Stacey D. Bennett, FCJ). However, even though the parties had earlier entered their agreement to arbitrate, the Beth Din arbitrators were not empowered to make final and enforceable decisions about custody and visitation. New York’s public policy requires that such decisions only be made by the secular courts.

On that basis, Justice Palmieri vacated that portion of the Beth Din award that provided that unresolved disputes concerning the children would be referred to a named Rabbi.

A party gives up substantial rights under both substantive law and procedure when electing to arbitrate. Appellate review is all but completely absent.

Here, having participated in the Beth Din arbitration and failing to raise objections to the panel, the husband waived any claim that the process was tainted or was biased against him. Quoting the  of Appeals in Matter of Silverman (Benmore Coats), 61 N.Y.2d 299 (1984), Justice Palmieri held:

The only basis upon which an award can be vacated at the behest of a party who participated in the arbitration. . . Is that the rights of that party were prejudiced by corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award, partiality of an arbitrator, that the arbitrator exceeded his power or failed to make a final and definite award, or a procedural failure that was not waived.

The husband’s claims that the arbitrators exceeded their powers must rest on the fact that the award violated a strong public policy, was irrational, or clearly exceeded a specific limitation on the arbitrators’ powers.

Continue Reading Substantial Legal and Procedural Rights Are Lost in Divorce Arbitration Before Jewish Beth Din Panel

Mediation.jpgThe ex-husband brought this post-divorce civil action against his ex-wife and Alan L. Finkel, the attorney who mediated the spouses’ 2007 divorce settlement agreement, seeking to set aside that agreement.

In his July 12, 2012, decision in Valkavich v. Valkavich, Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice Ralph T. Gazzillo, granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The husband complained that the child support provisions did not comply with the Child Support Standards Act (C.S.S.A.), that it contained erroneous statements concerning his earnings at the time.

Justice Gazzillo found that the ex-husband had not demonstrated that the Stipulation of Settlement was unfair when made or that there was overreaching in its execution. The Court placed heavy emphasis on the waivers and disclaimers signed by the parties at the time of their mediation. It was clear from the agreement between the parties and the mediator, as well as the Stipulation of Settlement, that the parties were advised to seek guidance from an outside attorney, if they so chose. This was certainly sufficient opportunity for plaintiff to have had the proposed agreement reviewed by an attorney and to have been advised of any questions he had as to its terms. By the terms of the agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that he had the right to obtain counsel, that he knew and understood what he was signing, and that he entered into it freely and voluntarily.

Pertinent portions of the agreement between the parties and The Divorce Mediation Center stated:

At the end … of the first session, you will be asked to complete a financial disclosure package. However, you are free to waive this homework assignment, provided you both agree to do so. … We highly recommend that prior to signing the final agreement, each of you spend sufficient time in fully reviewing it (and bringing it to your attorney, accountant, guru,, parent, sibling, or other adviser or confidant) to be confident that it contains everything you need, and that the agreement is fair.

Continue Reading Mediated Divorce Settlement Agreement Upheld In Light Of Waiver of Financial Disclosure

Generations.jpgWhat are the support rights and obligations of a couple who have habitually lived often the generosity of their parents?

That was the question Monroe County Suprme Court Justice Richard A. Dollinger answered in his July 23, 2012 decision in G.R.P. v. L.B.P. when determining temporary support.

The divorcing couple have been married for 20 years and have 3 children. Throughout the marriage, they enjoyed a “substantial” lifestyle: a comfortable home, country club and health club memberships, annual vacations in resort communities including skiing in Colorado and winters in Florida.

However, that lifestyle always exceeded the couple’s earned income. The husband had been employed as a photographer in a business owned by his father, but the business stalled and was closed in the last 18 months. The husband claimed $8,470 in annual income as of July 2011. Although the husband held two undergraduate degrees, he never earned significant sums, with annual earnings in 2000-2009 approximating $35,000. The husband provided no evidence of his efforts to find employment, except a “meek statement” of trying to find work as a self-employed photographer.

In considering his obligation to support his family, this court declines to give any significant credence to the husband’s employment efforts. Again, the only reasonable conclusion is that the husband’s parents have financed most of, if not all, the family’s expenses for at least two years, if not significantly longer.

The wife, who also held an undergraduate degree, earned $25,000 annually from her employment.

Nonetheless, the husband in his statement of net worth listed expenses of $94,812 annually. The wife estimated expenses at more than $107,000 annually. Moreover, neither party’s budget included any expenses for the education of the oldest child, now attending college.

Continue Reading When Divorcing Parents Live Off Their Own Parents

Scheinkman photo 2.jpgFrom the “You Can’t Make This Stuff Up” Department:

During the course of this Westchester County divorce action, Elizabeth Perry “engaged in inappropriate litigation behavior.” She refused to comply with court orders to produce documents or to submit to an examination before trial, she secreted assets (including millions of dollars of cash assets), and she apparently illicitly acquired documents and computer files belonging to her husband, Jeffrey.

The July 17, 2012 decision of Supreme Court Justice Alan D. Scheinkman (pictured) in Perry v. Perry, resolved a motion prompted by the wife’s alleged transmission to the husband of an unsigned, haphazardly redacted and truncated letter from an undisclosed attorney writing to “confirm” an understanding with the wife and which recommended the filing of a civil RICO action against the husband in the United States District Court.  The document suggested that the litigation would be based on the husband’s failure to fully disclose his income and assets on his Statement of Net Worth.

Mr. Perry alleged that at the outset of the case, his wife’s first of 11 attorneys in this 19-month pending action made similar allegations. Although the husband attested to having provided tens of thousands of pages of documents, the wife refused to provide any.

It was also alleged that the wife had intercepted some nine boxes of files intended for the husband and hid them. Ms. Perry apparently orchestrated the hacking of her husband’s computer, including privileged matter. Mr. Perry alleged that in order to circumvent a restraint imposed by the Court, his wife put the housekeeper in a disguise and directed her to take a taxi to a storage unit in order to remove a suitcase full of jewelry. It was also claimed that Ms. Perry emptied a money market account of $5 million and removed valuable furniture, artwork and mirrors from the marital residence. Further, recent bank information indicated that of the approximately $11.5 million held in a particular Chase account of the wife in April 2012, there is only just over $1 million left.

On non-financial matters, the wife attempted to involve the police and commenced a now-dismissed family offense proceeding when her husband technically violated a driveway-pickup order when he entered the former marital residence in Scarsdale in order to convince his daughter to go with him on a planned vacation trip to Australia. As it happened, his wife’s absence from the home was also likely a violation of that portion of the order that required her to be inside the residence. While Ms. Perry’s effort to involve the police was not wholly successful (she did get Homeland Security officials to detain Mr. Perry and the children briefly upon return to this country), she obtained an ex parte Family Court temporary order of protection, which she used to derail the husband’s access to the children for a time.

Mr Perry also believed it was his wife, after Justice Scheinkman previously directed that Mr. Perry have custody of the children, who anonymously complained to Child Protective Services that the children were being held against their will at Mr. Perry’s residence. This claim was investigated and found to be unfounded.

Continue Reading Divorce Court Will Not Enjoin Wife From Commencing Federal RICO Action Against Husband

House on money flipped.jpgDealing with the appreciation in value during the marriage of a marital home owned by one spouse before the marriage has been, perhaps, the most troublesome area of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law. Inconsistencies in decisions abound. The entire area may have been turned on its head in 2010 by the Court of Appeals in Fields v. Fields (see prior blog), 15 N.Y.3d 158, 905 N.Y.S.2d 783.

In its July 12, 2012 decision in Biagiotti v. Biagiotti, the Third Department appears to have handled the issue conservatively, but logically.

The parties were married in September 2002. Their action was commenced in 2010. The husband owned the marital residence before the marriage. Title to the home was not changed during the marriage. It was conceded to be the husband’s separate property.

The wife, however, made a claim to share in the home’s increase in value over the course of the marriage. The Third Department noted that:

Appreciation in value of separate property can become marital property if the appreciation is due to the contributions or efforts of the nontitled spouse.

Although, the parties stipulated that the residence had increased in value by $105,500 between the date of the marriage and the date of commencement of the divorce action, they did not stipulate on what caused that appreciation.

The parties had spent $185,000 of marital funds during the marriage to improve the home. The renovations were paid for with marital funds. The trial evidence showed that defendant was more personally involved in the renovations than plaintiff.

According to an appraisal in the record, however, the improvements only accounted for approximately $11,000 of the increase in value. The appellate court considered the parties’ different levels of involvement, and that most of the appreciation was passive based on market forces rather than related to the improvements. As a result, the Third Department affirmed the award to the wife by Albany County Supreme Court Justice Joseph C. Teresi of 15% of the amount of the property’s appreciation.

Moreover, before the marriage the residence had been encumbered by a mortgage and a home equity line of credit. In 2003, shortly after the marriage, the husband refinanced the mortgage and paid off the existing line of credit by rolling them into a new mortgage. The mortgage payments were thereafter made from a checking account into which both parties deposited their paychecks. The amount of the refinanced mortgage was reduced by $24,028 during the marriage. The Third Departed noted:

If marital assets are used to reduce one party’s separate indebtedness, the other spouse can recoup his or her equitable share of the expended marital funds.

As it was payments from marital funds that reduced the husband’s indebtedness on his separate property, the wife was entitled to recoup $12,014, or half of the reduction of this separate debt.

On the other hand, after so refinancing the mortgage in 2003, the husband also took out a home equity line of credit. The parties agreed that the line of credit had been repeatedly borrowed against and used, according to the husband, to pay for home maintenance and repairs, vehicles, furniture and other living expenses.

As the evidence established that the line of credit was used for marital expenses and the wife’s evidence did not refute this, the appellate court held that Justice Teresi did not abuse his discretion by equally dividing this debt between the parties.

The wife was represented by Jennifer P. Rutkey, Esq., of Gordon, Tepper & Decorsey, LLP, of Glenville, NY. The husband was represented by Daniel D. Cunningham, Esq., of Rhoades, Cunningham & McFadden PLLC, of Latham, NY.

Islam symbol.jpgIt seems that every decision after trial rendered by Kings County Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine is a divorce law treatise. His July 4, 2012 decision in Mojdeh M. v. Jamshid A. is no exception.

In addition to issues of property division, spousal maintenance for the husband, child support, and insurance, Justice Sunshine also considered the husband’s refusal to provide his wife with an Islamic divorce.

The parties were born in Iran and married in the Islamic faith. After 11 years of marriage, with one child, the wife commenced this action for divorce in 2007. In 2008, the wife was granted a divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment after a grounds trial.

At the current trial before Justice Sunshine to determine the issues ancillary to the secular divorce, the wife testified that she had repeatedly asked her husband, both in person and by email, to accompany her to a mosque to obtain a religious divorce. The wife advised the Court that in accordance with the parties’ religious practices in the Islamic faith, the only way the parties can obtain a religious divorce is for he husband to accompany the wife to a mosque where “… there is a gentleman or lady that will read some part of the Koran that we are divorced. So it’s going to be transported to [her] birth certificate” thereby officially divorcing the parties.

The wife also testified that in the Islamic faith, until her birth certificate reflects her religious divorce, she will be unable to remarry. In addition, without a religious divorce, the wife testified that were she to travel to Iran, the husband could legally withhold his permission for her to leave Iran indefinitely. The wife asserted that she would have no remedy; a civil judgment of divorce would bear no impact in this situation.

Despite the wife’s efforts, the husband would not participate in this process. He simply stated “no comment. I have to talk to my lawyer.”

The wife requested that in consideration of the husband’s failure to provide the wife a religious divorce, the husband be barred from equitable distribution and maintenance. The husband contended that the issue of the religious divorce should have no impact on his award of maintenance or equitable distribution.

The Court held that the misuse of the unequal allocation of power between spouses to terminate a religious marriage can be taken into consideration when determining equitable distribution. Justice Sunshine noted that Domestic Relations Law §236[B][5][h] authorizes the court to consider the effects of a barrier to remarriage of one of the spouses when determining equitable distribution.

[The subdivision] was enacted … to codify and to prevent one spouse from using the requirement of voluntarily removing barriers to remarriage as financial leverage against the other spouse and conceding them to secure an agreement that barriers will be removed.

The section, added in 1992, codified the then seminal Supreme Court decision which characterized the husband’s refusal to give a “Get,” a Jewish divorce, as another “factor” to take into consideration when determining the distribution of assets between parties (Schwartz v. Schwartz, 153 Misc.2d 789, 583 N.Y.S.2d 716 [Kings Co. Supreme Ct. 1992 (Rigler, J.)]). In 1997, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision and held that the former husband forfeited any right to distributive awards due to his initial refusal to give his wife a Get (Schwartz v. Schwartz, 235 A.D.2d 468, 652 N.Y.S.2d 616 [2 Dept. 1997]).

D.R.L. §253[6] defines barrier to remarriage as including, without limitation, any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition, of which the party required to make the verified statement is aware, that is imposed on a party to a marriage, under the principles held by the clergyman or minister who has solemnized the marriage, by reason of the other party’s commission or withholding of any voluntary act.

Justice Sunshine credited the wife’s testimony that she had made arrangements for the parties to meet at a local mosque to address the religious divorce, but that the husband simply did not respond. The Court found that the husband had his own agenda.

This led Justice Sunshine to find that the husband’s refusal to give the wife a religious divorce was a basis for the Court to exercise its discretion under Domestic Relations Law 236[B][5][h] to disproportionately distribute marital assets. Justice Sunshine gave the husband 45 days from the date of this decision to take any necessary steps to remove any barriers to the wife’s remarriage. In the event that the husband failed to comply, the husband forfeited the (very limited) maintenance and equitable distribution awards which the Court also made in the decision.

Update: In a decision issued December 6, 2012, the Appellate Division, Third Department, disbarred Mr. Melendez for his failure to disclose to the Committee on Professional Standards his child support arrears and other related misconduct:

Respondent is guilty of very serious professional misconduct. He exhibited a lack of candor on his application for admission. As we recently stated, candor and the voluntary disclosure of negative information by an applicant are the cornerstones upon which is built the character and fitness investigation of an applicant for admission to the New York State bar.

Original July 17, 2012 entry:

Attorney drawing.jpgWilliam Eric Melendez was admitted to the practice of law in New York in 2009. Although he resides in Puerto Rico, he maintains an office for the practice of law in New York.

On January 26, 2011, the Superior Court of Puerto Rico issued an order finding Mr. Meledez had failed to make child support payments for over 36 months and was $90,897.84 in arrears.

In Matter of Melendez, the First Department suspended Mr. Melendez immediately, and until his arrears were paid.

New York Domestic Relations Law §244–c provides for the suspension of a professional license if the bearer of such license has arrears in child support obligations amounting to four months or more. Section 244-c(a) provides:

In any proceeding for enforcement of a direction or agreement, incorporated in a judgement or order, to pay any sum of money as child support or combined child and spousal support, if the court is satisfied by competent proof that the respondent has accumulated support arrears equivalent to or greater than the amount of support due pursuant to such judgment or order for a period of four months and that the respondent is licensed, permitted or registered by or with a board, department, authority or office of this state to conduct a trade, business, profession or occupation, the court may order such board, department, authority or office to commence proceedings as required by law regarding the suspension of such license, permit, registration, or authority to practice and to inform the court of the actions it has taken pursuant to such proceedings. . . .

Based on its findings of non-support, the Superior Court of Puerto Rico referred the matter to the Appellate Division. That court presides over attorney discipline. The First Department, in turn, referred the matter to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee. A Hearing Panel of that committee reported and recommended the suspension of Mr. Melendez.

Here, the procedural requirements under Judiciary Law §90(2-a)(b) were satisfied and respondent failed to appear and assert the only applicable defense, proof of full satisfaction of arrears. Under the circumstances, respondent’s immediate suspension is warranted.

The suspension will continue until the Court has been notified by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, or its designate support collection unit, that all child support arrears have been satisfied in full, and until further order of the Court.

The ruling is not unique. In Berger-Carniol v Carniol, 273 A.D.2d 427, 710 N.Y.S.2d 114, the Second Department in 2000 held that it was proper to direct the commencement of proceedings to suspend Mr. Carniol’s licenses to practice law and to act as a mortgage broker, mortgage banker, insurance broker, and real estate broker, based on evidence that he had accumulated support arrears equivalent to or greater than the amount of current support due for four months.

Attorney discipline may be imposed without resort to D.R.L. §244-c. Also in 2000, in Matter of Klagsbrun, 279 A.D.2d 192, 717 N.Y.S.2d 297, the Second Department disbarred an attorney who was found to have engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1–102(a)(5) (22 NYCRR 1200.3[a][5]). In 1995, the Supreme Court, New York County, had directed the Mr. Klagsbrun to make the following payments in a matrimonial action: (a) $1,812,758.75 to his former wife, Shulamith Klagsbrun, (b) $60,000 to Shulamith Klagsbrun, and (c) $296,075 to Elaine Rudnick Sheps, Esq. Although Mr. Klagsbrun had actual notice of the provisions of the order and judgment, he failed to comply with them.

Whether to suspend a license, absolutely or conditionally, may require balancing discipline with the need to continue the ability of the support provider to earn a living. Where that balance is struck may well reflect the good faith efforts of the support payor to partially comply with the support obligations. In all events, license suspension remains an extraordinarily powerful weapon available to enforce support.